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Lab 07 Malware & Endpoint Investigation

Welcome to Lab 07 — Malware & Endpoint Investigation.

In Lab 06, you investigated phishing and determined whether users interacted with suspicious links or attachments.

Now you will investigate what happens when an endpoint security product generates a malware or suspicious-process alert.

A malware alert is not the same as a compromised endpoint.

The SOC must determine:

  • what file or process triggered the alert

  • whether execution occurred

  • which user was involved

  • what launched the process

  • what child processes appeared

  • what files or system changes occurred

  • whether the endpoint communicated externally

  • whether persistence was established

  • whether the same indicators appear elsewhere

  • whether containment is required

Mission Goal: Investigate a simulated malware or endpoint alert, reconstruct the execution chain, determine the extent of endpoint impact, identify related systems and indicators, and produce an evidence-based containment and escalation decision.

Item Details
Difficulty Intermediate
Estimated Time 120–150 minutes
Primary Skill Endpoint Security Investigation
Secondary Skill Malware Alert Analysis
Environment GoHackersCloud SOC Analyst Lab
Evidence Simulated EDR/SIEM/host/network telemetry
Primary Outcome Endpoint Investigation Report
Safety Level Authorized Training Evidence Only

By completing this lab, you will be able to:

  • investigate endpoint security alerts

  • distinguish detection from execution

  • identify the affected host and user

  • analyze file metadata

  • analyze file hashes

  • interpret process trees

  • investigate parent-child process relationships

  • review command-line evidence

  • identify suspicious file creation

  • analyze endpoint network activity

  • identify persistence indicators conceptually

  • correlate endpoint events with DNS and proxy logs

  • search for indicators across other systems

  • determine endpoint scope

  • determine incident scope

  • assign severity and confidence

  • make containment recommendations

  • prepare an escalation package

  • produce a professional endpoint investigation report

Use:

Endpoint Alert → File/Process → Execution → Parent/Child → File/System Changes → Network → Persistence → Scope → Impact

Conceptually:

Endpoint Alert
Affected Host
User Context
File / Process
Executed?
┌───┴────┐
│ │
No Yes
│ │
▼ ▼
Blocked Process Tree
├── Child Processes
├── Files
├── Registry/System
├── Services/Tasks
└── Network
Scope Analysis
Contain / Escalate / Close

The core principle is:

Detection is evidence of a security control event. Execution and impact must be established separately.

Part 1 — Create the Investigation Workspace

Section titled “Part 1 — Create the Investigation Workspace”

Create:

SOC-Labs/
└── Lab-07/
├── 01-Scope/
├── 02-Alert/
├── 03-Host-Context/
├── 04-User-Context/
├── 05-File-Analysis/
├── 06-Process-Analysis/
├── 07-File-System-Changes/
├── 08-Persistence/
├── 09-Network/
├── 10-IOC-Correlation/
├── 11-Scope/
├── 12-Timeline/
├── 13-Evidence/
├── 14-Findings/
└── 15-Report/

Create:

Lab-07-Malware-Endpoint-Investigation.md

Example:

CASE ID:
GHC-SOC-2026-007
CASE TITLE:
Malware & Endpoint Investigation
STATUS:
Investigating
INITIAL PRIORITY:
P2
ANALYST:
DATE:

Part 3 — Review the Initial Endpoint Alert

Section titled “Part 3 — Review the Initial Endpoint Alert”

Assume:

ALERT ID:
ALT-EDR-001
ALERT:
Suspicious Executable Detected
HOST:
WIN-FIN-02
USER:
finance-user
FILE:
InvoiceViewer.exe
LOCATION:
User Downloads
DETECTION:
Malware / Suspicious File
ACTION:
Quarantined
INITIAL SEVERITY:
High
PROCESS EXECUTION:
Unknown

Do not immediately conclude:

Endpoint compromised.

Start with:

Was the file merely detected, or did it execute?

Create:

ENDPOINT ALERT PROFILE
Alert ID:
Detection Name:
Timestamp:
Host:
User:
File:
File Path:
File Hash:
Process:
Parent Process:
Command Line:
Detection Engine:
Action Taken:
Execution Status:
Network Activity:
Initial Severity:
Evidence Reference:

Create:

HOST PROFILE
Hostname:
IP:
Operating System:
Department:
Business Role:
Criticality:
Owner:
Expected User:
Endpoint Protection:
Logging Status:
Isolation Capability:
Yes / No / Unknown

Record:

USER PROFILE
User:
Department:
Role:
Privileged:
Yes / No
Expected Host:
Normal Applications:
Recent Email Incident:
Yes / No / Unknown
Recent Authentication Alert:
Yes / No / Unknown

This may connect the case with Lab 06.

Part 7 — Determine Whether the File Was Delivered

Section titled “Part 7 — Determine Whether the File Was Delivered”

Possible sources include:

  • email attachment

  • web download

  • shared drive

  • removable media

  • software deployment

  • existing file

Create:

FILE DELIVERY PROFILE
Filename:
Source:
First Seen:
Downloaded:
Yes / No / Unknown
Email Related:
Yes / No / Unknown
Browser Related:
Yes / No / Unknown
Expected Software:
Yes / No / Unknown

Record:

FILE METADATA
Filename:
Path:
Size:
Created:
Modified:
Hash:
Type:
Signer:
If supplied
Source:
Quarantine Status:

Do not execute the file.

A hash may help correlate:

  • EDR detections

  • gateway detections

  • sandbox results

  • other hosts

Remember:

Malicious Hash Match
Execution Proven

It proves the file matches the referenced content, not that it ran.

Part 10 — Build the File Evidence Register

Section titled “Part 10 — Build the File Evidence Register”
File ID Filename Hash Host Detection Executed
FILE-01 InvoiceViewer.exe WIN-FIN-02 Malicious Unknown

This is one of the most important phases.

Look for:

  • process creation

  • endpoint execution event

  • parent-child relationship

  • command line

  • execution timestamp

  • security-control action

Classify:

Not Executed
Execution Blocked
Executed
Execution Suspected
Unknown

Part 12 — Example — Detection Before Execution

Section titled “Part 12 — Example — Detection Before Execution”

Suppose evidence shows:

File Downloaded:
10:05
EDR Detection:
10:05:02
Action:
Quarantined
Process Creation:
None
Child Processes:
None

Disposition may be:

Malicious File Detected — Execution Not Observed

Part 13 — Example — Execution Confirmed

Section titled “Part 13 — Example — Execution Confirmed”

Suppose:

10:05
File downloaded
10:06
InvoiceViewer.exe launched
10:06
Child process created
10:07
External network connection

Now the case requires deeper analysis.

Time File/Process Event User Evidence
Downloaded
Executed
Blocked

A process does not appear in isolation.

Ask:

What launched it?

Possible parents:

  • browser

  • email client

  • explorer

  • command shell

  • Office application

  • management software

  • another suspicious process

Part 16 — Build the Parent-Child Process Tree

Section titled “Part 16 — Build the Parent-Child Process Tree”

Example:

outlook.exe
InvoiceViewer.exe
├── powershell.exe
└── cmd.exe

Or:

chrome.exe
InvoiceViewer.exe

Do not infer malicious intent from one child process alone.

Part 17 — Create the Process Tree Register

Section titled “Part 17 — Create the Process Tree Register”
Process Parent User Time Assessment
InvoiceViewer.exe explorer.exe finance-user
powershell.exe InvoiceViewer.exe finance-user

If provided, record:

PROCESS COMMAND LINE
Process:
Parent:
Command Line:
User:
Time:
Expected:
Security Relevance:

Do not guess missing command lines.

If unavailable:

Telemetry Gap:
Command-line evidence unavailable.

Ask:

Did the process create children?
Were those processes expected?
Did any child process access the network?
Did any child process make system changes?

Create:

Parent Child User Network Assessment

Review available endpoint evidence for:

  • newly created files

  • modified files

  • files written to startup locations

  • dropped components

  • archive extraction

  • temporary files

Do not browse unrelated user files.

Part 21 — Build the File-System Change Register

Section titled “Part 21 — Build the File-System Change Register”
Time File Path Action Process
Created

Part 22 — Distinguish File Creation from Execution

Section titled “Part 22 — Distinguish File Creation from Execution”

Always separate:

File Created
File Executed

and:

File Executed
Successful Malicious Action

Part 23 — Review Registry/System Changes Where Available

Section titled “Part 23 — Review Registry/System Changes Where Available”

If endpoint telemetry supplies Windows registry or system changes, inspect relevant evidence.

Potential categories include:

  • startup configuration

  • security-setting changes

  • application settings

  • persistence-related entries

Do not modify the registry.

Part 24 — Build the System Change Register

Section titled “Part 24 — Build the System Change Register”
Time Type Object Process Assessment
Registry/System

Part 25 — Investigate Persistence Indicators

Section titled “Part 25 — Investigate Persistence Indicators”

Possible evidence can include:

  • scheduled task

  • service creation

  • startup entry

  • login-start configuration

  • recurring execution

Your role is to identify supplied evidence, not create persistence.

Remember:

Scheduled Task
Malicious Persistence Automatically
New Service
Persistence Automatically

Part 26 — Create the Persistence Register

Section titled “Part 26 — Create the Persistence Register”
Mechanism Observed Process/User Expected
Scheduled task
Service
Startup entry
Other

Part 27 — Correlate Endpoint Network Activity

Section titled “Part 27 — Correlate Endpoint Network Activity”

Investigate:

  • destination IP

  • domain

  • port

  • protocol

  • process

  • timestamp

  • allowed/blocked

Create:

NETWORK EVENT
Time:
Host:
Process:
Destination:
Domain:
Port:
Protocol:
Action:
Expected:
Assessment:

Part 28 — Build the Network Connection Register

Section titled “Part 28 — Build the Network Connection Register”
Time Process Destination Port Action Assessment

Search DNS telemetry around process execution.

Example:

InvoiceViewer.exe
DNS Query
suspicious-domain.example.test

Record:

Time Client Domain Process Assessment

If a suspicious process or browser interaction appears, correlate:

  • URL

  • domain

  • user

  • host

  • response

  • allowed/blocked

  • download

Build:

WEB ACTIVITY
Time:
User:
Host:
URL:
Destination:
Result:
File Download:
Yes / No / Unknown
Assessment:

Part 31 — Distinguish Network Attempt from Successful Communication

Section titled “Part 31 — Distinguish Network Attempt from Successful Communication”

Remember:

Connection Attempt
Connection Established

and:

Connection Established
Data Exfiltration

Evidence must support each claim.

Part 32 — Investigate Security-Control Outcome

Section titled “Part 32 — Investigate Security-Control Outcome”

Determine whether the endpoint tool:

Detected
Blocked
Killed Process
Quarantined File
Isolated Host
Allowed
Unknown

Create:

CONTROL OUTCOME
Detection:
Execution Prevention:
Process Terminated:
File Quarantined:
Network Blocked:
Host Isolated:
Additional Alerting:

Part 33 — Identify Positive Security Controls

Section titled “Part 33 — Identify Positive Security Controls”

Examples:

  • file blocked before execution

  • process terminated

  • malicious connection blocked

  • file quarantined

  • endpoint automatically isolated

  • user lacked administrative rights

  • MFA protected the identity

Document these.

Part 34 — Build the Endpoint Security Control Matrix

Section titled “Part 34 — Build the Endpoint Security Control Matrix”
Control Status Evidence
Antivirus/EDR
Execution prevention
File quarantine
Network protection
Host isolation
Least privilege

Part 35 — Search for the Same Hash Across Hosts

Section titled “Part 35 — Search for the Same Hash Across Hosts”

Using the supplied SIEM/EDR data, search for:

File Hash

Create:

Host Hash Seen Executed Action
WIN-FIN-02 Yes Yes Investigating
WIN-HR-04 Yes No Quarantined

Filename searches may help identify campaign spread.

But remember:

Same Filename
Same File

Hashes provide stronger file identity where available.

Search authorized telemetry for:

  • destination domain

  • destination IP

  • URL

  • file hash

This helps determine whether one endpoint or many endpoints are involved.

Part 38 — Build the IOC Correlation Matrix

Section titled “Part 38 — Build the IOC Correlation Matrix”
IOC Endpoint DNS Proxy Firewall Email
Hash
Domain
URL
IP

Part 39 — Connect Back to the Phishing Case

Section titled “Part 39 — Connect Back to the Phishing Case”

If Lab 06 contained a related email:

Phishing Email
Attachment / Link
User Interaction
Endpoint Alert

Correlate:

  • recipient

  • attachment hash

  • URL

  • host

  • user

  • timeline

Part 40 — Build the Email-to-Endpoint Correlation Register

Section titled “Part 40 — Build the Email-to-Endpoint Correlation Register”
Evidence Email Endpoint Match
User finance-user finance-user Yes
File InvoiceViewer.exe InvoiceViewer.exe Yes
Hash
Time

Part 41 — Investigate Authentication After Execution

Section titled “Part 41 — Investigate Authentication After Execution”

If endpoint activity suggests credential access or browser interaction, review identity telemetry.

Look for:

  • unexpected authentication

  • new session

  • unusual source

  • MFA activity

  • privileged login

Use the Lab 03 methodology.

Part 42 — Build the Identity Correlation Register

Section titled “Part 42 — Build the Identity Correlation Register”
Time User Authentication Source Expected

Ask:

Was the affected user privileged?
Did the suspicious process run as administrator?
Did it obtain elevated context?
Were privileged actions observed?

Do not claim privilege escalation without evidence.

Part 44 — Build the Privilege Context Register

Section titled “Part 44 — Build the Privilege Context Register”
USER:
Privilege Level:
Process Context:
Administrative Rights:
Yes / No / Unknown
Privilege Change Observed:
Yes / No
Evidence:

Classify observed impact:

File Present Only
Execution Blocked
Execution Confirmed
System Changes Observed
Network Communication Observed
Persistence Indicators Observed
Credential Risk
Multiple Hosts Affected

Part 46 — Create the Endpoint Impact Matrix

Section titled “Part 46 — Create the Endpoint Impact Matrix”
Impact Confirmed Evidence
File present
Executed
Child process
File change
System change
Network communication
Persistence
Credential impact

Ask:

One host?
Multiple hosts?
Same hash?
Same domain?
Same user?
Same process?

Create:

Host File Execution Network Status
WIN-FIN-02 Yes Yes Yes Investigating
WIN-HR-04 Yes No No Blocked

Create:

USER SCOPE
Primary User:
Other Users:
Privileged Users:
Users Who Received File:
Users Who Executed File:
Potential Credential Exposure:

Create:

PROCESS SCOPE
Primary Process:
Parent:
Child Processes:
Hosts:
Users:
First Seen:
Last Seen:
Network Destinations:
Known Impact:

Create:

IOC SCOPE
Hash Hits:
Domain Hits:
IP Hits:
URL Hits:
Endpoints:
Users:
First Seen:
Last Seen:

Part 51 — Build the Master Endpoint Timeline

Section titled “Part 51 — Build the Master Endpoint Timeline”

Example:

09:55
Phishing email delivered
10:02
Attachment downloaded
10:03
File created on WIN-FIN-02
10:04
File executed
10:04
Child process created
10:05
DNS query observed
10:05
Outbound connection attempted
10:06
EDR alert generated
10:06
Process terminated
10:07
File quarantined
10:10
SOC case opened

Only include evidence-supported events.

Correlate:

  • EDR

  • Windows logs

  • DNS

  • proxy

  • firewall

  • email

  • identity logs

Use the same master timezone.

Part 53 — Build Investigation Hypotheses

Section titled “Part 53 — Build Investigation Hypotheses”
Known legitimate application
+
expected user
+
approved software
+
no suspicious behavior

Hypothesis 2 — Malicious File Blocked Before Execution

Section titled “Hypothesis 2 — Malicious File Blocked Before Execution”
Malicious detection
+
file quarantined
+
no process creation
+
no network activity

Hypothesis 3 — Malicious Execution with Limited Impact

Section titled “Hypothesis 3 — Malicious Execution with Limited Impact”
Execution confirmed
+
process terminated quickly
+
no persistence
+
limited network activity

Hypothesis 4 — Potential Endpoint Compromise

Section titled “Hypothesis 4 — Potential Endpoint Compromise”
Execution
+
child processes
+
system changes
+
network activity
+
unexplained persistence indicators
Hypothesis Supporting Evidence Contradicting Evidence Confidence
False positive
Blocked before execution
Limited execution
Endpoint compromise

Use:

Evidence supports legitimate activity.

File was malicious or policy-violating but execution was prevented.

Evidence requires deeper investigation.

Execution occurred.

This does not automatically describe full compromise scope.

Multiple correlated indicators suggest meaningful host impact.

Evidence clearly demonstrates unauthorized malicious endpoint activity.

Evidence is insufficient.

Part 56 — Example — File Blocked Before Execution

Section titled “Part 56 — Example — File Blocked Before Execution”
DISPOSITION:
Malicious File — Execution Prevented
HOST:
WIN-FIN-02
USER:
finance-user
EVIDENCE:
The suspicious file was downloaded to the endpoint.
Endpoint protection identified and quarantined the file before
process creation was observed.
No child processes or related outbound communications were found
during the reviewed window.
KNOWN IMPACT:
Malicious file reached the endpoint but execution was not observed.
SEVERITY:
Medium
CONFIDENCE:
High

Part 57 — Example — Malware Execution Confirmed

Section titled “Part 57 — Example — Malware Execution Confirmed”
DISPOSITION:
Confirmed Malware Execution
HOST:
WIN-FIN-02
USER:
finance-user
EVIDENCE:
InvoiceViewer.exe was executed from the user's Downloads directory.
Endpoint telemetry recorded child-process activity shortly after
execution.
Related DNS and network activity was observed.
The endpoint security product terminated the process.
PERSISTENCE:
Not confirmed.
KNOWN IMPACT:
Malicious code execution occurred on one endpoint.
SEVERITY:
High
CONFIDENCE:
High
ESCALATION:
Required.

Part 58 — Example — Potential Endpoint Compromise

Section titled “Part 58 — Example — Potential Endpoint Compromise”
DISPOSITION:
Potential Endpoint Compromise
EVIDENCE:
Suspicious executable ran successfully.
Additional process activity and system changes occurred afterward.
The affected endpoint communicated with an unexpected external
destination.
Persistence-related evidence requires further validation.
SCOPE:
One endpoint confirmed; additional hosts being reviewed.
SEVERITY:
High
CONFIDENCE:
Medium
CONTAINMENT:
Recommended.

Consider:

  • execution status

  • host criticality

  • user privilege

  • system changes

  • persistence

  • credential impact

  • network activity

  • multiple hosts

  • security-control outcome

  • potential data impact

Example:

Severity:
Critical
Confidence:
Medium

may be appropriate when the potential business impact is very high but the available telemetry is incomplete.

Part 61 — Determine Containment Requirements

Section titled “Part 61 — Determine Containment Requirements”

Potential actions may include:

  • isolate endpoint

  • terminate malicious process

  • quarantine malicious file

  • block domain/IP/hash

  • disable affected account

  • revoke sessions

  • preserve endpoint evidence

  • increase monitoring

Do not perform these actions unless the lab explicitly authorizes them.

Part 62 — Build the Containment Decision Matrix

Section titled “Part 62 — Build the Containment Decision Matrix”
Action Required Reason Business Impact Approval
Endpoint isolation
Process termination
File quarantine
IOC blocking
Credential reset

Part 63 — Prioritize Evidence Preservation

Section titled “Part 63 — Prioritize Evidence Preservation”

Where practical:

Preserve → Contain → Investigate Further

But active threats may require immediate containment.

Document the reason for the sequence chosen.

Escalate when:

  • malware execution confirmed

  • suspicious child processes observed

  • external communication observed

  • persistence suspected

  • privileged user involved

  • multiple endpoints affected

  • credential exposure suspected

  • containment is required

  • sensitive host involved

ESCALATION SUMMARY
Case ID:
Host:
User:
Endpoint Criticality:
Alert:
Detection:
Execution Status:
Primary Process:
Parent Process:
Child Processes:
File Hash:
System Changes:
Network Destinations:
Persistence:
Credential Risk:
Other Affected Hosts:
Known Impact:
Severity:
Confidence:
Containment Recommended:
Evidence References:
Next Investigation Step:

Part 66 — Build the Endpoint Evidence Register

Section titled “Part 66 — Build the Endpoint Evidence Register”
Evidence ID Source Description
EV-END-01 EDR Original alert
EV-END-02 Endpoint File metadata
EV-END-03 Endpoint Process creation
EV-END-04 Endpoint Process tree
EV-END-05 DNS Domain activity
EV-END-06 Firewall/Proxy Network connection
EV-END-07 Email Delivery/source evidence
EV-END-08 Identity Related authentication

Part 67 — Build the Final Endpoint Investigation Register

Section titled “Part 67 — Build the Final Endpoint Investigation Register”
CASE ID:
HOST:
USER:
HOST CRITICALITY:
ALERT:
FILE:
HASH:
FILE SOURCE:
EXECUTION STATUS:
PRIMARY PROCESS:
PARENT PROCESS:
CHILD PROCESSES:
COMMAND LINE:
FILES CREATED:
SYSTEM CHANGES:
PERSISTENCE:
DNS ACTIVITY:
NETWORK ACTIVITY:
SECURITY CONTROL ACTION:
OTHER HOSTS:
OTHER USERS:
EMAIL CORRELATION:
IDENTITY CORRELATION:
TELEMETRY GAPS:
POSITIVE CONTROLS:
DISPOSITION:
SEVERITY:
CONFIDENCE:
PRIORITY:
KNOWN IMPACT:
ESCALATION:
CONTAINMENT:
REMAINING QUESTIONS:

Complete:

LAB INFORMATION
Lab:
Malware & Endpoint Investigation
Case ID:
Analyst:
Date:
INITIAL ALERT
Alert ID:
Detection:
Host:
User:
File:
Path:
Severity:
Action:
HOST CONTEXT
Hostname:
IP:
Role:
Criticality:
Owner:
Endpoint Protection:
USER CONTEXT
User:
Role:
Privileged:
Expected Host:
Related Phishing Case:
FILE ANALYSIS
Filename:
Path:
Size:
Hash:
Type:
Source:
Downloaded:
Quarantined:
Malicious Classification:
EXECUTION
Executed:
Yes / No / Unknown
Execution Time:
Process:
Parent:
Command Line:
Blocked:
Terminated:
PROCESS TREE
Parent:
Primary Process:
Child 01:
Child 02:
Child 03:
Assessment:
FILE / SYSTEM CHANGES
Files Created:
Files Modified:
Registry/System Changes:
Unexpected Changes:
PERSISTENCE
Scheduled Task:
Service:
Startup Entry:
Other:
Persistence Confirmed:
Yes / No / Unknown
NETWORK
DNS Queries:
Destinations:
Ports:
Protocols:
Proxy Activity:
Firewall Activity:
Blocked / Allowed:
CONTROL OUTCOME
Detected:
Execution Prevented:
Process Terminated:
File Quarantined:
Network Blocked:
Endpoint Isolated:
IOC CORRELATION
Hash on Other Hosts:
Domain on Other Hosts:
IP on Other Hosts:
URL on Other Hosts:
EMAIL CORRELATION
Related Email:
Sender:
Attachment/URL Match:
Recipient:
Timeline Match:
IDENTITY CORRELATION
Unexpected Authentication:
MFA Events:
Credential Risk:
SCOPE
Affected Hosts:
Affected Users:
Executed On:
Network Communications:
Potential Credential Exposure:
TELEMETRY GAPS
Gap 01:
Impact:
Gap 02:
Impact:
FINAL ASSESSMENT
Disposition:
Execution Status:
Endpoint Compromise:
Confirmed / Potential / Not Observed
Severity:
Confidence:
Priority:
Known Impact:
Escalation:
Yes / No
Containment Recommended:
Yes / No
Remaining Questions:
Ready for Network Security Alert Investigation:
Yes / No

Do not:

Execute suspicious files
Disable security software
Run unknown binaries
Open suspicious attachments normally
Upload sensitive files to unapproved public services
Modify suspicious files
Delete original evidence
Remove artifacts before documenting them
Assume detection equals execution
Assume execution equals full compromise
Assume child process equals malicious behavior
Assume network connection equals exfiltration
Assume scheduled task equals persistence
Assume new service equals persistence
Assume hash match means every host executed the file
Reset accounts without authorization
Isolate business-critical systems without approval
Terminate production processes without authorization
Search unrelated user data
Create malware for the exercise
Attempt to reproduce malicious behavior

The professional rule is:

Investigate the malware’s observed behavior without reproducing the malware’s behavior yourself.

The file may have been blocked before execution.

Check:

  • process creation

  • control action

  • file quarantine

  • event timing

Process Exists but Command Line Is Missing

Section titled “Process Exists but Command Line Is Missing”

Document the telemetry gap.

Do not invent arguments.

Unknown reputation does not mean benign.

Use local behavior and evidence.

File Was Downloaded but User Says They Never Opened It

Section titled “File Was Downloaded but User Says They Never Opened It”

Check execution telemetry.

User statements are useful context, but execution evidence is stronger.

Determine:

  • which process generated it

  • whether it was allowed

  • whether data transfer is evidenced

Do not call it exfiltration automatically.

Document the containment as a positive control and continue scoping.

Determine execution separately for each endpoint.

Capture:

Original endpoint alert.

Case scope.

Host Profile.

User Profile.

File Delivery Profile.

File metadata.

File hash.

Execution status.

Execution Register.

Parent process.

Process tree.

Command-line evidence.

Child-process activity.

File-System Change Register.

System Change Register.

Persistence Register.

Network Connection Register.

DNS correlation.

Proxy/web correlation.

Security-Control Outcome.

Endpoint Security Control Matrix.

Hash search across endpoints.

IOC Correlation Matrix.

Email-to-Endpoint Correlation.

Identity correlation.

Privilege Context Register.

Endpoint Impact Matrix.

Host Scope.

User Scope.

Process Scope.

IOC Scope.

Master Endpoint Timeline.

Hypothesis Matrix.

Containment Decision Matrix.

Escalation Package.

Endpoint Evidence Register.

Final Endpoint Investigation Register.

Mission Challenge worksheet.

Complete:

  • endpoint case opened

  • original alert preserved

  • host context established

  • user context established

  • file source investigated

  • file metadata documented

  • hash documented

  • execution status determined

  • process creation analyzed

  • parent process identified

  • child processes analyzed

  • command-line evidence reviewed

  • file-system changes reviewed

  • system changes reviewed

  • persistence indicators assessed

  • DNS evidence correlated

  • network evidence correlated

  • proxy evidence correlated

  • security-control outcome documented

  • positive controls documented

  • hash searched across other endpoints

  • other indicators correlated

  • phishing evidence correlated where applicable

  • identity activity correlated where applicable

  • privilege context determined

  • endpoint impact assessed

  • host scope determined

  • user scope determined

  • process scope determined

  • IOC scope determined

  • master timeline completed

  • competing hypotheses evaluated

  • disposition assigned

  • severity assigned

  • confidence assigned separately

  • containment decision documented

  • escalation decision documented

  • final Endpoint Investigation Report completed

# Lab 07 — Malware & Endpoint Investigation
## Executive Summary
## Mission Objective
## Case Information
## Initial Endpoint Alert
## Investigation Scope
## Host Context
## User Context
## File Delivery Analysis
## File Metadata
## File Hash Analysis
## Execution Analysis
## Parent-Child Process Analysis
## Process Tree
## Command-Line Analysis
## File-System Changes
## System Changes
## Persistence Analysis
## DNS Correlation
## Network Correlation
## Proxy / Web Correlation
## Security-Control Outcome
## Email Correlation
## Identity Correlation
## Privilege Context
## IOC Correlation
## Endpoint Impact
## Host Scope
## User Scope
## Process Scope
## IOC Scope
## Master Timeline
## Hypothesis Analysis
## Final Disposition
## Severity
## Confidence
## Positive Security Controls
## Containment Recommendation
## Escalation Decision
## Evidence Register
## Remaining Questions
## Limitations
## Conclusion

Question 1 — Does an endpoint malware alert prove the file executed?

Section titled “Question 1 — Does an endpoint malware alert prove the file executed?”

No.

The security product may have detected and blocked it before execution.

Question 2 — Does a file hash match prove endpoint compromise?

Section titled “Question 2 — Does a file hash match prove endpoint compromise?”

No.

It proves the file content matches the referenced hash. Execution and impact require separate evidence.

Question 3 — Why analyze the parent process?

Section titled “Question 3 — Why analyze the parent process?”

It helps determine how the suspicious process was launched and provides execution context.

Question 4 — Does PowerShell as a child process automatically prove malicious activity?

Section titled “Question 4 — Does PowerShell as a child process automatically prove malicious activity?”

No.

Context, command line, user, timing, and related behavior must be analyzed.

Question 5 — Does file creation prove execution?

Section titled “Question 5 — Does file creation prove execution?”

No.

A file can exist without ever being run.

Question 6 — Does an outbound connection prove data exfiltration?

Section titled “Question 6 — Does an outbound connection prove data exfiltration?”

No.

Connection and confirmed data transfer are separate findings.

Question 7 — Does a scheduled task automatically prove persistence?

Section titled “Question 7 — Does a scheduled task automatically prove persistence?”

No.

Scheduled tasks are commonly used for legitimate operations.

Question 8 — Why search the same hash across other endpoints?

Section titled “Question 8 — Why search the same hash across other endpoints?”

To determine whether the file is isolated to one endpoint or appears elsewhere.

Question 9 — Why correlate endpoint evidence with phishing evidence?

Section titled “Question 9 — Why correlate endpoint evidence with phishing evidence?”

It can establish whether an email delivery or user interaction preceded the endpoint alert.

Question 10 — What is the central question of this lab?

Section titled “Question 10 — What is the central question of this lab?”

“Was malicious code actually executed on the endpoint, what did it do, how far did the activity spread, and what evidence supports containment or escalation?”

After completing this lab, you should understand:

  • EDR alert investigation

  • malware-detection analysis

  • file metadata analysis

  • hash correlation

  • execution validation

  • process-tree analysis

  • parent-child relationships

  • command-line analysis

  • file-system change investigation

  • system-change investigation

  • persistence analysis

  • DNS correlation

  • endpoint network investigation

  • IOC correlation

  • phishing-to-endpoint correlation

  • identity correlation

  • privilege-context analysis

  • endpoint impact determination

  • incident scoping

  • containment planning

  • SOC escalation

  • endpoint incident reporting

A weak endpoint investigation looks like:

Malware Alert
Malicious Hash
Host Compromised

A professional endpoint investigation looks like:

Endpoint Alert
Identify Host + User
Identify File
Determine Execution
Parent / Child Processes
File + System Changes
Network Activity
Persistence Evidence
Correlate Email + Identity
Search Other Endpoints
Build Timeline
Determine Scope + Impact
Contain / Escalate / Report

Always distinguish:

Malware Detection
Malware Execution
Malware Execution
Complete Host Compromise
Hash Match
Execution
File Downloaded
File Executed
Child Process
Malicious Child Process
Network Connection
Data Exfiltration
Scheduled Task
Malicious Persistence
New Service
Malicious Persistence
One Affected Endpoint
Enterprise-Wide Compromise

The strongest endpoint analyst does not stop after asking:

“What did the antivirus detect?”

They continue until they can answer:

“Did it execute, what process chain followed, what changed on the system, what communications occurred, what other systems show the same indicators, and what evidence justifies containment?”

➡️ Lab 08 — Network Security Alert Investigation

In the next lab, you will shift from endpoint telemetry to network detection and analyze:

  • source and destination IP addresses

  • source and destination ports

  • protocols

  • network direction

  • IDS/IPS alerts

  • firewall actions

  • connection frequency

  • asset ownership

  • service context

  • related authentication

  • endpoint correlation

  • allowed vs blocked traffic

  • repeated communications

  • network scope

  • alert confidence

  • escalation decisions

The methodology becomes:

Network Alert → Source → Destination → Service → Direction → Context → Correlation → Scope → Disposition

The central question will be:

“What network activity triggered the alert, was the communication actually allowed or successful, and does the correlated evidence support expected traffic, suspicious behavior, or a security incident?”