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CySA+ Runbook 03 — Phishing Email Investigation and Response

Item Details
Runbook 03
Runbook Name Phishing Email Investigation and Response
Track CompTIA CySA+
Difficulty Intermediate
Primary Role SOC Analyst / Cybersecurity Analyst
Purpose Investigate reported or detected phishing messages and determine organizational impact
Primary Systems Email Security, SIEM, Endpoint Security, Identity Provider, DNS, Proxy, Threat Intelligence
Primary Data Sources Email Headers, Message Metadata, Email Gateway Logs, URL Telemetry, Attachment Hashes, Endpoint Logs, Authentication Logs
Output Benign / Spam / Phishing / Credential Phishing / Malware Delivery / BEC / Escalation
Related Labs Lab 11, Lab 12, Lab 13, Lab 16, Lab 17, Lab 20

Operational Principle: Never judge a suspicious email solely by appearance. Validate the sender, infrastructure, authentication results, URLs, attachments, delivery scope, user interaction, and related security telemetry.

This runbook provides a repeatable process for investigating suspicious email.

The analyst must determine:

What was received?
Who actually sent it?
Was the sender spoofed?
Did email authentication pass?
What links or attachments exist?
Are the indicators malicious?
Who received the message?
Did anyone interact with it?
Did credentials or systems become compromised?
What must be contained?

Use this runbook when:

  • a user reports suspicious email

  • an email-security platform creates a phishing alert

  • a suspicious URL is detected in email

  • a malicious attachment is detected

  • display-name impersonation is reported

  • executive impersonation is suspected

  • credential phishing is suspected

  • business email compromise is suspected

  • an email is associated with suspicious authentication

  • an email may have delivered malware

  • an IOC hunt identifies a suspicious message campaign

Every phishing investigation should reach a clear disposition.

Suspicious Email
Investigation
├── Benign
├── Spam
├── Suspicious
├── Phishing
├── Credential Phishing
├── Malware Delivery
├── Business Email Compromise
└── Inconclusive — Continue Investigation

Use:

Email Alert / User Report
Preserve Message
Review Message Content
Analyze Sender
Analyze Headers
Review SPF / DKIM / DMARC
Analyze URLs
Analyze Attachments
Extract IOCs
Threat Intelligence
Determine Delivery Scope
Determine User Interaction
Correlate Endpoint Activity
Correlate Authentication
Determine Impact
Contain
Escalate
Document

Capture:

Case ID:
Alert ID:
Alert Name:
Detection Source:
Detection Time:
Sender:
Recipient:
Subject:
Message-ID:
Attachment:
URL:
Original Severity:

If the report came from a user, record:

Reporter:
Reported Time:
Interaction Reported:
Yes / No / Unknown

6. Step 2 — Preserve the Original Message

Section titled “6. Step 2 — Preserve the Original Message”

Where possible, preserve the full message as:

.eml

or:

.msg

Do not rely only on a forwarded copy or screenshot.

Preserve:

Headers
Body
URLs
Attachments
Message-ID
Delivery Metadata

If the message has been exported as a file, calculate SHA-256.

Terminal window
sha256sum suspicious-email.eml

Record:

Email SHA-256:
Collection Time:
Evidence Location:

8. Step 4 — Perform Initial Visual Triage

Section titled “8. Step 4 — Perform Initial Visual Triage”

Review without clicking links or opening attachments.

Check:

Display Name
From Address
Recipient
Subject
Urgency
Branding
Language
Grammar
Requested Action
Links
Attachments
Reply Instructions

Look for social-engineering themes such as:

Account suspension
Password expiry
Invoice
Payment
MFA request
Shared document
Payroll
Voicemail
Security alert
Executive request
Urgent transfer

Record:

Display Name:
Visible From Address:
Claimed Organization:
Claimed Role:

Ask:

Does the display name match the sender address?
Does the domain belong to the claimed organization?
Is the sender expected to contact the recipient?
Is the role believable?

10. Step 6 — Investigate Display-Name Impersonation

Section titled “10. Step 6 — Investigate Display-Name Impersonation”

Example:

Display Name:
Chief Executive Officer
Actual Address:
external-account@example.invalid

The display name may be trusted-looking while the address is unrelated.

Classify:

Display Name Match:
Expected / Suspicious / Impersonated

Locate:

From:

Record:

Mailbox:
Domain:

Investigate the domain carefully.

Look for:

Misspelling
Extra words
Hyphens
Unexpected TLD
Lookalike characters
Unrelated domain

Locate:

Return-Path:

Compare:

From
vs
Return-Path

A mismatch is not automatically malicious.

Legitimate mail platforms often use separate envelope-sender domains.

Record whether the relationship is expected.

Locate:

Reply-To:

A suspicious pattern may be:

From:
ceo@trusted.example
Reply-To:
external-mailbox@example.invalid

This can be especially important in BEC investigations.

14. Step 10 — Build the Sender Identity Table

Section titled “14. Step 10 — Build the Sender Identity Table”

Create:

Field Value Assessment
Display Name <value> Expected / Suspicious
From <value> Expected / Suspicious
Return-Path <value> Expected / Suspicious
Reply-To <value> Expected / Suspicious

Review:

Received:

headers.

Work from the earliest trustworthy infrastructure toward the recipient.

Document:

Sending Host:
Sending IP:
Mail Relay:
Gateway:
Timestamps:

Do not blindly trust sender-supplied header values.

16. Step 12 — Reconstruct the Delivery Path

Section titled “16. Step 12 — Reconstruct the Delivery Path”

Build:

Sending Infrastructure
Intermediate Relay
Email Security Gateway
Recipient Mail Environment

Record any suspicious IPs or hostnames for later enrichment.

17. Step 13 — Review Authentication-Results

Section titled “17. Step 13 — Review Authentication-Results”

Locate:

Authentication-Results:

Record:

SPF:
DKIM:
DMARC:

Possible values may include:

pass
fail
softfail
neutral
none
temperror
permerror

SPF helps determine whether the sending infrastructure was authorized for the evaluated domain.

Ask:

Did SPF pass?
Which domain was evaluated?
Which IP was evaluated?

Remember:

SPF Pass
Message Is Safe

An attacker can configure SPF correctly for a malicious domain.

Review:

DKIM-Signature:

and authentication results.

Record:

Signing Domain:
Selector:
Result:

DKIM helps validate signed message content and domain identity.

DMARC evaluates domain alignment involving the visible From domain.

Record:

DMARC Result:
Policy:
Aligned Domain:

A DMARC failure may significantly increase concern when the message claims to come from a protected organization.

21. Step 17 — Analyze SPF, DKIM and DMARC Together

Section titled “21. Step 17 — Analyze SPF, DKIM and DMARC Together”

Create:

Control Result Assessment
SPF Pass / Fail <notes>
DKIM Pass / Fail <notes>
DMARC Pass / Fail <notes>

Do not make a phishing verdict from one control alone.

Look for:

Urgency
Authority
Fear
Financial Request
Credential Request
MFA Request
Unusual Instructions
Security Warning
Link-Based Action
Attachment-Based Action

Document the requested action.

Do not click links.

Extract them from:

Plain Text
HTML
Buttons
Images
Attachments where safely parsed

Record:

Displayed Text:
Actual URL:
Domain:
Path:
Parameters:

24. Step 20 — Compare Displayed and Actual URLs

Section titled “24. Step 20 — Compare Displayed and Actual URLs”

Example:

Displayed:
https://trusted.example/login
Actual:
hxxps://unrelated[.]example/login

This mismatch is a strong phishing indicator.

For each URL, identify:

Scheme
Subdomain
Registered Domain
Top-Level Domain
Path
Query

Be careful with URLs such as:

trusted.example.attacker.invalid

The controlling domain is:

attacker.invalid

not:

trusted.example

26. Step 22 — Identify Lookalike Domains

Section titled “26. Step 22 — Identify Lookalike Domains”

Look for:

Character Substitution
Typosquatting
Added Security Words
Added Login Words
Unexpected TLD
Brand Name Inside Unrelated Domain

Record:

Lookalike:
Yes / No / Unknown

Look for:

%2F
%3A
%40
Encoded Query Parameters
URL Shorteners
Redirect Parameters

Decode text safely using approved analysis tools.

Do not navigate to the decoded destination.

Determine whether the URL contains or leads through:

redirect=
url=
next=
continue=
target=

Record:

Initial URL:
Intermediate URL:
Final Destination:

Use safe intelligence or sandbox data where authorized.

29. Step 25 — Enrich URL and Domain Indicators

Section titled “29. Step 25 — Enrich URL and Domain Indicators”

For suspicious URLs/domains, investigate:

Reputation
First Seen
Last Seen
Hosting
Registration Age
Associated Malware
Phishing Reports
Related Domains
Related IPs

Assign confidence.

30. Step 26 — Review Domain Registration Context

Section titled “30. Step 26 — Review Domain Registration Context”

Where appropriate, record:

Registrar:
Creation Date:
Expiration Date:
Name Servers:
Registration Status:

Do not treat privacy-protected registration as malicious by itself.

Investigate:

A
AAAA
MX
NS
TXT
CNAME

where relevant.

Look for relationships between phishing infrastructure and other known indicators.

Record:

Filename:
Displayed Extension:
Actual File Type:
Size:
MIME Type:

Do not open suspicious attachments directly.

33. Step 29 — Verify the Actual File Type

Section titled “33. Step 29 — Verify the Actual File Type”

Use appropriate static-analysis methods.

For example:

Terminal window
file suspicious-attachment

Compare:

Filename
vs
Actual File Type

A mismatch may be important.

34. Step 30 — Calculate Attachment Hashes

Section titled “34. Step 30 — Calculate Attachment Hashes”

Calculate:

SHA-256

and optionally:

MD5
SHA-1

Example:

Terminal window
sha256sum suspicious-attachment

Record the hash.

35. Step 31 — Perform Static Attachment Triage

Section titled “35. Step 31 — Perform Static Attachment Triage”

Depending on file type, review safely:

Metadata
Strings
Embedded URLs
Macros
Document Structure
Archive Contents
Executable Metadata

Do not execute the file.

36. Step 32 — Enrich the Attachment Hash

Section titled “36. Step 32 — Enrich the Attachment Hash”

Search approved malware-reputation sources.

Record:

Known / Unknown:
Classification:
Detection Count:
Malware Family:
First Seen:
Related Infrastructure:
Confidence:

Create:

Type Indicator Source Confidence
Sender <email> Header Medium
IP <IP> Received Medium
Domain <domain> URL High
URL <URL> Message High
Hash <SHA-256> Attachment High

Defang malicious indicators in documentation.

Search the email environment for:

Message-ID
Sender
Subject
URL
Domain
Attachment Hash
Attachment Filename

Determine:

How many recipients?
Which mailboxes?
Was the message delivered?
Was it quarantined?
Was it blocked?

Create:

Recipient Delivered Quarantined User Interaction Status
user01 Yes No Unknown Investigate
user02 Yes No No Monitor
user03 No Yes N/A Protected

40. Step 36 — Search for Campaign Variants

Section titled “40. Step 36 — Search for Campaign Variants”

Attackers may vary:

Subject
Sender
Attachment Name
URL Path
Display Name

while reusing infrastructure.

Search related:

Domains
IPs
Hashes
Message Patterns

to determine campaign scope.

41. Step 37 — Determine User Interaction

Section titled “41. Step 37 — Determine User Interaction”

Ask:

Did the user open the email?
Click the URL?
Download the attachment?
Open the attachment?
Enable macros?
Enter credentials?
Approve MFA?
Reply?
Send payment?

Do not rely solely on user memory.

Correlate technical evidence.

Search the recipient endpoint for:

Phishing Domain

in DNS telemetry.

A sequence:

Email Delivered
DNS Query

may indicate interaction.

But DNS resolution alone does not prove credentials were submitted.

43. Step 39 — Investigate Web/Proxy Evidence

Section titled “43. Step 39 — Investigate Web/Proxy Evidence”

Search:

URL
Domain
Destination IP
Recipient Endpoint

in:

Proxy
Web Gateway
Zeek
Browser Telemetry
Firewall

Record:

Timestamp
Source Host
User
Destination
Status
Bytes

44. Step 40 — Investigate Endpoint Evidence

Section titled “44. Step 40 — Investigate Endpoint Evidence”

If an attachment was involved, review:

File Creation
Process Execution
Parent Process
Child Processes
PowerShell
Security Alerts
Network Connections

Example:

Email Client
Office Application
PowerShell

may require immediate escalation.

45. Step 41 — Investigate Attachment Execution

Section titled “45. Step 41 — Investigate Attachment Execution”

Determine:

Was the attachment saved?
Was it opened?
Was execution observed?
Was it blocked?
Was a child process created?

Classify:

Not Executed
Execution Attempted
Blocked
Executed
Unknown

46. Step 42 — Correlate Authentication Activity

Section titled “46. Step 42 — Correlate Authentication Activity”

If credential phishing is suspected, search the recipient’s identity.

Look for:

Failed Authentication
Successful Authentication
New Source IP
New Device
New Location
MFA Prompts
New MFA Registration
Privileged Activity

Pay special attention to events shortly after email interaction.

47. Step 43 — Build the Credential-Phishing Timeline

Section titled “47. Step 43 — Build the Credential-Phishing Timeline”

Example:

10:01 — Phishing email delivered
10:05 — Endpoint resolves phishing domain
10:06 — Web connection established
10:12 — User account login from new source
10:13 — MFA approved
10:18 — Internal application accessed

This sequence substantially increases the likelihood of account compromise.

If the user reports entering credentials, review:

MFA Denials
MFA Approvals
Repeated Prompts
New Device Registration
New Authentication Method

Credential phishing may lead to subsequent MFA manipulation.

49. Step 45 — Investigate Mailbox Activity

Section titled “49. Step 45 — Investigate Mailbox Activity”

For suspected mailbox compromise, review where available:

Mailbox Logins
Inbox Rules
Forwarding Rules
Deleted Messages
Sent Messages
OAuth/Application Grants
Delegates

Unexpected forwarding rules may indicate persistence or data collection.

50. Step 46 — Investigate Business Email Compromise

Section titled “50. Step 46 — Investigate Business Email Compromise”

BEC may involve:

Executive Impersonation
Vendor Impersonation
Payment Instructions
Invoice Fraud
Bank Account Change
Payroll Change
Gift Card Request

The message may contain no malicious attachment or URL.

Focus on:

Sender Identity
Reply-To
Conversation Context
Recipient Actions
Financial Impact
Mailbox Compromise

51. Step 47 — Investigate Conversation Hijacking

Section titled “51. Step 47 — Investigate Conversation Hijacking”

Attackers may insert themselves into legitimate email threads.

Look for:

Reply-To Changes
Unexpected Sender Domain
Conversation History
Mailbox Access
Unusual Sending Infrastructure

Do not assume a familiar conversation means the message is legitimate.

52. Step 48 — Determine Whether the Sender Account Is Compromised

Section titled “52. Step 48 — Determine Whether the Sender Account Is Compromised”

If the message came from a legitimate partner domain, consider:

Compromised External Account
Compromised Internal Mailbox
Spoofing
Lookalike Domain

Email-authentication success does not rule out a compromised legitimate account.

53. Step 49 — Determine Email Classification

Section titled “53. Step 49 — Determine Email Classification”

Use:

Legitimate message.

Unwanted but not malicious.

Insufficient evidence for phishing classification.

Deceptive message attempting to manipulate the user.

Designed to capture authentication information.

Delivered malicious or suspicious executable content.

Identity or mailbox deception intended to enable fraud or unauthorized business action.

54. Step 50 — Determine Compromise Status

Section titled “54. Step 50 — Determine Compromise Status”

Use:

No User Interaction
Interaction — No Compromise Identified
Possible Credential Exposure
Confirmed Account Compromise
Possible Malware Execution
Confirmed Endpoint Compromise
Unknown

Classify:

Recipients Targeted
Recipients Delivered
Recipients Clicked
Recipients Submitted Credentials
Endpoints Executed Attachment
Accounts Compromised
Systems Compromised

56. Step 52 — Assess Confidentiality Impact

Section titled “56. Step 52 — Assess Confidentiality Impact”

Ask:

Were credentials exposed?
Was mailbox content accessed?
Was sensitive information sent?
Was data downloaded?
Was a compromised mailbox used to collect information?

Ask:

Were inbox rules created?
Were payment instructions modified?
Were messages sent from the account?
Were files changed?
Was malware installed?

58. Step 54 — Assess Availability Impact

Section titled “58. Step 54 — Assess Availability Impact”

Ask:

Was an account disabled?
Was email service disrupted?
Was an endpoint isolated?
Was business communication affected?
Phishing blocked before delivery
No interaction
No compromise
Message delivered
Suspicious interaction
No confirmed compromise
Credential compromise
Malware execution
Mailbox compromise
Multiple recipients impacted
Privileged account compromise
Widespread campaign
Major financial fraud
Sensitive-data exposure
Enterprise-wide malware impact

60. Step 56 — Contain Malicious Messages

Section titled “60. Step 56 — Contain Malicious Messages”

Where authorized:

Quarantine Message
Remove Message from Mailboxes
Block Sender
Block Domain
Block URL
Block Attachment Hash

Validate shared infrastructure risk before blocking broad indicators.

61. Step 57 — Contain Compromised Identities

Section titled “61. Step 57 — Contain Compromised Identities”

For credential compromise:

Disable or Secure Account
Reset Password
Revoke Sessions
Invalidate Tokens
Reset MFA
Remove Unauthorized MFA Methods
Review Mailbox Rules
Review OAuth Grants

62. Step 58 — Contain Affected Endpoints

Section titled “62. Step 58 — Contain Affected Endpoints”

If malware execution is suspected:

Isolate Endpoint
Preserve Evidence
Quarantine File
Block Hash
Search Environment for Hash
Investigate Persistence
Search Related Network Indicators

63. Step 59 — Search the Enterprise for IOCs

Section titled “63. Step 59 — Search the Enterprise for IOCs”

Hunt:

Sender
Domain
URL
IP
SHA-256
Filename
Subject
Message-ID

across all available telemetry.

Escalate when:

Credentials were entered
Account compromise confirmed
MFA compromise suspected
Attachment executed
Malware detected
Privileged user affected
Multiple users interacted
Sensitive information exposed
Financial fraud suspected
Mailbox rules or forwarding changed
Campaign scope expanding

Use:

Case ID:
Classification:
Severity:
Sender:
Subject:
Recipients:
Delivered Count:
User Interaction:
URL:
Attachment:
SHA-256:
SPF:
DKIM:
DMARC:
Threat Intelligence:
Credential Exposure:
Yes / No / Unknown
Endpoint Execution:
Yes / No / Unknown
Account Compromise:
Confirmed / Suspected / Not Observed
Affected Users:
Affected Endpoints:
Containment Performed:
Outstanding Questions:
Recommended Action:
Escalated To:

66. Example Credential-Phishing Escalation

Section titled “66. Example Credential-Phishing Escalation”
Case:
PHISH-2026-019
Classification:
Credential Phishing
Severity:
High
Recipients:
12
Delivered:
8
User Interaction:
2 users accessed the phishing URL.
Credential Exposure:
One user reported entering credentials.
Identity Evidence:
Suspicious authentication from a previously unseen
external source occurred shortly afterward.
MFA:
An unexpected MFA approval was recorded.
Assessment:
Evidence supports compromise of user01.
Containment:
Message removed from remaining mailboxes.
Phishing domain blocked.
user01 sessions revoked and credentials reset.
Escalation:
Identity and Incident Response teams notified.
Classification:
Malware Delivery
Attachment:
Invoice.pdf.exe
SHA-256:
<hash>
Email:
Delivered to four recipients.
Interaction:
One user opened the attachment.
Endpoint:
Process execution confirmed.
EDR:
Malware detection triggered after execution.
Network:
Endpoint contacted suspicious external infrastructure.
Severity:
High
Response:
Isolate endpoint, preserve evidence, block hash,
remove messages, hunt IOCs, and escalate to IR.
Classification:
Benign
Investigation:
Sender domain belongs to an approved business partner.
SPF:
Pass
DKIM:
Pass
DMARC:
Pass
URL:
Matches known partner infrastructure.
Attachment:
Expected business PDF.
Threat Intelligence:
No suspicious indicators identified.
User Context:
Recipient confirmed expected communication.
Disposition:
Close as benign.

Record:

Time Action Result
11:02 Opened alert Suspicious sender identified
11:06 Reviewed headers DMARC failed
11:10 Extracted URL Lookalike domain found
11:15 Searched mailboxes 14 recipients identified
11:21 Checked proxy logs 2 users clicked
11:28 Checked authentication 1 suspicious login found
11:35 Escalated IR and Identity notified

Avoid:

Clicking suspicious links
Opening attachments directly
Trusting display names
Looking only at SPF
Assuming SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass means benign
Ignoring Reply-To
Ignoring delivery scope
Ignoring users who clicked
Ignoring authentication after phishing
Ignoring endpoint execution
Uploading confidential files to public services
Blocking shared infrastructure without validation
Closing after removing the email
Failing to revoke compromised sessions
Treating all recipients as compromised
Failing to hunt for campaign variants
□ Original email preserved
□ Sender reviewed
□ Display name reviewed
□ From reviewed
□ Return-Path reviewed
□ Reply-To reviewed
□ Received chain reviewed
□ SPF checked
□ DKIM checked
□ DMARC checked
□ URLs extracted
□ URLs analyzed safely
□ Lookalike domains checked
□ Attachments identified
□ File types verified
□ SHA-256 calculated
□ Threat intelligence checked
□ IOC inventory created
□ Delivery scope determined
□ Recipient list created
□ User interaction checked
□ DNS/proxy evidence reviewed
□ Endpoint activity reviewed
□ Authentication activity reviewed
□ MFA activity reviewed
□ Compromise status assigned
□ Severity assigned
□ Messages contained where authorized
□ Identity containment considered
□ Endpoint containment considered
□ Enterprise IOC hunt completed
□ Escalation decision made
□ Case documented
# Phishing Email Investigation
## Case Information
Case ID:
Analyst:
Date:
## Email Summary
Sender:
Recipient:
Subject:
Message-ID:
Delivery Time:
## Sender Analysis
Display Name:
From:
Return-Path:
Reply-To:
Assessment:
## Received Headers
Document the delivery path.
## Email Authentication
### SPF
Result:
### DKIM
Result:
### DMARC
Result:
## Message Content
Document:
- social engineering theme
- requested action
- urgency
- impersonation
## URL Analysis
### URL 1
Displayed Text:
Actual URL:
Domain:
Redirects:
Reputation:
### URL 2
Document if applicable.
## Attachment Analysis
Filename:
Actual File Type:
Size:
SHA-256:
Reputation:
Static Findings:
## IOC Inventory
Document:
- sender
- IP
- domain
- URL
- hash
- filename
## Threat Intelligence
Document findings and confidence.
## Delivery Scope
Targeted:
Delivered:
Quarantined:
## Recipient Interaction
Document:
- clicked
- downloaded
- opened
- credentials entered
- MFA approved
## Endpoint Correlation
Document process/file/network evidence.
## Authentication Correlation
Document:
- new source
- successful login
- MFA events
- account changes
## Mailbox Investigation
Document:
- forwarding
- rules
- sent messages
- OAuth grants
## Classification
Benign / Spam / Suspicious / Phishing / Credential Phishing / Malware Delivery / BEC
## Compromise Status
No Interaction / Possible Exposure / Confirmed Identity Compromise / Confirmed Endpoint Compromise / Unknown
## Scope
Document affected:
- users
- accounts
- endpoints
- mailboxes
## Impact
### Confidentiality
### Integrity
### Availability
## Severity
Low / Medium / High / Critical
## Containment
Document actions performed or recommended.
## Escalation
Escalated:
Yes / No
Escalated To:
## Outstanding Questions
Document investigation gaps.
## Final Analyst Assessment
Summarize findings.
## Disposition
Close / Monitor / Continue Investigation / Escalate
  • Original email preserved

  • Message metadata documented

  • Evidence hash calculated where applicable

  • Attachments preserved safely

  • Display name reviewed

  • From analyzed

  • Return-Path analyzed

  • Reply-To analyzed

  • Sending infrastructure reviewed

  • Received chain reconstructed

  • SPF reviewed

  • DKIM reviewed

  • DMARC reviewed

  • Results evaluated together

  • All URLs extracted

  • Displayed and actual destinations compared

  • Domain structure analyzed

  • Lookalike domains checked

  • Encoding reviewed

  • Redirects reviewed

  • Reputation checked

  • Attachment identified

  • Actual file type verified

  • Hash calculated

  • Static triage performed

  • Reputation checked

  • Execution status investigated

  • Delivery scope determined

  • Campaign variants searched

  • Recipient list created

  • User interaction investigated

  • DNS activity reviewed

  • Proxy/web telemetry reviewed

  • Endpoint telemetry reviewed

  • Authentication telemetry reviewed

  • MFA telemetry reviewed

  • Mailbox activity reviewed where relevant

  • Credential exposure assessed

  • Endpoint compromise assessed

  • Mailbox compromise assessed

  • Financial/BEC impact assessed

  • Confidentiality assessed

  • Integrity assessed

  • Availability assessed

  • Classification assigned

  • Severity assigned

  • Malicious messages contained

  • Malicious indicators considered for blocking

  • Identity containment considered

  • Endpoint containment considered

  • Enterprise IOC hunt performed

  • Escalation criteria evaluated

  • IOC inventory created

  • Timeline created

  • Analyst actions documented

  • Outstanding questions documented

  • Final disposition documented

A phishing investigation should not stop at:

"This email looks suspicious."

The analyst must build evidence across:

Email
Sender Identity
Authentication
URLs / Attachments
Threat Intelligence
Delivery Scope
User Interaction
Endpoint Activity
Authentication Activity
Impact
Containment

The key operational lesson is:

The most important question in phishing response is not only whether the email is malicious, but whether anyone interacted with it and whether that interaction led to identity or endpoint compromise.

CySA+ Runbook 04 — Malware and Endpoint Compromise Investigation

Section titled “CySA+ Runbook 04 — Malware and Endpoint Compromise Investigation”

The next runbook focuses on suspicious files, process execution, endpoint alerts, and potential malware compromise.

You will build a repeatable procedure for investigating:

  • malware alerts

  • suspicious file hashes

  • suspicious process execution

  • parent-child process relationships

  • PowerShell activity

  • file creation

  • persistence

  • registry changes

  • scheduled tasks

  • services

  • endpoint network activity

  • DNS

  • suspicious external infrastructure

  • IOC enrichment

  • enterprise hash hunting

  • affected-host scope

  • containment

  • escalation

The workflow progresses from:

Malware Alert
File / Process Validation
Execution Analysis
Persistence
Network Activity
IOC Enrichment
Scope
Compromise Assessment
Containment
Escalation

➡️ Next: CySA+ Runbook 04 — Malware and Endpoint Compromise Investigation