Lab 20 — SOC Analyst Capstone Investigation
Mission Information
Section titled “Mission Information”| Item | Details |
|---|---|
| Lab | 20 |
| Lab Name | SOC Analyst Capstone Investigation |
| Track | CompTIA CySA+ |
| Difficulty | Advanced |
| Estimated Time | 180–240 minutes |
| Primary Role | Cybersecurity Analyst / SOC Analyst |
| Environment | Enterprise SOC Investigation Lab |
| Primary Systems | SIEM + Windows Endpoint + Linux Server + Web Server + Analyst Workstation |
| Primary Data Sources | Windows Logs, Linux Logs, Zeek, Suricata, Web Logs, Authentication, Endpoint Telemetry, Threat Intelligence |
| Skills | Alert Triage, Incident Investigation, Log Correlation, Threat Hunting, IOC Analysis, Timeline Reconstruction, Incident Scoping, ATT&CK Mapping, Containment, Reporting |
Capstone Rule: You are not told exactly what happened. Treat every initial assumption as a hypothesis until supported by evidence.
Lab Safety: Perform all investigation activities only inside the authorized GoHackersCloud CySA+ lab environment. Do not execute suspicious files or interact directly with malicious infrastructure.
Mission Scenario
Section titled “Mission Scenario”You are beginning your shift as a SOC Analyst at GHC Enterprise.
During the overnight period, several alerts were generated across different security systems.
Individually, they appear unrelated.
The SIEM contains:
Multiple Authentication Failures
Successful Authentication
Suspicious PowerShell Activity
Endpoint Malware Alert
Unusual DNS Query
Suricata Network Alert
Unexpected Web Request
Outbound Network ConnectionNo incident has yet been declared.
The overnight analyst left the following note:
“Multiple alerts occurred between 01:00 and 04:00. Possible relationship between authentication, endpoint, and network events. Requires investigation.”
You are assigned:
Case:GHC-SOC-2026-020
Priority:Unassigned
Status:Investigation RequiredYour responsibility is to determine what actually happened.
You must answer:
Was there a compromise?
How did it begin?
Which identity was involved?
Which endpoint was affected?
What executed?
Did malware run?
Was persistence established?
Did the attacker obtain elevated privileges?
Was lateral movement attempted?
Was a web application involved?
What external infrastructure was contacted?
How many systems are affected?
What data may have been exposed?
Is the threat still active?
What should be contained?
What should happen next?Mission Objective: Conduct an end-to-end SOC investigation using multiple telemetry sources, reconstruct the complete attack story, determine organizational impact, and produce defensible technical and executive incident reports.
Mission Objectives
Section titled “Mission Objectives”By completing this capstone, you will be able to:
-
triage multiple security alerts
-
establish an investigation strategy
-
correlate security telemetry
-
investigate authentication anomalies
-
analyze Windows security logs
-
investigate Linux security logs
-
analyze process execution
-
investigate PowerShell activity
-
analyze endpoint malware evidence
-
investigate DNS activity
-
analyze network connections
-
correlate Zeek telemetry
-
investigate Suricata alerts
-
analyze web application activity
-
enrich indicators with threat intelligence
-
identify persistence
-
investigate privilege activity
-
detect lateral movement
-
identify potential command-and-control activity
-
investigate possible data exfiltration
-
collect and preserve evidence
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reconstruct an attack timeline
-
determine incident scope
-
map observed behavior to MITRE ATT&CK
-
assign incident severity
-
recommend containment
-
recommend remediation
-
produce technical findings
-
produce an executive incident summary
1. Understand the Capstone Investigation Model
Section titled “1. Understand the Capstone Investigation Model”Unlike previous labs, you will not investigate one predefined security problem.
You will begin with:
Raw Alertsand work toward:
Raw Alerts ↓Triage ↓Evidence Collection ↓Correlation ↓Hypothesis ↓Validation ↓Attack Timeline ↓Scope ↓Impact ↓Containment ↓Recovery Recommendations ↓ReportingYour job is to reconstruct the incident from evidence.
2. Start the Enterprise Lab
Section titled “2. Start the Enterprise Lab”Start:
CYSA-ANALYST10.10.10.10
CYSA-WIN0110.10.10.20
CYSA-LINUX0110.10.10.30
CYSA-SIEM10.10.10.40
CYSA-WEB0110.10.10.50Verify connectivity only where required for investigation.
3. Verify Telemetry
Section titled “3. Verify Telemetry”Confirm the SIEM contains data from:
Windows
Linux
Zeek
Suricata
DNS
Authentication
Web Server
Endpoint SecurityDo not begin by searching random indicators.
First understand what evidence is available.
4. Create the Case Workspace
Section titled “4. Create the Case Workspace”On CYSA-ANALYST:
mkdir -p ~/CySA-Lab/Investigations/LAB20/{Alerts,Evidence,Windows,Linux,Network,Web,IOCs,Timeline,ATTACK,Screenshots,Reports}Create:
touch ~/CySA-Lab/Investigations/LAB20/investigation-notes.mdUse:
Case ID:GHC-SOC-2026-0205. Record the Initial Case Information
Section titled “5. Record the Initial Case Information”Document:
Case ID:GHC-SOC-2026-020
Analyst:<your name>
Investigation Start:<timestamp>
Initial Priority:Unassigned
Known Investigation Window:01:00–04:00
Current Status:TriageDo not assign a final severity yet.
6. Create an Alert Inventory
Section titled “6. Create an Alert Inventory”Collect every potentially related alert.
Create:
| Alert ID | Time | Source | Host | User | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A001 | <time> |
Authentication | <host> |
<user> |
Medium |
| A002 | <time> |
Endpoint | <host> |
<user> |
High |
| A003 | <time> |
Suricata | <host> |
N/A | High |
| A004 | <time> |
Web | <host> |
N/A | Medium |
Your actual values should come from the lab.
7. Sort Alerts Chronologically
Section titled “7. Sort Alerts Chronologically”Arrange alerts:
Earliest ↓Authentication ↓Endpoint ↓DNS ↓Network ↓Web ↓LatestDo not assume alert order equals attack order.
Some detections may occur long after the underlying activity began.
8. Identify the First Investigation Pivot
Section titled “8. Identify the First Investigation Pivot”Select the alert containing the strongest combination of:
Specific Host
Specific User
Specific Indicator
High-Fidelity DetectionGood pivots include:
Username
Hostname
Source IP
Destination IP
Domain
File Hash
Process9. Create Initial Hypotheses
Section titled “9. Create Initial Hypotheses”For example:
H1:Account compromise led to endpoint access.
H2:Malware executed on CYSA-WIN01.
H3:Network alerts are related to endpoint activity.
H4:Web activity is part of the same incident.
H5:The alerts are unrelated.You must test these hypotheses.
10. Investigate Authentication Failures
Section titled “10. Investigate Authentication Failures”Search:
Event ID 4625Determine:
Target User
Source IP
Destination Host
Logon Type
Failure Reason
First Attempt
Last Attempt
Number of Attempts11. Identify Authentication Patterns
Section titled “11. Identify Authentication Patterns”Look for:
One User +Many Password Attemptsor:
Many Users +One/Few Attempts Eachor:
Multiple Failures ↓Successful LoginClassify the pattern based on evidence.
12. Investigate Successful Authentication
Section titled “12. Investigate Successful Authentication”Search:
Event ID 4624for the affected identity.
Compare:
Source IP
Destination Host
Logon Type
Timestampwith the failed attempts.
13. Investigate Privileged Authentication
Section titled “13. Investigate Privileged Authentication”Search:
Event ID 4672Determine whether special privileges were assigned.
Ask:
Was this expected?
Was the account normally privileged?
Did privilege occur shortly after suspicious authentication?14. Build the Authentication Timeline
Section titled “14. Build the Authentication Timeline”Example:
| Time | Event | User | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 01:13 | Failed login | user01 | Source A |
| 01:14 | Failed login | user01 | Source A |
| 01:17 | Successful login | user01 | Source A |
| 01:18 | Privileged session | user01 | CYSA-WIN01 |
Do not conclude compromise from chronology alone.
Correlate additional evidence.
15. Pivot on the User
Section titled “15. Pivot on the User”Search the affected username across all available telemetry.
Determine:
Which hosts?
Which logons?
Which processes?
Which applications?
Which alerts?
Which network events?16. Pivot on the Endpoint
Section titled “16. Pivot on the Endpoint”If evidence points to:
CYSA-WIN0110.10.10.20search the host across:
Windows Logs
Endpoint Telemetry
DNS
Zeek
Suricata
SIEM Alerts17. Investigate Process Creation
Section titled “17. Investigate Process Creation”Search:
Event ID 4688where available.
Identify processes executed shortly after suspicious authentication.
Record:
Process
Parent Process
Command Line
User
Timestamp18. Build the Process Tree
Section titled “18. Build the Process Tree”Create:
Parent Process ↓Child Process ↓Grandchild ProcessLook for unexpected relationships.
For example:
Office Application ↓PowerShell ↓Unknown Executableor:
Browser ↓Downloaded File ↓Script Interpreter19. Investigate PowerShell
Section titled “19. Investigate PowerShell”Search:
Event ID 4104where available.
Review for:
Encoded Commands
Obfuscation
Unexpected Downloads
Discovery
Security Configuration Changes
Suspicious Script ExecutionDo not execute any commands found in the telemetry.
20. Identify Suspicious Files
Section titled “20. Identify Suspicious Files”Document:
Filename
Path
Creation Time
Modification Time
Execution Time
Associated Process
UserPay special attention to files appearing shortly before suspicious execution.
21. Calculate File Hashes
Section titled “21. Calculate File Hashes”For safe lab artifacts:
sha256sum <file>Record:
SHA-256:<hash>Do not execute the suspicious file.
22. Investigate the Hash
Section titled “22. Investigate the Hash”Use approved threat-intelligence sources.
Determine:
Known / Unknown
Classification
Malware Family
First Seen
Related Infrastructure
ConfidenceRemember:
Unknown Hash≠Benign File23. Investigate Endpoint Malware Alerts
Section titled “23. Investigate Endpoint Malware Alerts”Review:
Detection Name
File
Hash
Process
User
Action
TimestampDetermine whether the security product:
Blocked
Quarantined
Detected Only
Failed to Remediate24. Investigate Persistence
Section titled “24. Investigate Persistence”Look for:
Scheduled Tasks
Services
Startup Items
Registry Run Keys
New Accounts
Modified ConfigurationDetermine whether persistence was actually established.
25. Investigate Account Creation
Section titled “25. Investigate Account Creation”Search for:
Event ID 4720where relevant.
Record:
New Account
Creating Account
Timestamp
Host26. Investigate Scheduled Tasks
Section titled “26. Investigate Scheduled Tasks”Review suspicious tasks.
Document:
Task Name
Action
Executable
User
Trigger
Creation TimeDo not delete anything during investigation.
27. Investigate Services
Section titled “27. Investigate Services”Look for unexpected:
New Services
Changed Services
Unusual Executables
User-Writable PathsCorrelate service activity with the attack timeline.
28. Investigate Linux Authentication
Section titled “28. Investigate Linux Authentication”If the evidence reaches:
CYSA-LINUX01review:
sudo grep -i "failed\|accepted" /var/log/auth.logor:
sudo journalctl -u sshLook for:
Failed SSH
Successful SSH
Source IP
Username
Timestamp29. Investigate Linux Activity
Section titled “29. Investigate Linux Activity”Review relevant:
Authentication
sudo
Processes
Services
Cron
File ChangesDo not assume the Linux server is compromised merely because it was contacted.
30. Investigate DNS Activity
Section titled “30. Investigate DNS Activity”Pivot on the compromised endpoint.
Search for:
Queried Domain
Timestamp
Source Host
Response IPIdentify unusual or newly observed domains.
31. Enrich Suspicious Domains
Section titled “31. Enrich Suspicious Domains”For each suspicious domain, investigate:
Reputation
Registration Context
Associated IPs
Historical Activity
Malware AssociationsAssign confidence.
32. Investigate Zeek Network Telemetry
Section titled “32. Investigate Zeek Network Telemetry”Search:
CYSA-WIN01or:
10.10.10.20Review:
conn.log
dns.log
http.log
ssl.log / tls.logwhere available.
33. Analyze Network Connections
Section titled “33. Analyze Network Connections”Record:
Source IP
Destination IP
Destination Port
Protocol
Duration
Bytes Sent
Bytes ReceivedLook for unusual external and internal communications.
34. Investigate Suricata Alerts
Section titled “34. Investigate Suricata Alerts”Search for alerts involving the affected systems.
Record:
Signature
Category
Severity
Source
Destination
TimestampDetermine whether Suricata evidence supports your endpoint findings.
35. Correlate Endpoint and Network Evidence
Section titled “35. Correlate Endpoint and Network Evidence”Example:
02:14:03Suspicious Process Executes
02:14:06DNS Query
02:14:07External Connection
02:14:08Suricata AlertThis is stronger than any individual event.
36. Investigate Possible Command-and-Control Activity
Section titled “36. Investigate Possible Command-and-Control Activity”Look for:
Repeated Connections
Rare External Destinations
Unexpected Ports
Periodic Communication
Suspicious DNS
Connections from Unexpected ProcessesDo not classify traffic as C2 from timing alone.
37. Investigate Internal Connections
Section titled “37. Investigate Internal Connections”Determine whether the suspected compromised endpoint contacted:
CYSA-LINUX01
CYSA-WEB01
Other Internal SystemsRecord:
Destination
Protocol
Port
Timestamp
User
Authentication38. Investigate Lateral Movement
Section titled “38. Investigate Lateral Movement”Look for evidence involving:
SMB
RDP
SSH
WinRM
Remote Services
Administrative Shares
Remote AuthenticationYour task is to detect lateral movement, not reproduce it.
39. Validate Lateral Movement
Section titled “39. Validate Lateral Movement”A network connection alone does not prove compromise.
Look for:
Internal Connection +Authentication +Remote Process / Sessionbefore declaring successful lateral movement.
40. Investigate the Web Server
Section titled “40. Investigate the Web Server”If:
CYSA-WEB01appears in the incident, review:
Access Logs
Error Logs
Authentication
Application Logs
File Activity
Processes
Network Activity41. Review Web Requests
Section titled “41. Review Web Requests”Look for:
Suspicious Source IP
Unusual URI
Authentication Attempts
Unexpected POST
Injection Indicators
File UploadsDetermine whether web activity is related to the primary incident.
42. Investigate Web Server File Activity
Section titled “42. Investigate Web Server File Activity”Look for recently created files.
For example:
sudo find /var/www -type f -mmin -180 -lsAdjust the path and time to your environment.
Do not execute suspicious files.
43. Investigate Potential Web-Shell Evidence
Section titled “43. Investigate Potential Web-Shell Evidence”Look for:
Unexpected Script
Repeated Requests to Script
Web Process Spawning OS Process
Outbound Connection
Recently Modified Web FileRequire corroborating evidence before declaring a web shell.
44. Determine Whether Web Activity Is Related
Section titled “44. Determine Whether Web Activity Is Related”Possible conclusions:
Related to Primary Incident
Independent Attack
Benign Activity
Insufficient EvidenceNot every alert occurring in the same window belongs to the same incident.
45. Build the IOC Inventory
Section titled “45. Build the IOC Inventory”Create:
| IOC ID | Type | Indicator | Source | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| IOC-001 | IP | <IP> |
Authentication | High |
| IOC-002 | Domain | <domain> |
DNS | High |
| IOC-003 | Hash | <SHA-256> |
Endpoint | High |
| IOC-004 | File | <filename> |
Endpoint | High |
| IOC-005 | IP | <IP> |
Network | Medium |
46. Enrich Every Significant IOC
Section titled “46. Enrich Every Significant IOC”For each IOC, determine:
Reputation
Context
Relationships
First Seen
Last Seen
Internal Matches
ConfidenceAvoid relying on a single reputation score.
47. Search IOCs Across the Environment
Section titled “47. Search IOCs Across the Environment”Search each:
IP
Domain
Hash
Filename
Usernameacross all telemetry.
Your objective is to discover the true scope.
48. Build the IOC Relationship Map
Section titled “48. Build the IOC Relationship Map”Example:
User Account ↓CYSA-WIN01 ↓Suspicious Process ↓Malware Hash ↓Domain ↓External IPAdditional evidence may show:
CYSA-WIN01 ↓Internal Authentication ↓CYSA-LINUX01This relationship map becomes part of the attack story.
49. Identify Potential Data Collection
Section titled “49. Identify Potential Data Collection”Look for:
Large File Enumeration
Sensitive Directory Access
Archive Creation
Database Access
File Share AccessRecord only evidence-supported findings.
50. Investigate Potential Exfiltration
Section titled “50. Investigate Potential Exfiltration”Review:
Outbound Bytes
Destination
Protocol
Timing
Archive Creation
Cloud Storage Activity
External ConnectionsClassify:
Confirmed
Suspected
No Evidence Observed
Unknown51. Determine the Earliest Suspicious Activity
Section titled “51. Determine the Earliest Suspicious Activity”You may have begun with an alert at:
03:10but discover suspicious authentication at:
01:14Continue moving backward until you identify the earliest defensible suspicious activity.
52. Determine Initial Access
Section titled “52. Determine Initial Access”Possible conclusions:
Credential Compromise
Phishing
Malicious Download
Public-Facing Application
Remote Service
UnknownDo not force a root cause when evidence is insufficient.
53. Identify Execution
Section titled “53. Identify Execution”Document the first confirmed attacker-controlled or suspicious execution.
Record:
Host
User
Process
Parent
Command Line
Timestamp54. Identify Persistence
Section titled “54. Identify Persistence”Classify:
Confirmed
Attempted
Not Observed
UnknownDocument the supporting evidence.
55. Identify Privilege Escalation or Privileged Use
Section titled “55. Identify Privilege Escalation or Privileged Use”Determine whether:
Privilege Escalation Occurredor whether:
Already-Privileged Credentials Were UsedThese are different findings.
56. Identify Credential Access
Section titled “56. Identify Credential Access”Determine whether evidence suggests:
Credential Theft
Token Theft
Password Access
Credential Store AccessIf unsupported:
Credential Access:Not Confirmed57. Identify Discovery
Section titled “57. Identify Discovery”Look for evidence of:
System Discovery
Account Discovery
Network Discovery
Process Discovery
Service Discovery
File and Directory Discovery58. Identify Lateral Movement
Section titled “58. Identify Lateral Movement”Document:
Source Host
Destination Host
Identity
Protocol
Timestamp
OutcomeDifferentiate:
Attemptedfrom:
Successful59. Identify Command-and-Control
Section titled “59. Identify Command-and-Control”Document:
Process
Domain
IP
Protocol
First Seen
Last Seen
Frequency
Threat IntelligenceClassify confidence.
60. Identify Impact
Section titled “60. Identify Impact”Look for:
File Encryption
File Deletion
Service Disruption
Account Modification
Application Modification
Data ExposureDo not assume ransomware or destructive activity unless supported by evidence.
61. Build the Master Incident Timeline
Section titled “61. Build the Master Incident Timeline”Create a table such as:
| Time | Host | User | Event | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 01:14 | WIN01 | user01 | Authentication failures | Windows |
| 01:17 | WIN01 | user01 | Successful login | Windows |
| 01:22 | WIN01 | user01 | Suspicious process | Endpoint |
| 01:23 | WIN01 | user01 | PowerShell activity | PowerShell |
| 01:25 | WIN01 | user01 | DNS query | Zeek |
| 01:26 | WIN01 | user01 | External connection | Zeek |
| 01:26 | WIN01 | N/A | Network alert | Suricata |
| 01:45 | WIN01 → LINUX01 | user01 | Internal activity | Network/Auth |
| 02:10 | WEB01 | N/A | Web activity | Web Logs |
Use your actual evidence.
62. Build the Attack Story
Section titled “62. Build the Attack Story”Convert the timeline into a narrative.
For example:
Suspicious Authentication ↓Account Access ↓Endpoint Execution ↓PowerShell ↓Malware ↓Persistence ↓External Communication ↓Internal Discovery ↓Lateral Movement ↓Potential Data AccessEvery arrow should be supported by evidence.
63. Map to MITRE ATT&CK
Section titled “63. Map to MITRE ATT&CK”Create:
| Attack Stage | Observed Behavior | ATT&CK Context |
|---|---|---|
| Initial Access | <evidence> |
<technique> |
| Execution | <evidence> |
<technique> |
| Persistence | <evidence> |
<technique> |
| Credential Access | <evidence> |
<technique> |
| Discovery | <evidence> |
<technique> |
| Lateral Movement | <evidence> |
<technique> |
| C2 | <evidence> |
<technique> |
| Exfiltration | <evidence> |
<technique> |
| Impact | <evidence> |
<technique> |
Do not map techniques that were not observed.
64. Determine Incident Scope
Section titled “64. Determine Incident Scope”Classify every system:
| Asset | Evidence | Status |
|---|---|---|
| CYSA-WIN01 | Execution + Network | Confirmed Compromised |
| CYSA-LINUX01 | Internal Contact | Investigate |
| CYSA-WEB01 | Web Alert | Investigate |
| CYSA-SIEM | No compromise evidence | Monitoring |
Use:
Confirmed Compromised
Suspected Compromised
Exposed / Contacted
Unaffected
Unknown65. Determine Identity Scope
Section titled “65. Determine Identity Scope”Create:
| Identity | Evidence | Status |
|---|---|---|
| user01 | Suspicious authentication | Compromised/Suspected |
| admin01 | Privileged activity | Investigate |
| service-web | Web process | Monitor |
66. Assess Confidentiality Impact
Section titled “66. Assess Confidentiality Impact”Ask:
Was sensitive information accessed?
Were credentials exposed?
Was data staged?
Was data transferred externally?Classify:
None
Low
Moderate
High
Unknown67. Assess Integrity Impact
Section titled “67. Assess Integrity Impact”Ask:
Were files modified?
Was persistence installed?
Were accounts changed?
Was application content altered?
Were configurations changed?68. Assess Availability Impact
Section titled “68. Assess Availability Impact”Ask:
Were services interrupted?
Were files encrypted?
Were systems unavailable?
Was business functionality affected?69. Determine Incident Severity
Section titled “69. Determine Incident Severity”Consider:
Number of Compromised Systems
Identity Privilege
Asset Criticality
Malware
Persistence
Lateral Movement
Potential Data Exposure
Business Impact
Active Attacker PresenceClassify:
Low
Medium
High
Criticaland document why.
70. Determine Whether the Threat Is Active
Section titled “70. Determine Whether the Threat Is Active”Ask:
Are suspicious sessions active?
Are malicious processes running?
Are network connections continuing?
Are additional hosts being contacted?
Are new alerts appearing?Classify:
Active
Contained
Historical
Unknown71. Preserve Critical Evidence
Section titled “71. Preserve Critical Evidence”Collect:
SIEM Events
Windows Logs
Linux Logs
Web Logs
Process Evidence
PowerShell Logs
Suspicious Files
Hashes
Network Logs
PCAP
Threat Intelligence
ScreenshotsFollow the evidence procedures from Lab 17.
72. Calculate Evidence Hashes
Section titled “72. Calculate Evidence Hashes”For preserved files:
sha256sum <evidence-file>Create:
LAB20/Evidence/evidence-hashes.txtRecord:
Evidence ID
Filename
Source
SHA-256
Collection Time73. Create the Evidence Inventory
Section titled “73. Create the Evidence Inventory”| Evidence ID | Evidence | Source | Hash |
|---|---|---|---|
| EVID-001 | Security Log | WIN01 | <SHA-256> |
| EVID-002 | Suspicious File | WIN01 | <SHA-256> |
| EVID-003 | PCAP | Network | <SHA-256> |
| EVID-004 | Web Log | WEB01 | <SHA-256> |
74. Determine Immediate Containment Priorities
Section titled “74. Determine Immediate Containment Priorities”Rank actions.
Example:
P1 — Immediate
Isolate confirmed compromised endpoints
Secure compromised identities
Revoke active sessions
Block validated malicious infrastructure
Preserve volatile evidenceThen:
P2 — Urgent
Hunt for IOCs
Investigate lateral movement
Restrict affected network segments
Protect critical systems
Review privileged accountsThen:
P3 — Recovery Preparation
Remove persistence
Patch exploited vulnerabilities
Rotate credentials
Validate clean backups
Prepare system rebuilds75. Avoid Premature Remediation
Section titled “75. Avoid Premature Remediation”Do not immediately:
Delete suspicious files
Clear logs
Reimage everything
Restart systems
Disable serviceswithout considering:
Evidence Preservation
Business Impact
Containment Strategy
Incident Response Procedures76. Develop Eradication Recommendations
Section titled “76. Develop Eradication Recommendations”Depending on your findings:
Remove Malware
Remove Persistence
Patch Vulnerabilities
Reset Credentials
Rotate Secrets
Remove Unauthorized Accounts
Rebuild Compromised Systems
Correct Security Misconfigurations77. Develop Recovery Recommendations
Section titled “77. Develop Recovery Recommendations”Include:
Restore from Known-Good Backup
Validate System Integrity
Reconnect Systems Gradually
Increase Monitoring
Verify Authentication
Validate Business Services
Confirm No Recurrence78. Identify Detection Gaps
Section titled “78. Identify Detection Gaps”Ask:
Which attacker behavior was detected?
Which behavior was missed?
Which alert occurred too late?
Which telemetry was unavailable?
Which detection could be improved?This transforms the incident into a defensive improvement opportunity.
79. Create Detection Recommendations
Section titled “79. Create Detection Recommendations”Examples:
Improve authentication correlation
Alert on unusual PowerShell lineage
Detect suspicious DNS from endpoints
Correlate endpoint and network telemetry
Monitor new scheduled tasks
Detect unusual internal authentication
Improve web-server process monitoring80. Identify Security Control Improvements
Section titled “80. Identify Security Control Improvements”Consider:
MFA
Least Privilege
Network Segmentation
EDR
Application Hardening
Patch Management
Email Security
Web Application Firewall
DNS Security
Centralized Logging
Backup ProtectionRecommendations must connect to actual findings.
81. Create the Technical Incident Report
Section titled “81. Create the Technical Incident Report”Use:
# Technical Incident Report
## Case Information
Case ID:GHC-SOC-2026-020
## Incident Classification
Document the final classification.
## Severity
Low / Medium / High / Critical
## Initial Detection
Document the alerts that initiated the investigation.
## Initial Access
Document evidence.
## Authentication
Document:- users- source IPs- failures- successes- privilege
## Endpoint Activity
Document:- processes- command lines- files- hashes
## Persistence
Document findings.
## Credential Activity
Document findings.
## Network Activity
Document:- DNS- IPs- domains- ports- Zeek- Suricata
## Lateral Movement
Document:- source- destination- identity- protocol- outcome
## Web Activity
Document relevant findings.
## Indicators of Compromise
List all validated IOCs.
## Threat Intelligence
Document enrichment.
## Incident Scope
List affected:- systems- users- applications
## Data Impact
Document confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
## Timeline
Insert the master incident timeline.
## MITRE ATT&CK
Document evidence-supported techniques.
## Root Cause
Confirmed / Suspected / Undetermined
## Containment
Document immediate actions.
## Eradication
Document recommendations.
## Recovery
Document recommendations.
## Detection Improvements
Document lessons learned.
## Final Assessment
Summarize the technical investigation.82. Create the Executive Incident Summary
Section titled “82. Create the Executive Incident Summary”Your executive report should avoid unnecessary technical detail.
Use:
# Executive Incident Summary
## Incident
GHC-SOC-2026-020
## What Happened?
Provide a concise explanation.
## Business Impact
Explain:- affected systems- affected users- service impact- potential data exposure
## Current Status
Active / Contained / Recovered / Under Investigation
## Severity
Low / Medium / High / Critical
## Actions Taken
Summarize containment actions.
## Remaining Risk
Explain unresolved concerns.
## Next Steps
Summarize:- remediation- recovery- monitoring- security improvements83. Mission Challenge — Final SOC Investigation
Section titled “83. Mission Challenge — Final SOC Investigation”Your SOC Manager asks:
Determine what happened between 01:00 and 04:00, whether the alerts represent one coordinated incident, what assets and identities were affected, and what the organization must do next.
You must answer:
-
What was the earliest suspicious event?
-
What alert first brought the activity to the SOC’s attention?
-
Which identity was initially involved?
-
What source initiated suspicious authentication?
-
Did authentication succeed?
-
Was privileged access involved?
-
Which endpoint became suspicious?
-
What processes executed?
-
Was PowerShell involved?
-
Was malware identified?
-
What was the malware hash?
-
What threat intelligence exists?
-
Was persistence established?
-
Was credential access observed?
-
Was system discovery performed?
-
What domains were queried?
-
What external IPs were contacted?
-
What did Zeek observe?
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What did Suricata detect?
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Was command-and-control activity present?
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Did the attacker contact additional internal systems?
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Was lateral movement attempted?
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Did lateral movement succeed?
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Was CYSA-LINUX01 compromised?
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Was CYSA-WEB01 involved?
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Was web exploitation observed?
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Were suspicious server files created?
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Was data collected?
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Was potential exfiltration observed?
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What are the validated IOCs?
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How are the indicators related?
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What is the complete attack timeline?
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Which MITRE ATT&CK techniques are supported?
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Which systems are confirmed compromised?
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Which identities are compromised or suspected?
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What is the confidentiality impact?
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What is the integrity impact?
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What is the availability impact?
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What is the incident severity?
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Is the threat still active?
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What should be contained first?
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What evidence must be preserved?
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What is the likely root cause?
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What remediation is required?
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What security controls should be improved?
84. Document Your Investigation
Section titled “84. Document Your Investigation”Update:
~/CySA-Lab/Investigations/LAB20/investigation-notes.mdUse:
# LAB20 SOC Analyst Capstone Investigation
## Case
GHC-SOC-2026-020
## Initial Alerts
Document all alerts.
## Investigation Hypotheses
Document your initial hypotheses.
## Authentication Investigation
Document findings.
## Endpoint Investigation
Document findings.
## Malware Investigation
Document findings.
## Persistence Investigation
Document findings.
## Network Investigation
Document findings.
## Linux Investigation
Document findings.
## Web Investigation
Document findings.
## Threat Intelligence
Document IOC enrichment.
## Lateral Movement
Document findings.
## Potential Exfiltration
Document findings.
## IOC Inventory
Document all validated indicators.
## Incident Scope
### Confirmed Compromised
List systems.
### Suspected
List systems.
### Exposed / Contacted
List systems.
### Unaffected
List systems where supported.
## Identity Scope
Document affected identities.
## Master Timeline
Build the chronological incident timeline.
## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
Document evidence-supported techniques.
## Impact
### Confidentiality
Document assessment.
### Integrity
Document assessment.
### Availability
Document assessment.
## Severity
Low / Medium / High / Critical
## Incident Status
Active / Contained / Historical / Unknown
## Root Cause
Confirmed / Suspected / Undetermined
## Immediate Containment
Document prioritized actions.
## Eradication
Document recommendations.
## Recovery
Document recommendations.
## Detection Improvements
Document defensive improvements.
## Final Technical Assessment
Summarize the complete incident.85. Example Final Analyst Assessment
Section titled “85. Example Final Analyst Assessment”A simulated final assessment might resemble:
Case:GHC-SOC-2026-020
Classification:Confirmed Multi-Stage Security Incident
Initial Access:Suspicious authentication activity was followed by successful access to CYSA-WIN01.
Identity:A user account showed authentication activity inconsistent with expected behavior.
Execution:Suspicious PowerShell and endpoint process activity occurred shortly after authentication.
Malware:An unknown executable was identified and preserved for analysis.
Network:CYSA-WIN01 queried suspicious infrastructure and established outbound connections.
Threat Intelligence:Several indicators were associated with suspicious activity.
Persistence:Persistence-related activity was identified and requires remediation.
Lateral Movement:The compromised endpoint contacted additional internal systems. Successful compromise must be determined independently for each destination.
Web Activity:Web-server alerts were investigated separately and correlated where evidence supported a relationship.
Scope:CYSA-WIN01 confirmed compromised.Additional assets require continued investigation.
Data Exfiltration:Not confirmed from currently available evidence.
Severity:High
Status:Containment required.
Recommended Response:Isolate confirmed compromised systems, secure affected identities, preserve evidence, block validated malicious indicators, investigate internal movement, remove persistence, rotate credentials, remediate the initial access vector, and conduct environment-wide IOC hunting.86. Evidence to Capture
Section titled “86. Evidence to Capture”Capture:
01-alert-inventory.png02-authentication-failures.png03-successful-authentication.png04-privileged-access.png05-user-pivot.png06-endpoint-pivot.png07-process-execution.png08-process-tree.png09-powershell-activity.png10-malware-alert.png11-file-hash.png12-persistence.png13-dns-activity.png14-zeek-connections.png15-suricata-alerts.png16-threat-intelligence.png17-internal-connections.png18-lateral-movement.png19-linux-investigation.png20-web-investigation.png21-ioc-inventory.png22-ioc-relationship-map.png23-potential-exfiltration.png24-master-timeline.png25-mitre-attack-map.png26-incident-scope.png27-identity-scope.png28-evidence-inventory.png29-containment-plan.png30-technical-report.png31-executive-summary.png32-final-assessment.png87. Capstone Validation Checklist
Section titled “87. Capstone Validation Checklist”Triage
Section titled “Triage”-
All initial alerts were identified
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Alerts were placed chronologically
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Investigation hypotheses were created
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High-value pivots were identified
Identity
Section titled “Identity”-
Failed authentication was investigated
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Successful authentication was investigated
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Privileged access was investigated
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User activity was correlated across systems
Endpoint
Section titled “Endpoint”-
Process execution was investigated
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Process lineage was constructed
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PowerShell activity was analyzed
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Suspicious files were identified
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File hashes were calculated
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Malware alerts were investigated
-
Persistence was investigated
Network
Section titled “Network”-
DNS activity was analyzed
-
Zeek telemetry was analyzed
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Suricata alerts were investigated
-
External communications were identified
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Potential C2 was assessed
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Internal connections were investigated
Lateral Movement
Section titled “Lateral Movement”-
Internal authentication was reviewed
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Lateral-movement indicators were investigated
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Attempted and successful movement were distinguished
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Linux authentication was reviewed where relevant
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Linux activity was investigated
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Compromise status was determined
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Web logs were reviewed where relevant
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Suspicious requests were investigated
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Server-side evidence was correlated
-
Web compromise status was determined
Threat Intelligence
Section titled “Threat Intelligence”-
IOC inventory was created
-
Significant IOCs were enriched
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IOCs were searched across the environment
-
IOC relationships were documented
-
Confidence levels were assigned
Impact
Section titled “Impact”-
Potential data collection was investigated
-
Potential exfiltration was assessed
-
Confidentiality impact was assessed
-
Integrity impact was assessed
-
Availability impact was assessed
Incident Reconstruction
Section titled “Incident Reconstruction”-
Earliest suspicious activity was identified
-
Initial access was investigated
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Execution was identified
-
Persistence was assessed
-
Credential activity was assessed
-
Discovery was assessed
-
Lateral movement was assessed
-
C2 was assessed
-
Impact was assessed
-
Master timeline was completed
-
Attack story was reconstructed
-
MITRE ATT&CK mapping was completed
Response
Section titled “Response”-
Incident scope was established
-
Identity scope was established
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Severity was assigned
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Threat activity status was determined
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Evidence was preserved
-
Evidence hashes were recorded
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Containment priorities were established
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Eradication recommendations were created
-
Recovery recommendations were created
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Detection gaps were identified
-
Security-control improvements were recommended
Reporting
Section titled “Reporting”-
Technical incident report was completed
-
Executive incident summary was completed
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Final analyst assessment was completed
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Required screenshots/evidence were captured
88. Mission Review
Section titled “88. Mission Review”This capstone brought together the complete CySA+ analyst workflow.
You began with:
Disconnected Alertsand transformed them into:
Alerts ↓Evidence ↓Correlation ↓Indicators ↓Relationships ↓Timeline ↓Attack Story ↓Scope ↓Impact ↓Containment ↓Remediation ↓ReportingThe most important lesson from this lab is:
A SOC analyst’s job is not simply to respond to alerts. The analyst must transform fragmented telemetry into an evidence-backed explanation of what happened, what is affected, and what the organization should do next.
A mature investigation combines:
Identity Evidence +Endpoint Evidence +Network Evidence +Application Evidence +Threat Intelligence +Timeline Analysis +Business Context =Defensible Incident AssessmentSkills Developed
Section titled “Skills Developed”After completing this capstone, you should be able to:
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triage enterprise security alerts
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manage a structured SOC investigation
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investigate suspicious authentication
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analyze Windows and Linux telemetry
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investigate endpoint processes
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analyze PowerShell activity
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investigate malware alerts
-
analyze file hashes
-
identify persistence
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investigate network traffic
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analyze Zeek telemetry
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investigate Suricata alerts
-
analyze DNS activity
-
investigate web security events
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enrich indicators with threat intelligence
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correlate endpoint and network evidence
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investigate lateral movement
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assess command-and-control activity
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investigate potential data exfiltration
-
build IOC relationship maps
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reconstruct multi-stage attacks
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map evidence to MITRE ATT&CK
-
establish incident scope
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assess CIA impact
-
determine incident severity
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prioritize containment
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recommend eradication and recovery
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identify detection gaps
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produce technical incident reports
-
communicate incidents to leadership
CySA+ Labs Completed
Section titled “CySA+ Labs Completed”You have completed the full CompTIA CySA+ practical lab sequence:
Lab 01 — Build Your CySA+ SOC Lab Environment ↓Lab 02 — Windows Security Log Analysis ↓Lab 03 — Windows Endpoint Investigation ↓Lab 04 — Linux Security Log Investigation ↓Lab 05 — Network Traffic Analysis with Wireshark ↓Lab 06 — Network Attack Detection with Zeek ↓Lab 07 — IDS Alert Investigation with Suricata ↓Lab 08 — SIEM Fundamentals and Log Ingestion ↓Lab 09 — SIEM Detection and Correlation Lab ↓Lab 10 — Authentication Attack Investigation ↓Lab 11 — Phishing Email Investigation ↓Lab 12 — Malware Analysis Fundamentals ↓Lab 13 — Endpoint Malware Investigation ↓Lab 14 — Vulnerability Scanning and Assessment ↓Lab 15 — Vulnerability Prioritization with CVSS, EPSS and Threat Intelligence ↓Lab 16 — Threat Intelligence and IOC Enrichment ↓Lab 17 — Incident Triage and Evidence Collection ↓Lab 18 — Ransomware Incident Investigation ↓Lab 19 — Web Application Attack Investigation ↓Lab 20 — SOC Analyst Capstone InvestigationWhat’s Next?
Section titled “What’s Next?”CySA+ Runbooks
Section titled “CySA+ Runbooks”You have completed the hands-on investigation labs.
The next stage should move from guided investigations to repeatable analyst procedures.
Instead of learning:
How do I investigate this?you will build operational procedures answering:
When this happens in the SOC,what exactly should the analyst do?The runbook series will convert the skills developed throughout these labs into reusable SOC workflows for:
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alert triage
-
suspicious authentication
-
phishing
-
malware
-
endpoint compromise
-
network alerts
-
threat-intelligence enrichment
-
vulnerability escalation
-
ransomware
-
web application incidents
-
evidence collection
-
incident escalation
The progression becomes:
Lessons ↓Labs ↓Investigation Skills ↓Runbooks ↓Repeatable SOC Operations ↓Job-Ready Analyst Workflow➡️ Next: CySA+ Runbook 01 — SOC Alert Triage and Escalation