CySA+ Runbook 03 — Phishing Email Investigation and Response
Runbook Information
Section titled “Runbook Information”| Item | Details |
|---|---|
| Runbook | 03 |
| Runbook Name | Phishing Email Investigation and Response |
| Track | CompTIA CySA+ |
| Difficulty | Intermediate |
| Primary Role | SOC Analyst / Cybersecurity Analyst |
| Purpose | Investigate reported or detected phishing messages and determine organizational impact |
| Primary Systems | Email Security, SIEM, Endpoint Security, Identity Provider, DNS, Proxy, Threat Intelligence |
| Primary Data Sources | Email Headers, Message Metadata, Email Gateway Logs, URL Telemetry, Attachment Hashes, Endpoint Logs, Authentication Logs |
| Output | Benign / Spam / Phishing / Credential Phishing / Malware Delivery / BEC / Escalation |
| Related Labs | Lab 11, Lab 12, Lab 13, Lab 16, Lab 17, Lab 20 |
Operational Principle: Never judge a suspicious email solely by appearance. Validate the sender, infrastructure, authentication results, URLs, attachments, delivery scope, user interaction, and related security telemetry.
1. Purpose
Section titled “1. Purpose”This runbook provides a repeatable process for investigating suspicious email.
The analyst must determine:
What was received? ↓Who actually sent it? ↓Was the sender spoofed? ↓Did email authentication pass? ↓What links or attachments exist? ↓Are the indicators malicious? ↓Who received the message? ↓Did anyone interact with it? ↓Did credentials or systems become compromised? ↓What must be contained?2. When to Use This Runbook
Section titled “2. When to Use This Runbook”Use this runbook when:
-
a user reports suspicious email
-
an email-security platform creates a phishing alert
-
a suspicious URL is detected in email
-
a malicious attachment is detected
-
display-name impersonation is reported
-
executive impersonation is suspected
-
credential phishing is suspected
-
business email compromise is suspected
-
an email is associated with suspicious authentication
-
an email may have delivered malware
-
an IOC hunt identifies a suspicious message campaign
3. Expected Outcomes
Section titled “3. Expected Outcomes”Every phishing investigation should reach a clear disposition.
Suspicious Email ↓Investigation ↓├── Benign│├── Spam│├── Suspicious│├── Phishing│├── Credential Phishing│├── Malware Delivery│├── Business Email Compromise│└── Inconclusive — Continue Investigation4. Phishing Investigation Workflow
Section titled “4. Phishing Investigation Workflow”Use:
Email Alert / User Report ↓Preserve Message ↓Review Message Content ↓Analyze Sender ↓Analyze Headers ↓Review SPF / DKIM / DMARC ↓Analyze URLs ↓Analyze Attachments ↓Extract IOCs ↓Threat Intelligence ↓Determine Delivery Scope ↓Determine User Interaction ↓Correlate Endpoint Activity ↓Correlate Authentication ↓Determine Impact ↓Contain ↓Escalate ↓Document5. Step 1 — Record the Initial Alert
Section titled “5. Step 1 — Record the Initial Alert”Capture:
Case ID:
Alert ID:
Alert Name:
Detection Source:
Detection Time:
Sender:
Recipient:
Subject:
Message-ID:
Attachment:
URL:
Original Severity:If the report came from a user, record:
Reporter:
Reported Time:
Interaction Reported:Yes / No / Unknown6. Step 2 — Preserve the Original Message
Section titled “6. Step 2 — Preserve the Original Message”Where possible, preserve the full message as:
.emlor:
.msgDo not rely only on a forwarded copy or screenshot.
Preserve:
HeadersBodyURLsAttachmentsMessage-IDDelivery Metadata7. Step 3 — Calculate an Evidence Hash
Section titled “7. Step 3 — Calculate an Evidence Hash”If the message has been exported as a file, calculate SHA-256.
sha256sum suspicious-email.emlRecord:
Email SHA-256:
Collection Time:
Evidence Location:8. Step 4 — Perform Initial Visual Triage
Section titled “8. Step 4 — Perform Initial Visual Triage”Review without clicking links or opening attachments.
Check:
Display Name
From Address
Recipient
Subject
Urgency
Branding
Language
Grammar
Requested Action
Links
Attachments
Reply InstructionsLook for social-engineering themes such as:
Account suspension
Password expiry
Invoice
Payment
MFA request
Shared document
Payroll
Voicemail
Security alert
Executive request
Urgent transfer9. Step 5 — Identify the Claimed Sender
Section titled “9. Step 5 — Identify the Claimed Sender”Record:
Display Name:
Visible From Address:
Claimed Organization:
Claimed Role:Ask:
Does the display name match the sender address?
Does the domain belong to the claimed organization?
Is the sender expected to contact the recipient?
Is the role believable?10. Step 6 — Investigate Display-Name Impersonation
Section titled “10. Step 6 — Investigate Display-Name Impersonation”Example:
Display Name:Chief Executive Officer
Actual Address:external-account@example.invalidThe display name may be trusted-looking while the address is unrelated.
Classify:
Display Name Match:Expected / Suspicious / Impersonated11. Step 7 — Review the From Header
Section titled “11. Step 7 — Review the From Header”Locate:
From:Record:
Mailbox:
Domain:Investigate the domain carefully.
Look for:
Misspelling
Extra words
Hyphens
Unexpected TLD
Lookalike characters
Unrelated domain12. Step 8 — Review Return-Path
Section titled “12. Step 8 — Review Return-Path”Locate:
Return-Path:Compare:
FromvsReturn-PathA mismatch is not automatically malicious.
Legitimate mail platforms often use separate envelope-sender domains.
Record whether the relationship is expected.
13. Step 9 — Review Reply-To
Section titled “13. Step 9 — Review Reply-To”Locate:
Reply-To:A suspicious pattern may be:
From:ceo@trusted.example
Reply-To:external-mailbox@example.invalidThis can be especially important in BEC investigations.
14. Step 10 — Build the Sender Identity Table
Section titled “14. Step 10 — Build the Sender Identity Table”Create:
| Field | Value | Assessment |
|---|---|---|
| Display Name | <value> |
Expected / Suspicious |
| From | <value> |
Expected / Suspicious |
| Return-Path | <value> |
Expected / Suspicious |
| Reply-To | <value> |
Expected / Suspicious |
15. Step 11 — Analyze Received Headers
Section titled “15. Step 11 — Analyze Received Headers”Review:
Received:headers.
Work from the earliest trustworthy infrastructure toward the recipient.
Document:
Sending Host:
Sending IP:
Mail Relay:
Gateway:
Timestamps:Do not blindly trust sender-supplied header values.
16. Step 12 — Reconstruct the Delivery Path
Section titled “16. Step 12 — Reconstruct the Delivery Path”Build:
Sending Infrastructure ↓Intermediate Relay ↓Email Security Gateway ↓Recipient Mail EnvironmentRecord any suspicious IPs or hostnames for later enrichment.
17. Step 13 — Review Authentication-Results
Section titled “17. Step 13 — Review Authentication-Results”Locate:
Authentication-Results:Record:
SPF:
DKIM:
DMARC:Possible values may include:
pass
fail
softfail
neutral
none
temperror
permerror18. Step 14 — Interpret SPF
Section titled “18. Step 14 — Interpret SPF”SPF helps determine whether the sending infrastructure was authorized for the evaluated domain.
Ask:
Did SPF pass?
Which domain was evaluated?
Which IP was evaluated?Remember:
SPF Pass≠Message Is SafeAn attacker can configure SPF correctly for a malicious domain.
19. Step 15 — Interpret DKIM
Section titled “19. Step 15 — Interpret DKIM”Review:
DKIM-Signature:and authentication results.
Record:
Signing Domain:
Selector:
Result:DKIM helps validate signed message content and domain identity.
20. Step 16 — Interpret DMARC
Section titled “20. Step 16 — Interpret DMARC”DMARC evaluates domain alignment involving the visible From domain.
Record:
DMARC Result:
Policy:
Aligned Domain:A DMARC failure may significantly increase concern when the message claims to come from a protected organization.
21. Step 17 — Analyze SPF, DKIM and DMARC Together
Section titled “21. Step 17 — Analyze SPF, DKIM and DMARC Together”Create:
| Control | Result | Assessment |
|---|---|---|
| SPF | Pass / Fail | <notes> |
| DKIM | Pass / Fail | <notes> |
| DMARC | Pass / Fail | <notes> |
Do not make a phishing verdict from one control alone.
22. Step 18 — Review the Message Body
Section titled “22. Step 18 — Review the Message Body”Look for:
Urgency
Authority
Fear
Financial Request
Credential Request
MFA Request
Unusual Instructions
Security Warning
Link-Based Action
Attachment-Based ActionDocument the requested action.
23. Step 19 — Identify All URLs
Section titled “23. Step 19 — Identify All URLs”Do not click links.
Extract them from:
Plain Text
HTML
Buttons
Images
Attachments where safely parsedRecord:
Displayed Text:
Actual URL:
Domain:
Path:
Parameters:24. Step 20 — Compare Displayed and Actual URLs
Section titled “24. Step 20 — Compare Displayed and Actual URLs”Example:
Displayed:https://trusted.example/login
Actual:hxxps://unrelated[.]example/loginThis mismatch is a strong phishing indicator.
25. Step 21 — Analyze Domain Structure
Section titled “25. Step 21 — Analyze Domain Structure”For each URL, identify:
Scheme
Subdomain
Registered Domain
Top-Level Domain
Path
QueryBe careful with URLs such as:
trusted.example.attacker.invalidThe controlling domain is:
attacker.invalidnot:
trusted.example26. Step 22 — Identify Lookalike Domains
Section titled “26. Step 22 — Identify Lookalike Domains”Look for:
Character Substitution
Typosquatting
Added Security Words
Added Login Words
Unexpected TLD
Brand Name Inside Unrelated DomainRecord:
Lookalike:Yes / No / Unknown27. Step 23 — Analyze URL Encoding
Section titled “27. Step 23 — Analyze URL Encoding”Look for:
%2F
%3A
%40
Encoded Query Parameters
URL Shorteners
Redirect ParametersDecode text safely using approved analysis tools.
Do not navigate to the decoded destination.
28. Step 24 — Investigate Redirects
Section titled “28. Step 24 — Investigate Redirects”Determine whether the URL contains or leads through:
redirect=
url=
next=
continue=
target=Record:
Initial URL:
Intermediate URL:
Final Destination:Use safe intelligence or sandbox data where authorized.
29. Step 25 — Enrich URL and Domain Indicators
Section titled “29. Step 25 — Enrich URL and Domain Indicators”For suspicious URLs/domains, investigate:
Reputation
First Seen
Last Seen
Hosting
Registration Age
Associated Malware
Phishing Reports
Related Domains
Related IPsAssign confidence.
30. Step 26 — Review Domain Registration Context
Section titled “30. Step 26 — Review Domain Registration Context”Where appropriate, record:
Registrar:
Creation Date:
Expiration Date:
Name Servers:
Registration Status:Do not treat privacy-protected registration as malicious by itself.
31. Step 27 — Review DNS Context
Section titled “31. Step 27 — Review DNS Context”Investigate:
A
AAAA
MX
NS
TXT
CNAMEwhere relevant.
Look for relationships between phishing infrastructure and other known indicators.
32. Step 28 — Identify Attachments
Section titled “32. Step 28 — Identify Attachments”Record:
Filename:
Displayed Extension:
Actual File Type:
Size:
MIME Type:Do not open suspicious attachments directly.
33. Step 29 — Verify the Actual File Type
Section titled “33. Step 29 — Verify the Actual File Type”Use appropriate static-analysis methods.
For example:
file suspicious-attachmentCompare:
FilenamevsActual File TypeA mismatch may be important.
34. Step 30 — Calculate Attachment Hashes
Section titled “34. Step 30 — Calculate Attachment Hashes”Calculate:
SHA-256and optionally:
MD5
SHA-1Example:
sha256sum suspicious-attachmentRecord the hash.
35. Step 31 — Perform Static Attachment Triage
Section titled “35. Step 31 — Perform Static Attachment Triage”Depending on file type, review safely:
Metadata
Strings
Embedded URLs
Macros
Document Structure
Archive Contents
Executable MetadataDo not execute the file.
36. Step 32 — Enrich the Attachment Hash
Section titled “36. Step 32 — Enrich the Attachment Hash”Search approved malware-reputation sources.
Record:
Known / Unknown:
Classification:
Detection Count:
Malware Family:
First Seen:
Related Infrastructure:
Confidence:37. Step 33 — Build the IOC Inventory
Section titled “37. Step 33 — Build the IOC Inventory”Create:
| Type | Indicator | Source | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sender | <email> |
Header | Medium |
| IP | <IP> |
Received | Medium |
| Domain | <domain> |
URL | High |
| URL | <URL> |
Message | High |
| Hash | <SHA-256> |
Attachment | High |
Defang malicious indicators in documentation.
38. Step 34 — Determine Delivery Scope
Section titled “38. Step 34 — Determine Delivery Scope”Search the email environment for:
Message-ID
Sender
Subject
URL
Domain
Attachment Hash
Attachment FilenameDetermine:
How many recipients?
Which mailboxes?
Was the message delivered?
Was it quarantined?
Was it blocked?39. Step 35 — Build the Recipient List
Section titled “39. Step 35 — Build the Recipient List”Create:
| Recipient | Delivered | Quarantined | User Interaction | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| user01 | Yes | No | Unknown | Investigate |
| user02 | Yes | No | No | Monitor |
| user03 | No | Yes | N/A | Protected |
40. Step 36 — Search for Campaign Variants
Section titled “40. Step 36 — Search for Campaign Variants”Attackers may vary:
Subject
Sender
Attachment Name
URL Path
Display Namewhile reusing infrastructure.
Search related:
Domains
IPs
Hashes
Message Patternsto determine campaign scope.
41. Step 37 — Determine User Interaction
Section titled “41. Step 37 — Determine User Interaction”Ask:
Did the user open the email?
Click the URL?
Download the attachment?
Open the attachment?
Enable macros?
Enter credentials?
Approve MFA?
Reply?
Send payment?Do not rely solely on user memory.
Correlate technical evidence.
42. Step 38 — Investigate DNS Evidence
Section titled “42. Step 38 — Investigate DNS Evidence”Search the recipient endpoint for:
Phishing Domainin DNS telemetry.
A sequence:
Email Delivered ↓DNS Querymay indicate interaction.
But DNS resolution alone does not prove credentials were submitted.
43. Step 39 — Investigate Web/Proxy Evidence
Section titled “43. Step 39 — Investigate Web/Proxy Evidence”Search:
URL
Domain
Destination IP
Recipient Endpointin:
Proxy
Web Gateway
Zeek
Browser Telemetry
FirewallRecord:
Timestamp
Source Host
User
Destination
Status
Bytes44. Step 40 — Investigate Endpoint Evidence
Section titled “44. Step 40 — Investigate Endpoint Evidence”If an attachment was involved, review:
File Creation
Process Execution
Parent Process
Child Processes
PowerShell
Security Alerts
Network ConnectionsExample:
Email Client ↓Office Application ↓PowerShellmay require immediate escalation.
45. Step 41 — Investigate Attachment Execution
Section titled “45. Step 41 — Investigate Attachment Execution”Determine:
Was the attachment saved?
Was it opened?
Was execution observed?
Was it blocked?
Was a child process created?Classify:
Not Executed
Execution Attempted
Blocked
Executed
Unknown46. Step 42 — Correlate Authentication Activity
Section titled “46. Step 42 — Correlate Authentication Activity”If credential phishing is suspected, search the recipient’s identity.
Look for:
Failed Authentication
Successful Authentication
New Source IP
New Device
New Location
MFA Prompts
New MFA Registration
Privileged ActivityPay special attention to events shortly after email interaction.
47. Step 43 — Build the Credential-Phishing Timeline
Section titled “47. Step 43 — Build the Credential-Phishing Timeline”Example:
10:01 — Phishing email delivered
10:05 — Endpoint resolves phishing domain
10:06 — Web connection established
10:12 — User account login from new source
10:13 — MFA approved
10:18 — Internal application accessedThis sequence substantially increases the likelihood of account compromise.
48. Step 44 — Investigate MFA Events
Section titled “48. Step 44 — Investigate MFA Events”If the user reports entering credentials, review:
MFA Denials
MFA Approvals
Repeated Prompts
New Device Registration
New Authentication MethodCredential phishing may lead to subsequent MFA manipulation.
49. Step 45 — Investigate Mailbox Activity
Section titled “49. Step 45 — Investigate Mailbox Activity”For suspected mailbox compromise, review where available:
Mailbox Logins
Inbox Rules
Forwarding Rules
Deleted Messages
Sent Messages
OAuth/Application Grants
DelegatesUnexpected forwarding rules may indicate persistence or data collection.
50. Step 46 — Investigate Business Email Compromise
Section titled “50. Step 46 — Investigate Business Email Compromise”BEC may involve:
Executive Impersonation
Vendor Impersonation
Payment Instructions
Invoice Fraud
Bank Account Change
Payroll Change
Gift Card RequestThe message may contain no malicious attachment or URL.
Focus on:
Sender Identity
Reply-To
Conversation Context
Recipient Actions
Financial Impact
Mailbox Compromise51. Step 47 — Investigate Conversation Hijacking
Section titled “51. Step 47 — Investigate Conversation Hijacking”Attackers may insert themselves into legitimate email threads.
Look for:
Reply-To Changes
Unexpected Sender Domain
Conversation History
Mailbox Access
Unusual Sending InfrastructureDo not assume a familiar conversation means the message is legitimate.
52. Step 48 — Determine Whether the Sender Account Is Compromised
Section titled “52. Step 48 — Determine Whether the Sender Account Is Compromised”If the message came from a legitimate partner domain, consider:
Compromised External Account
Compromised Internal Mailbox
Spoofing
Lookalike DomainEmail-authentication success does not rule out a compromised legitimate account.
53. Step 49 — Determine Email Classification
Section titled “53. Step 49 — Determine Email Classification”Use:
Benign
Section titled “Benign”Legitimate message.
Unwanted but not malicious.
Suspicious
Section titled “Suspicious”Insufficient evidence for phishing classification.
Phishing
Section titled “Phishing”Deceptive message attempting to manipulate the user.
Credential Phishing
Section titled “Credential Phishing”Designed to capture authentication information.
Malware Delivery
Section titled “Malware Delivery”Delivered malicious or suspicious executable content.
Business Email Compromise
Section titled “Business Email Compromise”Identity or mailbox deception intended to enable fraud or unauthorized business action.
54. Step 50 — Determine Compromise Status
Section titled “54. Step 50 — Determine Compromise Status”Use:
No User Interaction
Interaction — No Compromise Identified
Possible Credential Exposure
Confirmed Account Compromise
Possible Malware Execution
Confirmed Endpoint Compromise
Unknown55. Step 51 — Determine Scope
Section titled “55. Step 51 — Determine Scope”Classify:
Recipients Targeted
Recipients Delivered
Recipients Clicked
Recipients Submitted Credentials
Endpoints Executed Attachment
Accounts Compromised
Systems Compromised56. Step 52 — Assess Confidentiality Impact
Section titled “56. Step 52 — Assess Confidentiality Impact”Ask:
Were credentials exposed?
Was mailbox content accessed?
Was sensitive information sent?
Was data downloaded?
Was a compromised mailbox used to collect information?57. Step 53 — Assess Integrity Impact
Section titled “57. Step 53 — Assess Integrity Impact”Ask:
Were inbox rules created?
Were payment instructions modified?
Were messages sent from the account?
Were files changed?
Was malware installed?58. Step 54 — Assess Availability Impact
Section titled “58. Step 54 — Assess Availability Impact”Ask:
Was an account disabled?
Was email service disrupted?
Was an endpoint isolated?
Was business communication affected?59. Step 55 — Assign Severity
Section titled “59. Step 55 — Assign Severity”Phishing blocked before delivery
No interaction
No compromiseMedium
Section titled “Medium”Message delivered
Suspicious interaction
No confirmed compromiseCredential compromise
Malware execution
Mailbox compromise
Multiple recipients impactedCritical
Section titled “Critical”Privileged account compromise
Widespread campaign
Major financial fraud
Sensitive-data exposure
Enterprise-wide malware impact60. Step 56 — Contain Malicious Messages
Section titled “60. Step 56 — Contain Malicious Messages”Where authorized:
Quarantine Message
Remove Message from Mailboxes
Block Sender
Block Domain
Block URL
Block Attachment HashValidate shared infrastructure risk before blocking broad indicators.
61. Step 57 — Contain Compromised Identities
Section titled “61. Step 57 — Contain Compromised Identities”For credential compromise:
Disable or Secure Account
Reset Password
Revoke Sessions
Invalidate Tokens
Reset MFA
Remove Unauthorized MFA Methods
Review Mailbox Rules
Review OAuth Grants62. Step 58 — Contain Affected Endpoints
Section titled “62. Step 58 — Contain Affected Endpoints”If malware execution is suspected:
Isolate Endpoint
Preserve Evidence
Quarantine File
Block Hash
Search Environment for Hash
Investigate Persistence
Search Related Network Indicators63. Step 59 — Search the Enterprise for IOCs
Section titled “63. Step 59 — Search the Enterprise for IOCs”Hunt:
Sender
Domain
URL
IP
SHA-256
Filename
Subject
Message-IDacross all available telemetry.
64. Step 60 — Escalation Criteria
Section titled “64. Step 60 — Escalation Criteria”Escalate when:
Credentials were entered
Account compromise confirmed
MFA compromise suspected
Attachment executed
Malware detected
Privileged user affected
Multiple users interacted
Sensitive information exposed
Financial fraud suspected
Mailbox rules or forwarding changed
Campaign scope expanding65. Phishing Escalation Template
Section titled “65. Phishing Escalation Template”Use:
Case ID:
Classification:
Severity:
Sender:
Subject:
Recipients:
Delivered Count:
User Interaction:
URL:
Attachment:
SHA-256:
SPF:
DKIM:
DMARC:
Threat Intelligence:
Credential Exposure:Yes / No / Unknown
Endpoint Execution:Yes / No / Unknown
Account Compromise:Confirmed / Suspected / Not Observed
Affected Users:
Affected Endpoints:
Containment Performed:
Outstanding Questions:
Recommended Action:
Escalated To:66. Example Credential-Phishing Escalation
Section titled “66. Example Credential-Phishing Escalation”Case:PHISH-2026-019
Classification:Credential Phishing
Severity:High
Recipients:12
Delivered:8
User Interaction:2 users accessed the phishing URL.
Credential Exposure:One user reported entering credentials.
Identity Evidence:Suspicious authentication from a previously unseenexternal source occurred shortly afterward.
MFA:An unexpected MFA approval was recorded.
Assessment:Evidence supports compromise of user01.
Containment:Message removed from remaining mailboxes.Phishing domain blocked.user01 sessions revoked and credentials reset.
Escalation:Identity and Incident Response teams notified.67. Example Malware-Delivery Escalation
Section titled “67. Example Malware-Delivery Escalation”Classification:Malware Delivery
Attachment:Invoice.pdf.exe
SHA-256:<hash>
Email:Delivered to four recipients.
Interaction:One user opened the attachment.
Endpoint:Process execution confirmed.
EDR:Malware detection triggered after execution.
Network:Endpoint contacted suspicious external infrastructure.
Severity:High
Response:Isolate endpoint, preserve evidence, block hash,remove messages, hunt IOCs, and escalate to IR.68. Example Benign Email Closure
Section titled “68. Example Benign Email Closure”Classification:Benign
Investigation:Sender domain belongs to an approved business partner.
SPF:Pass
DKIM:Pass
DMARC:Pass
URL:Matches known partner infrastructure.
Attachment:Expected business PDF.
Threat Intelligence:No suspicious indicators identified.
User Context:Recipient confirmed expected communication.
Disposition:Close as benign.69. Analyst Action Log
Section titled “69. Analyst Action Log”Record:
| Time | Action | Result |
|---|---|---|
| 11:02 | Opened alert | Suspicious sender identified |
| 11:06 | Reviewed headers | DMARC failed |
| 11:10 | Extracted URL | Lookalike domain found |
| 11:15 | Searched mailboxes | 14 recipients identified |
| 11:21 | Checked proxy logs | 2 users clicked |
| 11:28 | Checked authentication | 1 suspicious login found |
| 11:35 | Escalated | IR and Identity notified |
70. Common Analyst Mistakes
Section titled “70. Common Analyst Mistakes”Avoid:
Clicking suspicious links
Opening attachments directly
Trusting display names
Looking only at SPF
Assuming SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass means benign
Ignoring Reply-To
Ignoring delivery scope
Ignoring users who clicked
Ignoring authentication after phishing
Ignoring endpoint execution
Uploading confidential files to public services
Blocking shared infrastructure without validation
Closing after removing the email
Failing to revoke compromised sessions
Treating all recipients as compromised
Failing to hunt for campaign variants71. Rapid Phishing Triage Checklist
Section titled “71. Rapid Phishing Triage Checklist”□ Original email preserved
□ Sender reviewed
□ Display name reviewed
□ From reviewed
□ Return-Path reviewed
□ Reply-To reviewed
□ Received chain reviewed
□ SPF checked
□ DKIM checked
□ DMARC checked
□ URLs extracted
□ URLs analyzed safely
□ Lookalike domains checked
□ Attachments identified
□ File types verified
□ SHA-256 calculated
□ Threat intelligence checked
□ IOC inventory created
□ Delivery scope determined
□ Recipient list created
□ User interaction checked
□ DNS/proxy evidence reviewed
□ Endpoint activity reviewed
□ Authentication activity reviewed
□ MFA activity reviewed
□ Compromise status assigned
□ Severity assigned
□ Messages contained where authorized
□ Identity containment considered
□ Endpoint containment considered
□ Enterprise IOC hunt completed
□ Escalation decision made
□ Case documented72. Investigation Documentation Template
Section titled “72. Investigation Documentation Template”# Phishing Email Investigation
## Case Information
Case ID:
Analyst:
Date:
## Email Summary
Sender:
Recipient:
Subject:
Message-ID:
Delivery Time:
## Sender Analysis
Display Name:
From:
Return-Path:
Reply-To:
Assessment:
## Received Headers
Document the delivery path.
## Email Authentication
### SPF
Result:
### DKIM
Result:
### DMARC
Result:
## Message Content
Document:- social engineering theme- requested action- urgency- impersonation
## URL Analysis
### URL 1
Displayed Text:
Actual URL:
Domain:
Redirects:
Reputation:
### URL 2
Document if applicable.
## Attachment Analysis
Filename:
Actual File Type:
Size:
SHA-256:
Reputation:
Static Findings:
## IOC Inventory
Document:- sender- IP- domain- URL- hash- filename
## Threat Intelligence
Document findings and confidence.
## Delivery Scope
Targeted:
Delivered:
Quarantined:
## Recipient Interaction
Document:- clicked- downloaded- opened- credentials entered- MFA approved
## Endpoint Correlation
Document process/file/network evidence.
## Authentication Correlation
Document:- new source- successful login- MFA events- account changes
## Mailbox Investigation
Document:- forwarding- rules- sent messages- OAuth grants
## Classification
Benign / Spam / Suspicious / Phishing / Credential Phishing / Malware Delivery / BEC
## Compromise Status
No Interaction / Possible Exposure / Confirmed Identity Compromise / Confirmed Endpoint Compromise / Unknown
## Scope
Document affected:- users- accounts- endpoints- mailboxes
## Impact
### Confidentiality
### Integrity
### Availability
## Severity
Low / Medium / High / Critical
## Containment
Document actions performed or recommended.
## Escalation
Escalated:Yes / No
Escalated To:
## Outstanding Questions
Document investigation gaps.
## Final Analyst Assessment
Summarize findings.
## Disposition
Close / Monitor / Continue Investigation / Escalate73. Runbook Validation Checklist
Section titled “73. Runbook Validation Checklist”Evidence
Section titled “Evidence”-
Original email preserved
-
Message metadata documented
-
Evidence hash calculated where applicable
-
Attachments preserved safely
Sender
Section titled “Sender”-
Display name reviewed
-
From analyzed
-
Return-Path analyzed
-
Reply-To analyzed
-
Sending infrastructure reviewed
-
Received chain reconstructed
Authentication
Section titled “Authentication”-
SPF reviewed
-
DKIM reviewed
-
DMARC reviewed
-
Results evaluated together
-
All URLs extracted
-
Displayed and actual destinations compared
-
Domain structure analyzed
-
Lookalike domains checked
-
Encoding reviewed
-
Redirects reviewed
-
Reputation checked
Attachments
Section titled “Attachments”-
Attachment identified
-
Actual file type verified
-
Hash calculated
-
Static triage performed
-
Reputation checked
-
Execution status investigated
-
Delivery scope determined
-
Campaign variants searched
-
Recipient list created
-
User interaction investigated
Correlation
Section titled “Correlation”-
DNS activity reviewed
-
Proxy/web telemetry reviewed
-
Endpoint telemetry reviewed
-
Authentication telemetry reviewed
-
MFA telemetry reviewed
-
Mailbox activity reviewed where relevant
Impact
Section titled “Impact”-
Credential exposure assessed
-
Endpoint compromise assessed
-
Mailbox compromise assessed
-
Financial/BEC impact assessed
-
Confidentiality assessed
-
Integrity assessed
-
Availability assessed
Response
Section titled “Response”-
Classification assigned
-
Severity assigned
-
Malicious messages contained
-
Malicious indicators considered for blocking
-
Identity containment considered
-
Endpoint containment considered
-
Enterprise IOC hunt performed
-
Escalation criteria evaluated
Documentation
Section titled “Documentation”-
IOC inventory created
-
Timeline created
-
Analyst actions documented
-
Outstanding questions documented
-
Final disposition documented
74. Runbook Summary
Section titled “74. Runbook Summary”A phishing investigation should not stop at:
"This email looks suspicious."The analyst must build evidence across:
Email ↓Sender Identity ↓Authentication ↓URLs / Attachments ↓Threat Intelligence ↓Delivery Scope ↓User Interaction ↓Endpoint Activity ↓Authentication Activity ↓Impact ↓ContainmentThe key operational lesson is:
The most important question in phishing response is not only whether the email is malicious, but whether anyone interacted with it and whether that interaction led to identity or endpoint compromise.
What’s Next?
Section titled “What’s Next?”CySA+ Runbook 04 — Malware and Endpoint Compromise Investigation
Section titled “CySA+ Runbook 04 — Malware and Endpoint Compromise Investigation”The next runbook focuses on suspicious files, process execution, endpoint alerts, and potential malware compromise.
You will build a repeatable procedure for investigating:
-
malware alerts
-
suspicious file hashes
-
suspicious process execution
-
parent-child process relationships
-
PowerShell activity
-
file creation
-
persistence
-
registry changes
-
scheduled tasks
-
services
-
endpoint network activity
-
DNS
-
suspicious external infrastructure
-
IOC enrichment
-
enterprise hash hunting
-
affected-host scope
-
containment
-
escalation
The workflow progresses from:
Malware Alert ↓File / Process Validation ↓Execution Analysis ↓Persistence ↓Network Activity ↓IOC Enrichment ↓Scope ↓Compromise Assessment ↓Containment ↓Escalation➡️ Next: CySA+ Runbook 04 — Malware and Endpoint Compromise Investigation