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Lab 20 — SOC Analyst Capstone Investigation

Item Details
Lab 20
Lab Name SOC Analyst Capstone Investigation
Track CompTIA CySA+
Difficulty Advanced
Estimated Time 180–240 minutes
Primary Role Cybersecurity Analyst / SOC Analyst
Environment Enterprise SOC Investigation Lab
Primary Systems SIEM + Windows Endpoint + Linux Server + Web Server + Analyst Workstation
Primary Data Sources Windows Logs, Linux Logs, Zeek, Suricata, Web Logs, Authentication, Endpoint Telemetry, Threat Intelligence
Skills Alert Triage, Incident Investigation, Log Correlation, Threat Hunting, IOC Analysis, Timeline Reconstruction, Incident Scoping, ATT&CK Mapping, Containment, Reporting

Capstone Rule: You are not told exactly what happened. Treat every initial assumption as a hypothesis until supported by evidence.

Lab Safety: Perform all investigation activities only inside the authorized GoHackersCloud CySA+ lab environment. Do not execute suspicious files or interact directly with malicious infrastructure.

You are beginning your shift as a SOC Analyst at GHC Enterprise.

During the overnight period, several alerts were generated across different security systems.

Individually, they appear unrelated.

The SIEM contains:

Multiple Authentication Failures
Successful Authentication
Suspicious PowerShell Activity
Endpoint Malware Alert
Unusual DNS Query
Suricata Network Alert
Unexpected Web Request
Outbound Network Connection

No incident has yet been declared.

The overnight analyst left the following note:

“Multiple alerts occurred between 01:00 and 04:00. Possible relationship between authentication, endpoint, and network events. Requires investigation.”

You are assigned:

Case:
GHC-SOC-2026-020
Priority:
Unassigned
Status:
Investigation Required

Your responsibility is to determine what actually happened.

You must answer:

Was there a compromise?
How did it begin?
Which identity was involved?
Which endpoint was affected?
What executed?
Did malware run?
Was persistence established?
Did the attacker obtain elevated privileges?
Was lateral movement attempted?
Was a web application involved?
What external infrastructure was contacted?
How many systems are affected?
What data may have been exposed?
Is the threat still active?
What should be contained?
What should happen next?

Mission Objective: Conduct an end-to-end SOC investigation using multiple telemetry sources, reconstruct the complete attack story, determine organizational impact, and produce defensible technical and executive incident reports.

By completing this capstone, you will be able to:

  • triage multiple security alerts

  • establish an investigation strategy

  • correlate security telemetry

  • investigate authentication anomalies

  • analyze Windows security logs

  • investigate Linux security logs

  • analyze process execution

  • investigate PowerShell activity

  • analyze endpoint malware evidence

  • investigate DNS activity

  • analyze network connections

  • correlate Zeek telemetry

  • investigate Suricata alerts

  • analyze web application activity

  • enrich indicators with threat intelligence

  • identify persistence

  • investigate privilege activity

  • detect lateral movement

  • identify potential command-and-control activity

  • investigate possible data exfiltration

  • collect and preserve evidence

  • reconstruct an attack timeline

  • determine incident scope

  • map observed behavior to MITRE ATT&CK

  • assign incident severity

  • recommend containment

  • recommend remediation

  • produce technical findings

  • produce an executive incident summary

1. Understand the Capstone Investigation Model

Section titled “1. Understand the Capstone Investigation Model”

Unlike previous labs, you will not investigate one predefined security problem.

You will begin with:

Raw Alerts

and work toward:

Raw Alerts
Triage
Evidence Collection
Correlation
Hypothesis
Validation
Attack Timeline
Scope
Impact
Containment
Recovery Recommendations
Reporting

Your job is to reconstruct the incident from evidence.

Start:

CYSA-ANALYST
10.10.10.10
CYSA-WIN01
10.10.10.20
CYSA-LINUX01
10.10.10.30
CYSA-SIEM
10.10.10.40
CYSA-WEB01
10.10.10.50

Verify connectivity only where required for investigation.

Confirm the SIEM contains data from:

Windows
Linux
Zeek
Suricata
DNS
Authentication
Web Server
Endpoint Security

Do not begin by searching random indicators.

First understand what evidence is available.

On CYSA-ANALYST:

Terminal window
mkdir -p ~/CySA-Lab/Investigations/LAB20/{Alerts,Evidence,Windows,Linux,Network,Web,IOCs,Timeline,ATTACK,Screenshots,Reports}

Create:

Terminal window
touch ~/CySA-Lab/Investigations/LAB20/investigation-notes.md

Use:

Case ID:
GHC-SOC-2026-020

Document:

Case ID:
GHC-SOC-2026-020
Analyst:
<your name>
Investigation Start:
<timestamp>
Initial Priority:
Unassigned
Known Investigation Window:
01:00–04:00
Current Status:
Triage

Do not assign a final severity yet.

Collect every potentially related alert.

Create:

Alert ID Time Source Host User Severity
A001 <time> Authentication <host> <user> Medium
A002 <time> Endpoint <host> <user> High
A003 <time> Suricata <host> N/A High
A004 <time> Web <host> N/A Medium

Your actual values should come from the lab.

Arrange alerts:

Earliest
Authentication
Endpoint
DNS
Network
Web
Latest

Do not assume alert order equals attack order.

Some detections may occur long after the underlying activity began.

Select the alert containing the strongest combination of:

Specific Host
Specific User
Specific Indicator
High-Fidelity Detection

Good pivots include:

Username
Hostname
Source IP
Destination IP
Domain
File Hash
Process

For example:

H1:
Account compromise led to endpoint access.
H2:
Malware executed on CYSA-WIN01.
H3:
Network alerts are related to endpoint activity.
H4:
Web activity is part of the same incident.
H5:
The alerts are unrelated.

You must test these hypotheses.

Search:

Event ID 4625

Determine:

Target User
Source IP
Destination Host
Logon Type
Failure Reason
First Attempt
Last Attempt
Number of Attempts

Look for:

One User
+
Many Password Attempts

or:

Many Users
+
One/Few Attempts Each

or:

Multiple Failures
Successful Login

Classify the pattern based on evidence.

Search:

Event ID 4624

for the affected identity.

Compare:

Source IP
Destination Host
Logon Type
Timestamp

with the failed attempts.

Search:

Event ID 4672

Determine whether special privileges were assigned.

Ask:

Was this expected?
Was the account normally privileged?
Did privilege occur shortly after suspicious authentication?

Example:

Time Event User Source
01:13 Failed login user01 Source A
01:14 Failed login user01 Source A
01:17 Successful login user01 Source A
01:18 Privileged session user01 CYSA-WIN01

Do not conclude compromise from chronology alone.

Correlate additional evidence.

Search the affected username across all available telemetry.

Determine:

Which hosts?
Which logons?
Which processes?
Which applications?
Which alerts?
Which network events?

If evidence points to:

CYSA-WIN01
10.10.10.20

search the host across:

Windows Logs
Endpoint Telemetry
DNS
Zeek
Suricata
SIEM Alerts

Search:

Event ID 4688

where available.

Identify processes executed shortly after suspicious authentication.

Record:

Process
Parent Process
Command Line
User
Timestamp

Create:

Parent Process
Child Process
Grandchild Process

Look for unexpected relationships.

For example:

Office Application
PowerShell
Unknown Executable

or:

Browser
Downloaded File
Script Interpreter

Search:

Event ID 4104

where available.

Review for:

Encoded Commands
Obfuscation
Unexpected Downloads
Discovery
Security Configuration Changes
Suspicious Script Execution

Do not execute any commands found in the telemetry.

Document:

Filename
Path
Creation Time
Modification Time
Execution Time
Associated Process
User

Pay special attention to files appearing shortly before suspicious execution.

For safe lab artifacts:

Terminal window
sha256sum <file>

Record:

SHA-256:
<hash>

Do not execute the suspicious file.

Use approved threat-intelligence sources.

Determine:

Known / Unknown
Classification
Malware Family
First Seen
Related Infrastructure
Confidence

Remember:

Unknown Hash
Benign File

Review:

Detection Name
File
Hash
Process
User
Action
Timestamp

Determine whether the security product:

Blocked
Quarantined
Detected Only
Failed to Remediate

Look for:

Scheduled Tasks
Services
Startup Items
Registry Run Keys
New Accounts
Modified Configuration

Determine whether persistence was actually established.

Search for:

Event ID 4720

where relevant.

Record:

New Account
Creating Account
Timestamp
Host

Review suspicious tasks.

Document:

Task Name
Action
Executable
User
Trigger
Creation Time

Do not delete anything during investigation.

Look for unexpected:

New Services
Changed Services
Unusual Executables
User-Writable Paths

Correlate service activity with the attack timeline.

If the evidence reaches:

CYSA-LINUX01

review:

Terminal window
sudo grep -i "failed\|accepted" /var/log/auth.log

or:

Terminal window
sudo journalctl -u ssh

Look for:

Failed SSH
Successful SSH
Source IP
Username
Timestamp

Review relevant:

Authentication
sudo
Processes
Services
Cron
File Changes

Do not assume the Linux server is compromised merely because it was contacted.

Pivot on the compromised endpoint.

Search for:

Queried Domain
Timestamp
Source Host
Response IP

Identify unusual or newly observed domains.

For each suspicious domain, investigate:

Reputation
Registration Context
Associated IPs
Historical Activity
Malware Associations

Assign confidence.

Search:

CYSA-WIN01

or:

10.10.10.20

Review:

conn.log
dns.log
http.log
ssl.log / tls.log

where available.

Record:

Source IP
Destination IP
Destination Port
Protocol
Duration
Bytes Sent
Bytes Received

Look for unusual external and internal communications.

Search for alerts involving the affected systems.

Record:

Signature
Category
Severity
Source
Destination
Timestamp

Determine whether Suricata evidence supports your endpoint findings.

35. Correlate Endpoint and Network Evidence

Section titled “35. Correlate Endpoint and Network Evidence”

Example:

02:14:03
Suspicious Process Executes
02:14:06
DNS Query
02:14:07
External Connection
02:14:08
Suricata Alert

This is stronger than any individual event.

36. Investigate Possible Command-and-Control Activity

Section titled “36. Investigate Possible Command-and-Control Activity”

Look for:

Repeated Connections
Rare External Destinations
Unexpected Ports
Periodic Communication
Suspicious DNS
Connections from Unexpected Processes

Do not classify traffic as C2 from timing alone.

Determine whether the suspected compromised endpoint contacted:

CYSA-LINUX01
CYSA-WEB01
Other Internal Systems

Record:

Destination
Protocol
Port
Timestamp
User
Authentication

Look for evidence involving:

SMB
RDP
SSH
WinRM
Remote Services
Administrative Shares
Remote Authentication

Your task is to detect lateral movement, not reproduce it.

A network connection alone does not prove compromise.

Look for:

Internal Connection
+
Authentication
+
Remote Process / Session

before declaring successful lateral movement.

If:

CYSA-WEB01

appears in the incident, review:

Access Logs
Error Logs
Authentication
Application Logs
File Activity
Processes
Network Activity

Look for:

Suspicious Source IP
Unusual URI
Authentication Attempts
Unexpected POST
Injection Indicators
File Uploads

Determine whether web activity is related to the primary incident.

Look for recently created files.

For example:

Terminal window
sudo find /var/www -type f -mmin -180 -ls

Adjust the path and time to your environment.

Do not execute suspicious files.

43. Investigate Potential Web-Shell Evidence

Section titled “43. Investigate Potential Web-Shell Evidence”

Look for:

Unexpected Script
Repeated Requests to Script
Web Process Spawning OS Process
Outbound Connection
Recently Modified Web File

Require corroborating evidence before declaring a web shell.

44. Determine Whether Web Activity Is Related

Section titled “44. Determine Whether Web Activity Is Related”

Possible conclusions:

Related to Primary Incident
Independent Attack
Benign Activity
Insufficient Evidence

Not every alert occurring in the same window belongs to the same incident.

Create:

IOC ID Type Indicator Source Confidence
IOC-001 IP <IP> Authentication High
IOC-002 Domain <domain> DNS High
IOC-003 Hash <SHA-256> Endpoint High
IOC-004 File <filename> Endpoint High
IOC-005 IP <IP> Network Medium

For each IOC, determine:

Reputation
Context
Relationships
First Seen
Last Seen
Internal Matches
Confidence

Avoid relying on a single reputation score.

Search each:

IP
Domain
Hash
Filename
Username

across all telemetry.

Your objective is to discover the true scope.

Example:

User Account
CYSA-WIN01
Suspicious Process
Malware Hash
Domain
External IP

Additional evidence may show:

CYSA-WIN01
Internal Authentication
CYSA-LINUX01

This relationship map becomes part of the attack story.

Look for:

Large File Enumeration
Sensitive Directory Access
Archive Creation
Database Access
File Share Access

Record only evidence-supported findings.

Review:

Outbound Bytes
Destination
Protocol
Timing
Archive Creation
Cloud Storage Activity
External Connections

Classify:

Confirmed
Suspected
No Evidence Observed
Unknown

51. Determine the Earliest Suspicious Activity

Section titled “51. Determine the Earliest Suspicious Activity”

You may have begun with an alert at:

03:10

but discover suspicious authentication at:

01:14

Continue moving backward until you identify the earliest defensible suspicious activity.

Possible conclusions:

Credential Compromise
Phishing
Malicious Download
Public-Facing Application
Remote Service
Unknown

Do not force a root cause when evidence is insufficient.

Document the first confirmed attacker-controlled or suspicious execution.

Record:

Host
User
Process
Parent
Command Line
Timestamp

Classify:

Confirmed
Attempted
Not Observed
Unknown

Document the supporting evidence.

55. Identify Privilege Escalation or Privileged Use

Section titled “55. Identify Privilege Escalation or Privileged Use”

Determine whether:

Privilege Escalation Occurred

or whether:

Already-Privileged Credentials Were Used

These are different findings.

Determine whether evidence suggests:

Credential Theft
Token Theft
Password Access
Credential Store Access

If unsupported:

Credential Access:
Not Confirmed

Look for evidence of:

System Discovery
Account Discovery
Network Discovery
Process Discovery
Service Discovery
File and Directory Discovery

Document:

Source Host
Destination Host
Identity
Protocol
Timestamp
Outcome

Differentiate:

Attempted

from:

Successful

Document:

Process
Domain
IP
Protocol
First Seen
Last Seen
Frequency
Threat Intelligence

Classify confidence.

Look for:

File Encryption
File Deletion
Service Disruption
Account Modification
Application Modification
Data Exposure

Do not assume ransomware or destructive activity unless supported by evidence.

Create a table such as:

Time Host User Event Evidence
01:14 WIN01 user01 Authentication failures Windows
01:17 WIN01 user01 Successful login Windows
01:22 WIN01 user01 Suspicious process Endpoint
01:23 WIN01 user01 PowerShell activity PowerShell
01:25 WIN01 user01 DNS query Zeek
01:26 WIN01 user01 External connection Zeek
01:26 WIN01 N/A Network alert Suricata
01:45 WIN01 → LINUX01 user01 Internal activity Network/Auth
02:10 WEB01 N/A Web activity Web Logs

Use your actual evidence.

Convert the timeline into a narrative.

For example:

Suspicious Authentication
Account Access
Endpoint Execution
PowerShell
Malware
Persistence
External Communication
Internal Discovery
Lateral Movement
Potential Data Access

Every arrow should be supported by evidence.

Create:

Attack Stage Observed Behavior ATT&CK Context
Initial Access <evidence> <technique>
Execution <evidence> <technique>
Persistence <evidence> <technique>
Credential Access <evidence> <technique>
Discovery <evidence> <technique>
Lateral Movement <evidence> <technique>
C2 <evidence> <technique>
Exfiltration <evidence> <technique>
Impact <evidence> <technique>

Do not map techniques that were not observed.

Classify every system:

Asset Evidence Status
CYSA-WIN01 Execution + Network Confirmed Compromised
CYSA-LINUX01 Internal Contact Investigate
CYSA-WEB01 Web Alert Investigate
CYSA-SIEM No compromise evidence Monitoring

Use:

Confirmed Compromised
Suspected Compromised
Exposed / Contacted
Unaffected
Unknown

Create:

Identity Evidence Status
user01 Suspicious authentication Compromised/Suspected
admin01 Privileged activity Investigate
service-web Web process Monitor

Ask:

Was sensitive information accessed?
Were credentials exposed?
Was data staged?
Was data transferred externally?

Classify:

None
Low
Moderate
High
Unknown

Ask:

Were files modified?
Was persistence installed?
Were accounts changed?
Was application content altered?
Were configurations changed?

Ask:

Were services interrupted?
Were files encrypted?
Were systems unavailable?
Was business functionality affected?

Consider:

Number of Compromised Systems
Identity Privilege
Asset Criticality
Malware
Persistence
Lateral Movement
Potential Data Exposure
Business Impact
Active Attacker Presence

Classify:

Low
Medium
High
Critical

and document why.

70. Determine Whether the Threat Is Active

Section titled “70. Determine Whether the Threat Is Active”

Ask:

Are suspicious sessions active?
Are malicious processes running?
Are network connections continuing?
Are additional hosts being contacted?
Are new alerts appearing?

Classify:

Active
Contained
Historical
Unknown

Collect:

SIEM Events
Windows Logs
Linux Logs
Web Logs
Process Evidence
PowerShell Logs
Suspicious Files
Hashes
Network Logs
PCAP
Threat Intelligence
Screenshots

Follow the evidence procedures from Lab 17.

For preserved files:

Terminal window
sha256sum <evidence-file>

Create:

LAB20/Evidence/evidence-hashes.txt

Record:

Evidence ID
Filename
Source
SHA-256
Collection Time
Evidence ID Evidence Source Hash
EVID-001 Security Log WIN01 <SHA-256>
EVID-002 Suspicious File WIN01 <SHA-256>
EVID-003 PCAP Network <SHA-256>
EVID-004 Web Log WEB01 <SHA-256>

74. Determine Immediate Containment Priorities

Section titled “74. Determine Immediate Containment Priorities”

Rank actions.

Example:

P1 — Immediate
Isolate confirmed compromised endpoints
Secure compromised identities
Revoke active sessions
Block validated malicious infrastructure
Preserve volatile evidence

Then:

P2 — Urgent
Hunt for IOCs
Investigate lateral movement
Restrict affected network segments
Protect critical systems
Review privileged accounts

Then:

P3 — Recovery Preparation
Remove persistence
Patch exploited vulnerabilities
Rotate credentials
Validate clean backups
Prepare system rebuilds

Do not immediately:

Delete suspicious files
Clear logs
Reimage everything
Restart systems
Disable services

without considering:

Evidence Preservation
Business Impact
Containment Strategy
Incident Response Procedures

Depending on your findings:

Remove Malware
Remove Persistence
Patch Vulnerabilities
Reset Credentials
Rotate Secrets
Remove Unauthorized Accounts
Rebuild Compromised Systems
Correct Security Misconfigurations

Include:

Restore from Known-Good Backup
Validate System Integrity
Reconnect Systems Gradually
Increase Monitoring
Verify Authentication
Validate Business Services
Confirm No Recurrence

Ask:

Which attacker behavior was detected?
Which behavior was missed?
Which alert occurred too late?
Which telemetry was unavailable?
Which detection could be improved?

This transforms the incident into a defensive improvement opportunity.

Examples:

Improve authentication correlation
Alert on unusual PowerShell lineage
Detect suspicious DNS from endpoints
Correlate endpoint and network telemetry
Monitor new scheduled tasks
Detect unusual internal authentication
Improve web-server process monitoring

80. Identify Security Control Improvements

Section titled “80. Identify Security Control Improvements”

Consider:

MFA
Least Privilege
Network Segmentation
EDR
Application Hardening
Patch Management
Email Security
Web Application Firewall
DNS Security
Centralized Logging
Backup Protection

Recommendations must connect to actual findings.

Use:

# Technical Incident Report
## Case Information
Case ID:
GHC-SOC-2026-020
## Incident Classification
Document the final classification.
## Severity
Low / Medium / High / Critical
## Initial Detection
Document the alerts that initiated the investigation.
## Initial Access
Document evidence.
## Authentication
Document:
- users
- source IPs
- failures
- successes
- privilege
## Endpoint Activity
Document:
- processes
- command lines
- files
- hashes
## Persistence
Document findings.
## Credential Activity
Document findings.
## Network Activity
Document:
- DNS
- IPs
- domains
- ports
- Zeek
- Suricata
## Lateral Movement
Document:
- source
- destination
- identity
- protocol
- outcome
## Web Activity
Document relevant findings.
## Indicators of Compromise
List all validated IOCs.
## Threat Intelligence
Document enrichment.
## Incident Scope
List affected:
- systems
- users
- applications
## Data Impact
Document confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
## Timeline
Insert the master incident timeline.
## MITRE ATT&CK
Document evidence-supported techniques.
## Root Cause
Confirmed / Suspected / Undetermined
## Containment
Document immediate actions.
## Eradication
Document recommendations.
## Recovery
Document recommendations.
## Detection Improvements
Document lessons learned.
## Final Assessment
Summarize the technical investigation.

Your executive report should avoid unnecessary technical detail.

Use:

# Executive Incident Summary
## Incident
GHC-SOC-2026-020
## What Happened?
Provide a concise explanation.
## Business Impact
Explain:
- affected systems
- affected users
- service impact
- potential data exposure
## Current Status
Active / Contained / Recovered / Under Investigation
## Severity
Low / Medium / High / Critical
## Actions Taken
Summarize containment actions.
## Remaining Risk
Explain unresolved concerns.
## Next Steps
Summarize:
- remediation
- recovery
- monitoring
- security improvements

83. Mission Challenge — Final SOC Investigation

Section titled “83. Mission Challenge — Final SOC Investigation”

Your SOC Manager asks:

Determine what happened between 01:00 and 04:00, whether the alerts represent one coordinated incident, what assets and identities were affected, and what the organization must do next.

You must answer:

  1. What was the earliest suspicious event?

  2. What alert first brought the activity to the SOC’s attention?

  3. Which identity was initially involved?

  4. What source initiated suspicious authentication?

  5. Did authentication succeed?

  6. Was privileged access involved?

  7. Which endpoint became suspicious?

  8. What processes executed?

  9. Was PowerShell involved?

  10. Was malware identified?

  11. What was the malware hash?

  12. What threat intelligence exists?

  13. Was persistence established?

  14. Was credential access observed?

  15. Was system discovery performed?

  16. What domains were queried?

  17. What external IPs were contacted?

  18. What did Zeek observe?

  19. What did Suricata detect?

  20. Was command-and-control activity present?

  21. Did the attacker contact additional internal systems?

  22. Was lateral movement attempted?

  23. Did lateral movement succeed?

  24. Was CYSA-LINUX01 compromised?

  25. Was CYSA-WEB01 involved?

  26. Was web exploitation observed?

  27. Were suspicious server files created?

  28. Was data collected?

  29. Was potential exfiltration observed?

  30. What are the validated IOCs?

  31. How are the indicators related?

  32. What is the complete attack timeline?

  33. Which MITRE ATT&CK techniques are supported?

  34. Which systems are confirmed compromised?

  35. Which identities are compromised or suspected?

  36. What is the confidentiality impact?

  37. What is the integrity impact?

  38. What is the availability impact?

  39. What is the incident severity?

  40. Is the threat still active?

  41. What should be contained first?

  42. What evidence must be preserved?

  43. What is the likely root cause?

  44. What remediation is required?

  45. What security controls should be improved?

Update:

~/CySA-Lab/Investigations/LAB20/investigation-notes.md

Use:

# LAB20 SOC Analyst Capstone Investigation
## Case
GHC-SOC-2026-020
## Initial Alerts
Document all alerts.
## Investigation Hypotheses
Document your initial hypotheses.
## Authentication Investigation
Document findings.
## Endpoint Investigation
Document findings.
## Malware Investigation
Document findings.
## Persistence Investigation
Document findings.
## Network Investigation
Document findings.
## Linux Investigation
Document findings.
## Web Investigation
Document findings.
## Threat Intelligence
Document IOC enrichment.
## Lateral Movement
Document findings.
## Potential Exfiltration
Document findings.
## IOC Inventory
Document all validated indicators.
## Incident Scope
### Confirmed Compromised
List systems.
### Suspected
List systems.
### Exposed / Contacted
List systems.
### Unaffected
List systems where supported.
## Identity Scope
Document affected identities.
## Master Timeline
Build the chronological incident timeline.
## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
Document evidence-supported techniques.
## Impact
### Confidentiality
Document assessment.
### Integrity
Document assessment.
### Availability
Document assessment.
## Severity
Low / Medium / High / Critical
## Incident Status
Active / Contained / Historical / Unknown
## Root Cause
Confirmed / Suspected / Undetermined
## Immediate Containment
Document prioritized actions.
## Eradication
Document recommendations.
## Recovery
Document recommendations.
## Detection Improvements
Document defensive improvements.
## Final Technical Assessment
Summarize the complete incident.

A simulated final assessment might resemble:

Case:
GHC-SOC-2026-020
Classification:
Confirmed Multi-Stage Security Incident
Initial Access:
Suspicious authentication activity was followed by successful access to CYSA-WIN01.
Identity:
A user account showed authentication activity inconsistent with expected behavior.
Execution:
Suspicious PowerShell and endpoint process activity occurred shortly after authentication.
Malware:
An unknown executable was identified and preserved for analysis.
Network:
CYSA-WIN01 queried suspicious infrastructure and established outbound connections.
Threat Intelligence:
Several indicators were associated with suspicious activity.
Persistence:
Persistence-related activity was identified and requires remediation.
Lateral Movement:
The compromised endpoint contacted additional internal systems. Successful compromise must be determined independently for each destination.
Web Activity:
Web-server alerts were investigated separately and correlated where evidence supported a relationship.
Scope:
CYSA-WIN01 confirmed compromised.
Additional assets require continued investigation.
Data Exfiltration:
Not confirmed from currently available evidence.
Severity:
High
Status:
Containment required.
Recommended Response:
Isolate confirmed compromised systems, secure affected identities, preserve evidence, block validated malicious indicators, investigate internal movement, remove persistence, rotate credentials, remediate the initial access vector, and conduct environment-wide IOC hunting.

Capture:

01-alert-inventory.png
02-authentication-failures.png
03-successful-authentication.png
04-privileged-access.png
05-user-pivot.png
06-endpoint-pivot.png
07-process-execution.png
08-process-tree.png
09-powershell-activity.png
10-malware-alert.png
11-file-hash.png
12-persistence.png
13-dns-activity.png
14-zeek-connections.png
15-suricata-alerts.png
16-threat-intelligence.png
17-internal-connections.png
18-lateral-movement.png
19-linux-investigation.png
20-web-investigation.png
21-ioc-inventory.png
22-ioc-relationship-map.png
23-potential-exfiltration.png
24-master-timeline.png
25-mitre-attack-map.png
26-incident-scope.png
27-identity-scope.png
28-evidence-inventory.png
29-containment-plan.png
30-technical-report.png
31-executive-summary.png
32-final-assessment.png
  • All initial alerts were identified

  • Alerts were placed chronologically

  • Investigation hypotheses were created

  • High-value pivots were identified

  • Failed authentication was investigated

  • Successful authentication was investigated

  • Privileged access was investigated

  • User activity was correlated across systems

  • Process execution was investigated

  • Process lineage was constructed

  • PowerShell activity was analyzed

  • Suspicious files were identified

  • File hashes were calculated

  • Malware alerts were investigated

  • Persistence was investigated

  • DNS activity was analyzed

  • Zeek telemetry was analyzed

  • Suricata alerts were investigated

  • External communications were identified

  • Potential C2 was assessed

  • Internal connections were investigated

  • Internal authentication was reviewed

  • Lateral-movement indicators were investigated

  • Attempted and successful movement were distinguished

  • Linux authentication was reviewed where relevant

  • Linux activity was investigated

  • Compromise status was determined

  • Web logs were reviewed where relevant

  • Suspicious requests were investigated

  • Server-side evidence was correlated

  • Web compromise status was determined

  • IOC inventory was created

  • Significant IOCs were enriched

  • IOCs were searched across the environment

  • IOC relationships were documented

  • Confidence levels were assigned

  • Potential data collection was investigated

  • Potential exfiltration was assessed

  • Confidentiality impact was assessed

  • Integrity impact was assessed

  • Availability impact was assessed

  • Earliest suspicious activity was identified

  • Initial access was investigated

  • Execution was identified

  • Persistence was assessed

  • Credential activity was assessed

  • Discovery was assessed

  • Lateral movement was assessed

  • C2 was assessed

  • Impact was assessed

  • Master timeline was completed

  • Attack story was reconstructed

  • MITRE ATT&CK mapping was completed

  • Incident scope was established

  • Identity scope was established

  • Severity was assigned

  • Threat activity status was determined

  • Evidence was preserved

  • Evidence hashes were recorded

  • Containment priorities were established

  • Eradication recommendations were created

  • Recovery recommendations were created

  • Detection gaps were identified

  • Security-control improvements were recommended

  • Technical incident report was completed

  • Executive incident summary was completed

  • Final analyst assessment was completed

  • Required screenshots/evidence were captured

This capstone brought together the complete CySA+ analyst workflow.

You began with:

Disconnected Alerts

and transformed them into:

Alerts
Evidence
Correlation
Indicators
Relationships
Timeline
Attack Story
Scope
Impact
Containment
Remediation
Reporting

The most important lesson from this lab is:

A SOC analyst’s job is not simply to respond to alerts. The analyst must transform fragmented telemetry into an evidence-backed explanation of what happened, what is affected, and what the organization should do next.

A mature investigation combines:

Identity Evidence
+
Endpoint Evidence
+
Network Evidence
+
Application Evidence
+
Threat Intelligence
+
Timeline Analysis
+
Business Context
=
Defensible Incident Assessment

After completing this capstone, you should be able to:

  • triage enterprise security alerts

  • manage a structured SOC investigation

  • investigate suspicious authentication

  • analyze Windows and Linux telemetry

  • investigate endpoint processes

  • analyze PowerShell activity

  • investigate malware alerts

  • analyze file hashes

  • identify persistence

  • investigate network traffic

  • analyze Zeek telemetry

  • investigate Suricata alerts

  • analyze DNS activity

  • investigate web security events

  • enrich indicators with threat intelligence

  • correlate endpoint and network evidence

  • investigate lateral movement

  • assess command-and-control activity

  • investigate potential data exfiltration

  • build IOC relationship maps

  • reconstruct multi-stage attacks

  • map evidence to MITRE ATT&CK

  • establish incident scope

  • assess CIA impact

  • determine incident severity

  • prioritize containment

  • recommend eradication and recovery

  • identify detection gaps

  • produce technical incident reports

  • communicate incidents to leadership

You have completed the full CompTIA CySA+ practical lab sequence:

Lab 01 — Build Your CySA+ SOC Lab Environment
Lab 02 — Windows Security Log Analysis
Lab 03 — Windows Endpoint Investigation
Lab 04 — Linux Security Log Investigation
Lab 05 — Network Traffic Analysis with Wireshark
Lab 06 — Network Attack Detection with Zeek
Lab 07 — IDS Alert Investigation with Suricata
Lab 08 — SIEM Fundamentals and Log Ingestion
Lab 09 — SIEM Detection and Correlation Lab
Lab 10 — Authentication Attack Investigation
Lab 11 — Phishing Email Investigation
Lab 12 — Malware Analysis Fundamentals
Lab 13 — Endpoint Malware Investigation
Lab 14 — Vulnerability Scanning and Assessment
Lab 15 — Vulnerability Prioritization with CVSS, EPSS and Threat Intelligence
Lab 16 — Threat Intelligence and IOC Enrichment
Lab 17 — Incident Triage and Evidence Collection
Lab 18 — Ransomware Incident Investigation
Lab 19 — Web Application Attack Investigation
Lab 20 — SOC Analyst Capstone Investigation

You have completed the hands-on investigation labs.

The next stage should move from guided investigations to repeatable analyst procedures.

Instead of learning:

How do I investigate this?

you will build operational procedures answering:

When this happens in the SOC,
what exactly should the analyst do?

The runbook series will convert the skills developed throughout these labs into reusable SOC workflows for:

  • alert triage

  • suspicious authentication

  • phishing

  • malware

  • endpoint compromise

  • network alerts

  • threat-intelligence enrichment

  • vulnerability escalation

  • ransomware

  • web application incidents

  • evidence collection

  • incident escalation

The progression becomes:

Lessons
Labs
Investigation Skills
Runbooks
Repeatable SOC Operations
Job-Ready Analyst Workflow

➡️ Next: CySA+ Runbook 01 — SOC Alert Triage and Escalation