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Shared Responsibility Model (Attacker Perspective)

By the end of this lesson, you will be able to:

  • Understand the Shared Responsibility Model from an attacker’s perspective.
  • Identify which cloud components attackers commonly target.
  • Learn why attackers rarely target cloud providers directly.
  • Recognise common customer-side security weaknesses.
  • Apply this knowledge during enterprise cloud penetration testing engagements.

The Shared Responsibility Model is one of the most important concepts in cloud security.

From a defensive perspective, it defines who is responsible for securing each layer of the cloud environment.

From an attacker’s perspective, however, it answers a different question:

“Which components can I realistically compromise?”

Professional Cloud Penetration Testers think like attackers to identify weaknesses while remaining within authorised Rules of Engagement.


Attackers generally ignore the physical infrastructure managed by the cloud provider.

Instead, they focus on customer-managed resources because these are more likely to contain security weaknesses.

Cloud Provider Infrastructure
Physical Servers
Networking Hardware
Hypervisor
❌ Not Targeted
────────────────────────────
Customer Environment
IAM
Applications
Virtual Machines
Containers
Kubernetes
Storage
APIs
Secrets
CI/CD
✔ Primary Targets

Major cloud providers invest heavily in security.

They operate:

  • Secure data centres
  • Physical access controls
  • Dedicated security teams
  • Hardware security
  • Infrastructure monitoring
  • Continuous patching

Compromising the cloud provider itself is extremely difficult.

Compromising a customer’s cloud configuration is often much easier.


Most attackers focus on:

  • Cloud identities
  • IAM permissions
  • Public storage
  • APIs
  • Kubernetes
  • Containers
  • Serverless functions
  • Secrets
  • CI/CD pipelines
  • Cloud workloads

These resources are controlled by customers and frequently contain misconfigurations.


Cloud Identity
Management Console
Cloud APIs
Storage
Compute
Containers
Kubernetes
Applications
Sensitive Data

Every component in the customer-managed layer can become an attack path.


Customer Responsibilities = Attack Surface

Section titled “Customer Responsibilities = Attack Surface”

The following customer-managed resources are common penetration testing targets.

Customer Responsibility Why Attackers Target It
IAM Users Credential theft
IAM Roles Privilege escalation
Security Groups Network exposure
Object Storage Sensitive data exposure
Virtual Machines Initial access
Containers Runtime compromise
Kubernetes Cluster takeover
Secrets Credential theft
APIs Authentication bypass
Logging Disable detection

CloudNova Technologies stores customer invoices in an Amazon S3 bucket.

The bucket is accidentally configured for public access.

Attacker workflow:

Internet Search
Public Bucket Discovery
Download Sensitive Files
Data Exfiltration

Root cause:

Customer misconfiguration.


Attack Scenario 2 — Excessive IAM Permissions

Section titled “Attack Scenario 2 — Excessive IAM Permissions”

Developer account:

AdministratorAccess

Attacker workflow:

Phishing
Credential Theft
AWS Console Login
Administrator Access
Complete Cloud Control

Root cause:

Excessive permissions.


Administrator account:

  • Username
  • Password

No MFA.

Attacker workflow:

Credential Leak
Login
Administrator Access
Persistence
Data Theft

MFA would significantly reduce this risk.


Attack Scenario 4 — Public Kubernetes API

Section titled “Attack Scenario 4 — Public Kubernetes API”

Cluster configuration:

Internet
Kubernetes API Server
Weak Authentication
Cluster Access

Possible attacker actions:

  • Enumerate Pods
  • Read Secrets
  • Deploy malicious workloads
  • Escalate privileges

Developer accidentally commits:

AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID
AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY

to GitHub.

Attacker workflow:

GitHub Search
Credential Discovery
Cloud Login
Resource Enumeration
Privilege Escalation

This remains a common real-world issue.


Attack Scenario 6 — Weak Security Groups

Section titled “Attack Scenario 6 — Weak Security Groups”

Configuration:

0.0.0.0/0
SSH
Linux Server

Attacker workflow:

Internet Scan
Open SSH
Credential Attack
Server Compromise

Restricting access significantly reduces exposure.


Attack Scenario 7 — Vulnerable Containers

Section titled “Attack Scenario 7 — Vulnerable Containers”

Container image contains:

  • Known vulnerabilities
  • Outdated packages
  • Root user

Attacker workflow:

Exploit Vulnerability
Container Access
Credential Discovery
Cloud Metadata Service
Cloud Credential Theft

Pipeline contains:

  • Hardcoded secrets
  • Over-privileged service account

Attacker workflow:

Pipeline Access
Secret Extraction
Cloud Authentication
Infrastructure Compromise

Modern cloud attacks rarely begin by exploiting operating systems.

Instead, attackers focus on identity.

Common objectives:

  • Steal credentials
  • Assume IAM roles
  • Abuse OAuth tokens
  • Compromise service accounts
  • Bypass authentication
  • Escalate privileges

Identity is often the shortest path to cloud resources.


Developer Laptop
Phishing
Cloud Credentials
AWS IAM
Administrator Role
Amazon EKS
Secrets
Database
Sensitive Data

One compromised identity can expose multiple services.


Attackers actively search for:

  • Public storage buckets
  • Disabled MFA
  • Excessive IAM permissions
  • Public databases
  • Public Kubernetes APIs
  • Weak RBAC
  • Unencrypted secrets
  • Hardcoded credentials
  • Disabled logging
  • Open Security Groups

Most of these issues require no software exploit—only insecure configuration.


Professional assessments typically include:

  • IAM review
  • Storage security
  • Security Group analysis
  • Kubernetes RBAC
  • Network segmentation
  • Secret management
  • API security
  • Logging configuration
  • Cloud monitoring
  • Infrastructure as Code review

These areas align with the customer’s security responsibilities.


Review Architecture
Review IAM
Review Networking
Review Storage
Review Compute
Review Containers
Review Kubernetes
Review Logging
Identify Attack Paths
Prioritise Risks

The goal is to identify realistic attacker paths.


Cloud Penetration Tester Red Team
Focuses on authorised security assessments Simulates full adversary campaigns
Identifies vulnerabilities Tests detection and response
Produces remediation reports Evaluates organisational resilience
Limited by agreed scope May simulate advanced persistent threats (within approved objectives)

Both approaches provide valuable security insights.


Every attack path teaches defenders something.

For example:

Weakness Defensive Control
Public bucket Block public access
Excessive IAM Least privilege
Missing MFA Enable MFA
Public Kubernetes API Private endpoint
Hardcoded secrets Secret Manager
Weak Security Groups Restrictive inbound rules
Unpatched containers Image scanning
Missing logging Enable CloudTrail and audit logging

Understanding both attack and defence strengthens security assessments.


To reduce attacker opportunities:

  • Apply least privilege.
  • Enable Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA).
  • Remove public access where unnecessary.
  • Rotate credentials regularly.
  • Store secrets securely.
  • Enable continuous monitoring.
  • Review IAM permissions frequently.
  • Scan container images before deployment.
  • Secure Kubernetes clusters.
  • Conduct regular cloud penetration tests.

Avoid:

  • Assuming the cloud provider secures customer configurations.
  • Granting administrator permissions by default.
  • Storing credentials in source code.
  • Ignoring Kubernetes security.
  • Leaving storage publicly accessible.
  • Disabling security logging.
  • Failing to review IAM permissions regularly.

1. Why do attackers primarily target the customer-managed layer of cloud environments?

Section titled “1. Why do attackers primarily target the customer-managed layer of cloud environments?”

Answer: Customer-managed resources such as IAM, storage, Kubernetes and applications are configurable and therefore more likely to contain exploitable misconfigurations than the cloud provider’s underlying infrastructure.

2. Why is IAM considered one of the highest-value attack targets?

Section titled “2. Why is IAM considered one of the highest-value attack targets?”

Answer: IAM controls access to cloud resources. Compromising identities or abusing excessive permissions can provide attackers with broad access across an organisation’s cloud environment.

3. Why are cloud misconfigurations often easier to exploit than software vulnerabilities?

Section titled “3. Why are cloud misconfigurations often easier to exploit than software vulnerabilities?”

Answer: Misconfigurations such as public storage or excessive permissions often require no sophisticated exploit. Attackers can simply take advantage of insecure settings.

4. What is the role of a Cloud Penetration Tester when assessing the Shared Responsibility Model?

Section titled “4. What is the role of a Cloud Penetration Tester when assessing the Shared Responsibility Model?”

Answer: A Cloud Penetration Tester evaluates customer-managed resources to identify security weaknesses, validate controls and recommend improvements based on realistic attack paths.

5. Why should organisations regularly review their cloud configurations?

Section titled “5. Why should organisations regularly review their cloud configurations?”

Answer: Cloud environments change frequently. Regular reviews help identify newly introduced misconfigurations, reduce attack surfaces and strengthen the overall security posture.


  • Attackers rarely target the cloud provider’s physical infrastructure.
  • The customer-managed layer is the primary cloud attack surface.
  • Identity is the most valuable target in modern cloud attacks.
  • Most cloud breaches result from customer misconfigurations rather than provider failures.
  • Understanding the attacker’s perspective helps penetration testers identify realistic attack paths and recommend effective defensive controls.

In the next lesson, we will explore the Cloud Attack Lifecycle, following the stages attackers use to compromise cloud environments—from initial access and reconnaissance through privilege escalation, persistence and data exfiltration.

➡️ Next Lesson: Lesson 04 — Cloud Attack Lifecycle