03 — Architecture Reviews
Architecture reviews are one of the most important responsibilities of a Senior Security Consultant.
A security assessment typically examines whether existing controls are present and effective.
An architecture review goes deeper.
It asks:
Is the system designed securely in the first place?
A strong architecture review evaluates how users, applications, identities, networks, workloads, data, security services, and external dependencies interact.
The objective is to identify security weaknesses before they become incidents, vulnerabilities, or expensive redesign projects.
Module Mission
Section titled “Module Mission”Your mission is to develop a repeatable architecture review methodology that moves from:
Business Requirement ↓Architecture Understanding ↓Trust Boundaries ↓Data Flows ↓Identity Flows ↓Threat Scenarios ↓Security Controls ↓Design Weaknesses ↓Architecture Risk ↓Secure Design RecommendationsBy the end of this module, you should be able to look at an architecture diagram and ask:
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What are we protecting?
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Who can access it?
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Where are the trust boundaries?
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What happens if one component is compromised?
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Where could an attacker move next?
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Which controls prevent or detect that movement?
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What design changes would reduce the risk?
1. What Is a Security Architecture Review?
Section titled “1. What Is a Security Architecture Review?”A security architecture review is a structured evaluation of a proposed or existing technology design to determine whether security has been appropriately built into the architecture.
Architecture reviews may evaluate:
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Applications
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Cloud platforms
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Enterprise networks
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APIs
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Identity systems
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Kubernetes platforms
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SaaS integrations
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Data platforms
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DevOps pipelines
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Hybrid environments
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Zero Trust architectures
The review focuses on the design relationships between components, not just individual configurations.
2. Architecture Review vs Security Assessment
Section titled “2. Architecture Review vs Security Assessment”These activities overlap but have different emphasis.
| Security Assessment | Architecture Review |
|---|---|
| Evaluates existing controls | Evaluates system design |
| Often configuration-focused | Relationship and flow-focused |
| Looks for implementation gaps | Looks for design weaknesses |
| Frequently evidence-driven | Diagram and threat-model driven |
| May assess operational effectiveness | Often occurs before implementation |
| Identifies control deficiencies | Identifies architectural risk |
For example:
A security assessment might identify:
Security groups allow overly broad inbound access.
An architecture review may identify:
The application architecture places management interfaces in an internet-accessible network tier, creating unnecessary external exposure.
The second issue exists at the design level.
3. When Architecture Reviews Are Performed
Section titled “3. When Architecture Reviews Are Performed”Architecture reviews may occur during:
New Projects
Section titled “New Projects”Before a new system is deployed.
Cloud Migration
Section titled “Cloud Migration”Before workloads move into AWS, Azure, or Google Cloud.
Major Architecture Changes
Section titled “Major Architecture Changes”Examples:
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New API
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New identity provider
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Kubernetes adoption
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Network redesign
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SaaS integration
Production Readiness
Section titled “Production Readiness”Before production go-live.
Security Transformation
Section titled “Security Transformation”During Zero Trust, cloud security, or enterprise architecture programmes.
Post-Incident Improvement
Section titled “Post-Incident Improvement”When architecture contributed to a security incident.
The earlier security is introduced into the architecture process, the cheaper problems are to fix.
4. Understand the Business Requirement First
Section titled “4. Understand the Business Requirement First”Never review an architecture without understanding its purpose.
Ask:
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What business capability does this system provide?
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Who will use it?
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How critical is it?
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What information does it process?
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What availability is required?
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What regulations apply?
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What would happen if it were compromised?
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What dependencies exist?
Consider two architectures that are technically identical.
One hosts:
A public marketing website.
The other hosts:
A payment processing system.
The required security controls may be significantly different.
5. Start With the Architecture Context
Section titled “5. Start With the Architecture Context”Your first objective is to understand the system at a high level.
A useful conceptual view is:
Users ↓Access Channels ↓Identity ↓Applications ↓Services / APIs ↓Infrastructure ↓Data ↓Security & MonitoringYou should be able to explain the architecture in simple language before reviewing its security.
If you cannot explain how the system works, you are not ready to assess it.
6. Collect Architecture Documentation
Section titled “6. Collect Architecture Documentation”Useful artefacts include:
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High-level design
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Low-level design
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Network diagrams
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Cloud architecture diagrams
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Data flow diagrams
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Sequence diagrams
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Identity flows
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API diagrams
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Deployment diagrams
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Security design documents
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Threat models
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Data classification documentation
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Integration documentation
Do not assume the diagram is current.
Always validate important architecture details with the relevant teams.
7. Validate the Diagram Against Reality
Section titled “7. Validate the Diagram Against Reality”Architecture diagrams frequently represent the intended design rather than the deployed design.
Ask:
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Is this the current production architecture?
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Are any components missing?
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Are external integrations shown?
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Are management paths included?
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Are third-party services included?
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Are data flows complete?
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Are trust boundaries visible?
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Are disaster recovery environments included?
A beautiful diagram is not evidence that the environment actually operates that way.
8. Identify Architecture Components
Section titled “8. Identify Architecture Components”Break the system into components.
For example:
Internet ↓CDN ↓Web Application Firewall ↓Load Balancer ↓Web Tier ↓Application Tier ↓DatabaseThen identify supporting components:
Identity ProviderSecrets ManagerLogging PlatformMonitoringBackupAdministrationCI/CDDNSKey ManagementThis creates the architecture inventory.
9. Identify Trust Boundaries
Section titled “9. Identify Trust Boundaries”A trust boundary exists whenever data or control crosses between environments with different trust assumptions.
Examples:
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Internet → application
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User device → corporate environment
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Application → database
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On-premises → cloud
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AWS account → another AWS account
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Kubernetes workload → cloud API
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SaaS → enterprise network
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Development → production
Represent trust boundaries clearly:
Untrusted Internet │======== Trust Boundary ======== │Public Application Tier │======== Trust Boundary ======== │Internal Application Tier │======== Trust Boundary ======== │Sensitive Data TierEvery boundary should make you ask:
What prevents unauthorised crossing of this boundary?
10. Identify Data Flows
Section titled “10. Identify Data Flows”Security architecture reviews should understand how information moves.
For every important flow, determine:
Source ↓Destination ↓Protocol ↓Authentication ↓Authorisation ↓Encryption ↓LoggingExample:
Mobile App ↓ HTTPSAPI Gateway ↓Application Service ↓ TLSDatabaseThen ask:
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Is transport encrypted?
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How is authentication performed?
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Is authorisation checked?
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Can data be intercepted?
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Can requests be replayed?
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Is the flow logged?
11. Follow Sensitive Data
Section titled “11. Follow Sensitive Data”Pick critical data and trace its journey.
Collection ↓Transmission ↓Processing ↓Storage ↓Access ↓Backup ↓Archival ↓DeletionFor each stage, evaluate:
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Confidentiality
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Integrity
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Availability
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Access control
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Encryption
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Monitoring
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Retention
This is especially important for:
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Customer data
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Payment data
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Credentials
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Health information
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Intellectual property
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Authentication tokens
12. Identify Identity Flows
Section titled “12. Identify Identity Flows”Identity should be reviewed as an architectural component.
Understand:
User ↓Identity Provider ↓Authentication ↓Token / Session ↓Application ↓Authorisation ↓ResourceAsk:
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Where is authentication performed?
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Which identity provider is authoritative?
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Is MFA enforced?
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How are tokens validated?
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Where are sessions stored?
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How is authorisation enforced?
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How are privileged identities handled?
13. Human vs Workload Identity
Section titled “13. Human vs Workload Identity”Modern architecture includes both.
Human Identities
Section titled “Human Identities”Examples:
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Employees
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Administrators
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Customers
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Contractors
Workload Identities
Section titled “Workload Identities”Examples:
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Applications
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APIs
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Lambda functions
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Virtual machines
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Kubernetes service accounts
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CI/CD pipelines
Workload identity is frequently overlooked.
Ask:
How does one service authenticate to another?
Avoid architectures based on:
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Embedded credentials
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Shared secrets
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Long-lived access keys
Prefer managed identity mechanisms where possible.
14. Identify Privileged Paths
Section titled “14. Identify Privileged Paths”Map how administrators access critical systems.
Example:
Administrator ↓Identity Provider ↓MFA ↓Privileged Access Management ↓Management Network ↓Production SystemsQuestions include:
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Is privileged access separate from normal access?
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Is MFA enforced?
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Is elevation temporary?
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Are sessions logged?
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Are administrative interfaces exposed publicly?
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Are privileged credentials centrally managed?
Privileged access architecture deserves special scrutiny.
15. Understand Network Zones
Section titled “15. Understand Network Zones”Map logical security zones.
Example:
Internet ↓DMZ / Edge ↓Application Zone ↓Service Zone ↓Data Zone ↓Management ZoneThen assess:
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Which flows are required?
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Which flows are allowed?
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Are zones actually enforced?
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Can compromised workloads move laterally?
Segmentation should reflect risk and trust.
16. Assess Internet Exposure
Section titled “16. Assess Internet Exposure”Identify every internet-facing component.
Examples:
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Web applications
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APIs
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Load balancers
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VPN gateways
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Administrative portals
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Storage endpoints
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Remote access services
For each, ask:
Does it need to be public? ↓How is it protected? ↓How is access authenticated? ↓How is abuse detected? ↓What happens if compromised?Reducing unnecessary exposure is one of the simplest architectural risk reductions.
17. Assess East-West Traffic
Section titled “17. Assess East-West Traffic”Security teams often focus heavily on north-south traffic:
Internet ↔ EnterpriseBut attackers frequently move laterally:
Application ↓Internal Service ↓Database ↓Management SystemAsk:
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Can application servers communicate with everything?
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Are workloads segmented?
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Are service-to-service flows controlled?
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Is internal traffic monitored?
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Are sensitive systems isolated?
Do not automatically trust internal traffic.
18. Review Security Control Placement
Section titled “18. Review Security Control Placement”Security controls must be placed where they can actually reduce risk.
For example:
Internet ↓WAF ↓Load Balancer ↓Applicationis useful for certain web threats.
But a WAF does not solve:
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Privilege escalation
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Weak IAM
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Database over-permission
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Compromised credentials
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Internal lateral movement
Architecture reviews should identify whether controls match the threat they are intended to mitigate.
19. Review Identity Architecture
Section titled “19. Review Identity Architecture”Assess:
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Central identity provider
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Federation
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MFA
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Conditional access
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Privileged identity
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Service identities
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Role design
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Access lifecycle
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External identities
Look for issues such as:
Multiple Identity Stores ↓Inconsistent Authentication ↓Weak Access Governance ↓Increased Account RiskSimplifying and centralising identity frequently improves security.
20. Review Network Architecture
Section titled “20. Review Network Architecture”Evaluate:
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Segmentation
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Routing
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Firewalls
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Private connectivity
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VPN
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Remote access
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Egress filtering
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DNS
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Management networks
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Network monitoring
Ask:
If one workload is compromised, how far can the attacker move?
This is one of the best architecture review questions.
21. Review Application Architecture
Section titled “21. Review Application Architecture”Understand:
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Frontend
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Backend
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APIs
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Authentication
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Sessions
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Secrets
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Databases
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External integrations
Consider:
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Authentication boundaries
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Authorisation enforcement
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Input validation
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Service trust
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API exposure
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Secrets usage
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Error handling
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Logging
Application architecture and infrastructure architecture cannot be reviewed independently.
22. Review API Architecture
Section titled “22. Review API Architecture”APIs frequently connect trusted and untrusted systems.
Review:
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Authentication
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Authorisation
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Rate limiting
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Schema validation
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Input validation
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Encryption
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Token handling
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Logging
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API inventory
Ask:
Can one authenticated user access another user’s data?
That is an architecture question as much as an application question.
23. Review Data Architecture
Section titled “23. Review Data Architecture”Understand:
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Where data originates
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Where it is stored
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How it moves
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Who can access it
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How long it remains
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Where copies exist
Review:
Classification ↓Storage ↓Encryption ↓Access ↓Monitoring ↓Backup ↓RetentionData architecture often reveals risks hidden by infrastructure diagrams.
24. Review Encryption Architecture
Section titled “24. Review Encryption Architecture”Do not stop at:
Encryption enabled.
Ask:
In Transit
Section titled “In Transit”-
Which protocols?
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TLS version?
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Internal traffic encrypted?
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Certificate management?
At Rest
Section titled “At Rest”-
Which data stores?
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Which keys?
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Who manages the keys?
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How are keys rotated?
Key Management
Section titled “Key Management”-
Are keys separated from encrypted data?
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Who can administer them?
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Are key operations logged?
Encryption is a system, not a checkbox.
25. Review Secrets Management
Section titled “25. Review Secrets Management”Identify how systems store:
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Passwords
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API keys
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Tokens
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Certificates
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Database credentials
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Encryption secrets
High-risk architecture:
Application ↓Configuration File ↓Static Database PasswordBetter:
Application Identity ↓Secrets Manager ↓Short-Lived Secret ↓DatabasePrefer architectures that minimise long-lived secrets.
26. Review Cloud Architecture
Section titled “26. Review Cloud Architecture”Cloud architecture reviews should examine:
Account Structure
Section titled “Account Structure”Are environments appropriately separated?
Identity
Section titled “Identity”Are roles and federation used?
Network
Section titled “Network”Is exposure controlled?
Workloads
Section titled “Workloads”Are workloads isolated and hardened?
Is sensitive storage protected?
Logging
Section titled “Logging”Are audit logs centralised?
Governance
Section titled “Governance”Are guardrails centrally enforced?
27. Review Multi-Account / Subscription Design
Section titled “27. Review Multi-Account / Subscription Design”Modern cloud architecture should usually separate important workloads.
Example:
Cloud Organisation│├── Security├── Logging├── Shared Services├── Production├── Development└── SandboxBenefits include:
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Reduced blast radius
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Separation of duties
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Central governance
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Better logging isolation
Ask whether account boundaries actually support the security model.
28. Review Kubernetes Architecture
Section titled “28. Review Kubernetes Architecture”For Kubernetes environments, understand:
Users ↓API Server ↓RBAC ↓Namespaces ↓Workloads ↓Services ↓Cloud ResourcesReview:
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Control plane access
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RBAC
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Namespace segmentation
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NetworkPolicy
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Secrets
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Workload identities
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Admission control
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Container registries
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Audit logging
Kubernetes introduces its own trust relationships.
29. Review SaaS Architecture
Section titled “29. Review SaaS Architecture”SaaS can introduce significant security dependencies.
Assess:
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SSO
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MFA
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Administrator access
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Data integration
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API tokens
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Third-party applications
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Logging
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Data export
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Offboarding
Ask:
What happens to enterprise security if this SaaS platform is compromised?
30. Review Third-Party Integrations
Section titled “30. Review Third-Party Integrations”Third-party integrations often introduce:
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API keys
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OAuth permissions
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Data sharing
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Network connectivity
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External dependencies
Map:
Internal System ↓Integration ↓Third Party ↓Data / PrivilegesEvaluate:
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What access is granted?
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Is it least privilege?
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Can it be revoked?
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Is activity monitored?
31. Review Administrative Architecture
Section titled “31. Review Administrative Architecture”Administrative interfaces should usually have stronger controls than standard user interfaces.
Review:
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Management portals
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Bastion hosts
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Jump servers
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Cloud consoles
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Kubernetes administration
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Database administration
Consider:
Admin Device ↓Strong Authentication ↓Privileged Access ↓Restricted Management Path ↓Target SystemAvoid direct public administrative access wherever practical.
32. Review Logging Architecture
Section titled “32. Review Logging Architecture”Security visibility should be designed into the architecture.
Map:
Application LogsCloud LogsIdentity LogsNetwork LogsSecurity Tool Logs ↓Central Collection ↓Security Analytics ↓Detection ↓Incident ResponseAsk:
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What logs exist?
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Where do they go?
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Can attackers modify them?
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How long are they retained?
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Who monitors them?
33. Review Detection Architecture
Section titled “33. Review Detection Architecture”Do not assume log collection equals detection capability.
Determine:
Threat Scenario ↓Telemetry ↓Detection Rule ↓Alert ↓Investigation ↓ResponseFor important threat scenarios, every stage should be considered.
34. Review Backup & Recovery Architecture
Section titled “34. Review Backup & Recovery Architecture”Security architecture includes resilience.
Understand:
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What is backed up?
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Where backups are stored?
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Whether backups are immutable
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Who can delete backups?
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Recovery procedures
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Recovery testing
Ask:
If a privileged attacker compromised production, could they also destroy the backups?
Backup security is frequently overlooked.
35. Review Availability Architecture
Section titled “35. Review Availability Architecture”Evaluate:
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Single points of failure
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Load balancing
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Redundancy
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Availability zones
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Regions
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Dependency resilience
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Capacity
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DDoS protection
Availability is part of security.
36. Identify Single Points of Security Failure
Section titled “36. Identify Single Points of Security Failure”A component may create excessive security dependency.
Example:
All Systems ↓Single Identity ProviderIf that identity provider fails or is compromised, impact could be enterprise-wide.
Identify:
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Single authentication paths
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Central secrets stores
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Logging dependencies
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Key management dependencies
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Network chokepoints
Then assess resilience.
37. Threat Model the Architecture
Section titled “37. Threat Model the Architecture”Threat modelling helps systematically identify attack scenarios.
One commonly used model is STRIDE:
S — Spoofing
Section titled “S — Spoofing”Can an attacker impersonate a user or service?
T — Tampering
Section titled “T — Tampering”Can data or configurations be modified?
R — Repudiation
Section titled “R — Repudiation”Can actions occur without reliable audit evidence?
I — Information Disclosure
Section titled “I — Information Disclosure”Can sensitive information be exposed?
D — Denial of Service
Section titled “D — Denial of Service”Can service availability be disrupted?
E — Elevation of Privilege
Section titled “E — Elevation of Privilege”Can users or workloads gain excessive privileges?
Use STRIDE as a thinking framework, not a mechanical checklist.
38. Build Attack Paths
Section titled “38. Build Attack Paths”Architecture becomes easier to evaluate when converted into potential attack paths.
Example:
Internet ↓Vulnerable Application ↓Compromised Workload ↓Over-Privileged IAM Role ↓Object Storage ↓Sensitive DataNow ask:
Which control breaks this chain?
Possible controls:
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WAF
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Application hardening
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Workload isolation
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Least privilege IAM
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Data access controls
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Monitoring
The strongest architectures create multiple barriers.
39. Think in Blast Radius
Section titled “39. Think in Blast Radius”Ask:
What can an attacker reach after compromising this component?
Example:
Compromised CI/CD Pipeline ↓Production Credentials ↓Cloud Environment ↓Application Deployment ↓Customer DataThe issue may not be simply:
CI/CD security weakness.
The architectural problem may be:
CI/CD compromise provides unrestricted production control.
Blast-radius thinking is essential for senior reviews.
40. Identify Transitive Trust
Section titled “40. Identify Transitive Trust”Transitive trust occurs when access to one system indirectly provides access to another.
Example:
Developer ↓CI/CD Platform ↓Deployment Role ↓Production EnvironmentThe developer may not technically have production access.
But if they control the pipeline, they may effectively have production influence.
Architecture reviews must identify these indirect access paths.
41. Challenge “Internal = Trusted”
Section titled “41. Challenge “Internal = Trusted””Traditional architectures often assume:
Outside = UntrustedInside = TrustedModern architecture should increasingly assume:
Trust must be continuously validated.
Review:
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Identity
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Device posture
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Workload identity
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Resource sensitivity
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Context
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Session risk
Network location alone should not provide broad trust.
42. Apply Least Privilege
Section titled “42. Apply Least Privilege”Least privilege applies beyond user permissions.
Consider:
What can they access?
Applications
Section titled “Applications”What resources can they access?
Networks
Section titled “Networks”Where can they communicate?
Which operations can they perform?
What environments can they modify?
Least privilege should be architectural.
43. Apply Separation of Duties
Section titled “43. Apply Separation of Duties”Avoid architectures where one identity or team controls everything.
Example:
Developer ↓Write Code ↓Approve Code ↓Deploy Production ↓Modify Security ControlsThis creates excessive privilege concentration.
Consider separation between:
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Development
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Approval
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Deployment
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Administration
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Security monitoring
44. Apply Defence in Depth
Section titled “44. Apply Defence in Depth”Avoid relying on one security control.
Example:
Internet ↓WAF ↓Authentication ↓Authorisation ↓Workload Isolation ↓Least Privilege ↓Data Access Control ↓MonitoringIf one layer fails, another should reduce the impact.
45. Apply Secure Defaults
Section titled “45. Apply Secure Defaults”Architecture should be secure by default.
Examples:
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Private by default
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Deny access unless explicitly required
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Encryption enabled
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Logging enabled
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MFA required
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No public administration
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Minimal privileges
Avoid architectures where every project team must remember to manually enable security.
46. Prefer Preventive Guardrails
Section titled “46. Prefer Preventive Guardrails”Manual review does not scale well.
Instead of:
Engineers should remember not to create public storage.
Prefer:
Policy Guardrail ↓Public Storage Deployment BlockedExamples include:
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Cloud organisation policies
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Azure Policy
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AWS SCPs
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Kubernetes admission policies
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Infrastructure-as-Code policies
Architecture should make insecure outcomes difficult.
47. Design for Detection
Section titled “47. Design for Detection”Assume preventive controls may fail.
Ask:
If this security boundary is crossed, how would we know?
For critical paths, ensure:
Security Event ↓Telemetry ↓Central Logging ↓Detection ↓Alert ↓ResponseDetection capability should be an architectural requirement.
48. Design for Incident Response
Section titled “48. Design for Incident Response”Architecture should support containment.
Examples:
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Ability to disable identities
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Ability to isolate workloads
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Ability to revoke tokens
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Ability to block traffic
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Central logs
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Forensic evidence
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Secure backups
Ask:
If compromise occurs, can the security team contain it quickly?
49. Identify Architecture Anti-Patterns
Section titled “49. Identify Architecture Anti-Patterns”Watch for patterns such as:
Flat Networks
Section titled “Flat Networks”Everything can communicate with everything.
Shared Administrator Accounts
Section titled “Shared Administrator Accounts”Poor accountability and excessive access.
Hardcoded Secrets
Section titled “Hardcoded Secrets”Long-lived credentials embedded in systems.
Public Management Interfaces
Section titled “Public Management Interfaces”Unnecessary attack surface.
Shared Production and Development
Section titled “Shared Production and Development”Weak isolation.
Single Security Boundary
Section titled “Single Security Boundary”One failed control exposes everything.
Decentralised Logging
Section titled “Decentralised Logging”Incomplete visibility.
Over-Privileged Workloads
Section titled “Over-Privileged Workloads”Compromise creates large blast radius.
50. Finding Architecture Risks
Section titled “50. Finding Architecture Risks”An architecture finding should clearly describe the design issue.
Example:
Finding
Section titled “Finding”Production Management Interfaces Are Exposed to the Internet
Observation
Section titled “Observation”Administrative interfaces for production services are directly accessible from the public internet.
Architecture Risk
Section titled “Architecture Risk”Public management exposure increases the attack surface for privileged administrative systems.
Attack Scenario
Section titled “Attack Scenario”Internet ↓Management Interface ↓Credential Attack ↓Administrative Access ↓Production EnvironmentRecommendation
Section titled “Recommendation”Restrict administrative access through controlled management paths using strong authentication, privileged access controls, and network restrictions.
51. Document Architecture Decisions
Section titled “51. Document Architecture Decisions”Not every design decision will be ideal.
Sometimes the business intentionally accepts a trade-off.
Record:
Architecture Decision ↓Security Concern ↓Alternatives Considered ↓Business Constraint ↓Risk DecisionThis prevents the same discussion from repeating later.
52. Use Architecture Decision Records
Section titled “52. Use Architecture Decision Records”A simple Architecture Decision Record can contain:
Decision ID
Context
Decision
Security Impact
Alternatives
Risk
Mitigation
Decision OwnerThis creates useful governance around important design choices.
53. Prioritise Architecture Findings
Section titled “53. Prioritise Architecture Findings”Not every design weakness requires immediate redesign.
Consider:
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Exposure
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Asset criticality
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Attack path
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Blast radius
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Existing controls
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Likelihood
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Business impact
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Cost of redesign
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Planned lifecycle
Prioritise according to meaningful security risk.
54. Recommend Design Improvements
Section titled “54. Recommend Design Improvements”Architecture recommendations should describe the target direction.
Instead of:
Improve network security.
Use:
Separate internet-facing, application, data, and management workloads into controlled network zones and restrict inter-zone communication to explicitly required flows.
Instead of:
Improve IAM.
Use:
Replace static application credentials with workload identities and restrict permissions to application-specific resources.
55. Distinguish Tactical and Strategic Recommendations
Section titled “55. Distinguish Tactical and Strategic Recommendations”Tactical
Section titled “Tactical”Can reduce immediate risk.
Examples:
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Restrict an exposed interface
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Reduce IAM permissions
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Enable logging
Strategic
Section titled “Strategic”Improves underlying architecture.
Examples:
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Introduce central identity architecture
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Redesign network segmentation
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Establish multi-account cloud architecture
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Build enterprise secrets management
Both are useful.
56. Architecture Review Deliverables
Section titled “56. Architecture Review Deliverables”Typical deliverables may include:
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Architecture review report
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Security risk register
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Annotated architecture diagram
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Threat model
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Attack path diagrams
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Security requirements
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Architecture recommendations
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Design decision records
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Remediation roadmap
The exact deliverables depend on the engagement.
57. Annotate Architecture Diagrams
Section titled “57. Annotate Architecture Diagrams”One of the most useful consultant techniques is adding security annotations directly to diagrams.
Example:
Internet ↓[1] Public API ↓Application ↓[2] Broad IAM Role ↓DatabaseThen document:
[1] API lacks adequate edge protection.
[2] Application identity has excessive database permissions.This makes architecture findings easier to understand.
58. Build a Security Architecture Checklist
Section titled “58. Build a Security Architecture Checklist”Your review checklist should include:
[ ] Business context understood[ ] Critical assets identified[ ] Sensitive data identified[ ] Architecture diagram validated[ ] Trust boundaries identified[ ] Data flows mapped[ ] Identity flows mapped[ ] Privileged paths mapped[ ] Internet exposure reviewed[ ] Network segmentation reviewed[ ] Application security reviewed[ ] API architecture reviewed[ ] Cloud architecture reviewed[ ] Workload identity reviewed[ ] Secrets management reviewed[ ] Encryption reviewed[ ] Logging architecture reviewed[ ] Detection capability reviewed[ ] Backup and recovery reviewed[ ] Third-party integrations reviewed[ ] Attack paths identified[ ] Blast radius evaluated[ ] Findings documented[ ] Recommendations prioritised59. Practical Architecture Review Scenario
Section titled “59. Practical Architecture Review Scenario”Imagine you are reviewing this architecture:
Internet ↓Public Load Balancer ↓Web Application ↓Application Server ↓Database
Application Server ↓Cloud Storage
Developers ↓CI/CD ↓ProductionYou discover:
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Application servers use a highly privileged cloud role
-
Database accepts connections from the entire application network
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CI/CD has permanent production administrator privileges
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Developers can modify production deployment pipelines
-
Security logs are stored only in the production account
Do not treat these as isolated issues.
60. Step 1 — Identify Attack Paths
Section titled “60. Step 1 — Identify Attack Paths”Example:
Internet ↓Application Compromise ↓Application Role ↓Cloud Administrator Access ↓Sensitive StorageAnother:
Developer Account ↓CI/CD Modification ↓Production Deployment ↓Production Compromise61. Step 2 — Evaluate Blast Radius
Section titled “61. Step 2 — Evaluate Blast Radius”Ask:
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Can application compromise reach the database?
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Can it access all cloud storage?
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Can CI/CD modify security controls?
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Can attackers delete logs?
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Can attackers access backup systems?
The architecture may contain a systemic privilege problem.
62. Step 3 — Identify Root Cause
Section titled “62. Step 3 — Identify Root Cause”Possible root causes:
Broad Trust +Excessive Privilege +Weak Environment Separation +Insufficient Logging IsolationRather than producing only five individual findings, identify the larger architectural weaknesses.
63. Step 4 — Design the Target Architecture
Section titled “63. Step 4 — Design the Target Architecture”You might recommend:
Internet ↓WAF ↓Load Balancer ↓Web Tier ↓Restricted Application Tier ↓Restricted Database TierWith:
Application ↓Dedicated Workload Identity ↓Least-Privilege PermissionsAnd:
Production Logs ↓Independent Security AccountAnd:
Developer ↓Controlled CI/CD ↓Approval ↓Temporary Deployment Role ↓ProductionThe recommendation addresses architecture, not merely configuration.
64. Architecture Review Questions for Senior Consultants
Section titled “64. Architecture Review Questions for Senior Consultants”Develop the habit of asking:
Business
Section titled “Business”What are we trying to protect?
Identity
Section titled “Identity”Who or what can access this?
Why do we trust this component?
Network
Section titled “Network”What can communicate with what?
Privilege
Section titled “Privilege”What happens if this identity is compromised?
Where does sensitive information travel?
Exposure
Section titled “Exposure”Does this need to be reachable?
Monitoring
Section titled “Monitoring”How would we detect abuse?
Resilience
Section titled “Resilience”What happens if this component fails?
Response
Section titled “Response”How would we contain compromise?
These questions apply to almost any architecture.
65. Consultant Technique — Assume One Component Is Compromised
Section titled “65. Consultant Technique — Assume One Component Is Compromised”Pick a component and assume the attacker owns it.
For example:
Assume the application server has been compromised.
Then ask:
What credentials are available? ↓What network access exists? ↓What APIs can be called? ↓What data can be accessed? ↓What systems can be reached? ↓What logs are generated?Repeat for important components.
This quickly exposes architectural weaknesses.
66. Consultant Technique — Remove One Security Control
Section titled “66. Consultant Technique — Remove One Security Control”Ask:
If this security control fails, what happens next?
Example:
If MFA fails:
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Does device trust still protect access?
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Is privileged elevation required?
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Is anomalous activity detected?
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Is administrative access restricted?
Resilient architectures do not collapse when one security layer fails.
67. Consultant Technique — Follow the Administrator
Section titled “67. Consultant Technique — Follow the Administrator”Trace the administrator path:
Device ↓Authentication ↓PAM ↓Management Network ↓Target ↓Audit LogsAny weak stage may undermine the entire administrative security model.
68. Consultant Technique — Follow the Application Identity
Section titled “68. Consultant Technique — Follow the Application Identity”Trace:
Workload ↓Identity ↓Permissions ↓Resources ↓Downstream ServicesAsk:
If this application is compromised, what can its identity do?
This question is extremely important in cloud architecture.
69. Consultant Technique — Follow the Deployment Pipeline
Section titled “69. Consultant Technique — Follow the Deployment Pipeline”Trace:
Developer ↓Source Control ↓Build ↓Artifact ↓Deployment ↓ProductionReview:
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Source control access
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Branch protection
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Build isolation
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Secrets
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Artifact integrity
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Deployment permissions
Modern software supply chains are part of security architecture.
70. Common Architecture Review Mistakes
Section titled “70. Common Architecture Review Mistakes”Avoid:
Reviewing Only the Diagram
Section titled “Reviewing Only the Diagram”Validate the real environment.
Reviewing Individual Components Only
Section titled “Reviewing Individual Components Only”Security weaknesses often exist between components.
Focusing Only on Network Security
Section titled “Focusing Only on Network Security”Identity and application trust are equally important.
Assuming Internal Systems Are Trusted
Section titled “Assuming Internal Systems Are Trusted”Compromise happens internally too.
Ignoring Administrative Paths
Section titled “Ignoring Administrative Paths”Management access is often the highest-risk path.
Ignoring CI/CD
Section titled “Ignoring CI/CD”Deployment systems frequently have production-level power.
Ignoring Workload Identity
Section titled “Ignoring Workload Identity”Applications may have more privilege than users.
Generic Recommendations
Section titled “Generic Recommendations”Provide specific design direction.
71. Build Your Architecture Review Toolkit
Section titled “71. Build Your Architecture Review Toolkit”Add:
Architecture Review Toolkit│├── Architecture Discovery Questionnaire├── Architecture Review Checklist├── Trust Boundary Template├── Data Flow Template├── Identity Flow Template├── Threat Model Template├── Attack Path Template├── Architecture Risk Register├── Security Requirement Template├── Architecture Decision Record├── Architecture Finding Template└── Target Architecture RecommendationThese will become reusable assets for consulting engagements.
72. Architecture Review Outcome
Section titled “72. Architecture Review Outcome”At the end of a strong architecture review, the client should understand:
Current Architecture
Section titled “Current Architecture”How the system is designed.
Critical Trust Relationships
Section titled “Critical Trust Relationships”Which components depend on each other.
Security Risks
Section titled “Security Risks”Where architecture creates unacceptable exposure.
Attack Paths
Section titled “Attack Paths”How compromise could propagate.
Priority Changes
Section titled “Priority Changes”Which design improvements matter most.
Target Direction
Section titled “Target Direction”How the architecture should evolve.
That is the value of a security architecture review.
Key Takeaways
Section titled “Key Takeaways”A Senior Security Consultant reviewing architecture should:
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Understand the business requirement first
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Validate architecture documentation
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Identify assets and components
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Identify trust boundaries
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Map data flows
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Map identity flows
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Review privileged access paths
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Evaluate network segmentation
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Assess cloud and workload identities
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Review application and API architecture
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Review sensitive data paths
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Evaluate secrets and encryption
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Review third-party integrations
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Assess logging and detection
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Consider resilience and recovery
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Build realistic attack paths
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Evaluate blast radius
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Identify transitive trust
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Challenge unnecessary trust
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Recommend architecture-level improvements
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Document important design decisions
The architecture review workflow is:
Understand ↓Map ↓Identify Trust ↓Threat Model ↓Build Attack Paths ↓Assess Controls ↓Evaluate Blast Radius ↓Identify Risk ↓RedesignA mature architecture review does not ask only:
“Is this component secure?”
It asks:
“If this component fails, what can happen next?”
That is the mindset expected from a Senior Security Consultant.
What’s Next?
Section titled “What’s Next?”➡️ 04 — Cloud Security Reviews
Now that you can evaluate architecture and identify design-level security weaknesses, the next module applies those capabilities specifically to modern cloud environments.
You will learn how to conduct structured security reviews across AWS, Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud, Kubernetes, and multi-cloud environments, focusing on governance, identity, network security, workloads, data protection, logging, detection, resilience, and cloud attack paths.
The goal is to move from:
“I understand cloud security controls.”
to:
“I can independently review an enterprise cloud environment, identify architectural and configuration risk, and provide a practical cloud security improvement roadmap.”