Project 10 — End-to-End Kubernetes Security Capstone
Project Overview
Section titled “Project Overview”Welcome to Project 10 — End-to-End Kubernetes Security Capstone.
This is the final project in the Enterprise Kubernetes Security Projects module.
In this capstone, you will combine the skills developed across the complete Kubernetes Security Engineer learning path into one enterprise engagement.
You will act as a:
- Kubernetes Security Engineer
- Cloud Security Architect
- Amazon EKS Security Engineer
- DevSecOps Engineer
- Security Assessor
- Detection Engineer
- Incident Responder
- Security Consultant
This project does not focus on one isolated security control.
You will assess, design, secure, validate, monitor, investigate and report on an enterprise Amazon EKS environment from beginning to end.
Business Requirements
↓
Environment Discovery
↓
Security Assessment
↓
Threat Modelling
↓
Target Architecture
↓
Security Implementation
↓
Control Validation
↓
Incident Simulation
↓
Investigation and Recovery
↓
Compliance and Reporting
↓
Executive RecommendationProject Mission
Section titled “Project Mission”CloudNova Technologies is preparing to launch a new enterprise digital platform on Amazon EKS.
The platform will support:
- Customer-facing applications
- Payment services
- Internal administration workloads
- Analytics services
- Shared platform components
- Security monitoring workloads
The organisation has completed several security initiatives, but the final production environment has not yet undergone a complete end-to-end validation.
Management has requested a full Kubernetes security engagement before production approval.
Your mission is to:
- Define the project scope.
- Discover the current environment.
- Assess the existing security posture.
- Identify critical risks.
- Design the target security architecture.
- Implement priority controls.
- Validate control effectiveness.
- Simulate a Kubernetes security incident.
- Investigate and contain the incident.
- Recover the environment securely.
- Produce compliance evidence.
- Present a final production recommendation.
Business Scenario
Section titled “Business Scenario”CloudNova Technologies operates a multi-account AWS environment.
The new digital platform will run across:
- Production AWS account
- Security tooling account
- Log archive account
- Shared services account
- CI/CD account
The production platform includes:
- Amazon EKS
- Private worker nodes
- Amazon ECR
- AWS Secrets Manager
- AWS KMS
- Amazon CloudWatch
- AWS CloudTrail
- Amazon GuardDuty
- AWS Security Hub
- Amazon Inspector
- Falco
- Prometheus
- Grafana
- Kyverno or OPA Gatekeeper
- Velero or approved backup tooling
- Enterprise SIEM
The organisation has identified several potential risks:
- Broad cluster administrator access
- Public Kubernetes API exposure
- Excessive Service Account permissions
- Workloads using node IAM roles
- Privileged Pods
- Missing default-deny Network Policies
- Mutable container tags
- Incomplete image scanning
- Secrets stored in Kubernetes manifests
- Inconsistent audit logging
- Runtime-monitoring gaps
- Untested incident runbooks
- Incomplete backup-restoration evidence
- Security exceptions without expiry dates
Target Business Outcome
Section titled “Target Business Outcome”At the end of this project, CloudNova Technologies should have:
- A complete Kubernetes security assessment
- A documented current-state risk profile
- A secure target-state architecture
- Implemented high-priority controls
- Validated workload and cluster security
- Centralised security telemetry
- Tested runtime detections
- Tested incident-response workflows
- Tested backup and recovery
- Compliance evidence
- A findings and remediation register
- A production-readiness scorecard
- An executive security recommendation
Project Objectives
Section titled “Project Objectives”By completing this project, you will be able to:
- Plan an enterprise Kubernetes security engagement
- Define assessment scope and Rules of Engagement
- Discover and inventory Amazon EKS environments
- Assess IAM, RBAC and workload identity
- Review cluster, node, workload and network security
- Identify privileged workloads and high-risk configurations
- Assess software supply-chain controls
- Review secrets and data protection
- Evaluate logging and runtime monitoring
- Perform threat modelling
- Design a production Kubernetes security architecture
- Implement security controls
- Test positive and negative security scenarios
- Conduct a controlled security incident simulation
- Investigate Pod, identity, runtime and network activity
- Perform containment and recovery
- Conduct Root Cause Analysis
- Validate compliance and production readiness
- Produce executive and technical reports
- Present a final risk-based recommendation
Project Difficulty
Section titled “Project Difficulty”Level: Expert
Estimated Time
Section titled “Estimated Time”Recommended Duration: 30–40 hours
This project should be completed over multiple practical sessions.
Project Type
Section titled “Project Type”- Enterprise capstone
- Security assessment
- Security architecture
- Hands-on implementation
- Detection engineering
- Incident response
- Compliance validation
- Executive reporting
- Portfolio project
Prerequisites
Section titled “Prerequisites”You should understand:
- Kubernetes architecture
- Amazon EKS
- AWS Organizations
- AWS IAM
- Kubernetes RBAC
- Service Accounts
- EKS Access Entries
- EKS Pod Identity and IRSA
- Amazon VPC
- Security Groups
- Kubernetes Network Policies
- Pod Security Admission
- Admission controllers
- Container image security
- Image scanning and signing
- AWS Secrets Manager
- AWS KMS
- Kubernetes Audit Logs
- Falco
- GuardDuty Runtime Monitoring
- SIEM concepts
- Incident response
- Pod and node forensics
- Root Cause Analysis
- Backup and disaster recovery
- Compliance frameworks
Recommended Tools
Section titled “Recommended Tools”- AWS Management Console
- AWS CLI
- AWS IAM Identity Center
- Amazon EKS
- Amazon ECR
- AWS Secrets Manager
- AWS KMS
- AWS CloudTrail
- Amazon GuardDuty
- AWS Security Hub
- Amazon Inspector
- AWS Config
- Amazon CloudWatch
- Amazon EventBridge
- AWS Backup
Kubernetes
Section titled “Kubernetes”kubectl- Helm
- Kubernetes RBAC
- Network Policies
- Pod Security Admission
- ResourceQuota
- LimitRange
- Admission controllers
- Kubernetes Audit Logs
Security
Section titled “Security”- Falco
- Falcosidekick
- Kyverno or OPA Gatekeeper
- Trivy
- Kubescape
- kube-bench
- kubeaudit
- Checkov
- Prometheus
- Grafana
- Enterprise SIEM
- Incident-management platform
Engineering
Section titled “Engineering”- Terraform
- Git
- GitHub or approved source-control platform
- CI/CD pipeline
- Diagramming tool
- Markdown
Cost Warning
Section titled “Cost Warning”This project may create billable AWS resources, including:
- Amazon EKS cluster
- EC2 worker nodes
- NAT Gateways
- Load balancers
- CloudWatch Logs
- GuardDuty Runtime Monitoring
- Security Hub
- Inspector
- ECR
- EBS volumes
- Backup storage
- Cross-Region copies
- SIEM ingestion
Use an approved lab or enterprise account.
Destroy unnecessary resources after completing the project.
Safety and Authorisation
Section titled “Safety and Authorisation”Perform this project only in:
- Your own AWS account
- An approved training environment
- A dedicated lab cluster
- An authorised enterprise environment
Do not perform:
- Real malware execution
- Uncontrolled reverse shells
- Destructive production testing
- Credential theft
- Denial-of-Service tests
- Container escape exploits
- Production data extraction
- Unauthorised security testing
All attack simulations must be safe, isolated and approved.
Capstone Architecture
Section titled “Capstone Architecture”AWS Organization
├── Security Tooling Account├── Log Archive Account├── Shared Services Account├── CI/CD Account├── Production Workload Account└── Non-Production Account
Enterprise Identity Provider
↓
AWS IAM Identity Center
↓
MFA and Temporary Roles
↓
Restricted Amazon EKS API
↓
EKS Access Entries
↓
Kubernetes RBAC
↓
Private Worker Nodes
↓
Secure Namespaces
├── Pod Security Admission├── ResourceQuota├── LimitRange├── Dedicated Service Accounts├── Workload IAM Roles└── Default-Deny Network Policies
↓
Secure Software Supply Chain
├── Source Review├── Secret Scanning├── Dependency Scanning├── Image Scanning├── SBOM├── Image Signing└── Admission Verification
↓
External Secrets and Encryption
↓
Logging and Runtime Detection
↓
SIEM and SOC
↓
Incident Response and Recovery
↓
Continuous Compliance and GovernanceSecurity Domains
Section titled “Security Domains”The project covers the following domains:
1. Governance and Scope
2. AWS Account Security
3. Amazon EKS Architecture
4. Identity and Access
5. Worker-Node Security
6. Namespace and Workload Security
7. Network Security
8. Software Supply Chain
9. Secrets and Data Protection
10. Logging and Monitoring
11. Runtime Security
12. Incident Response
13. Backup and Recovery
14. Compliance and Governance
15. Executive ReportingRequired Deliverables
Section titled “Required Deliverables”Planning Deliverables
Section titled “Planning Deliverables”- Project charter
- Scope statement
- Rules of Engagement
- Stakeholder register
- Assumptions and constraints
- Project plan
- Evidence-handling plan
Discovery Deliverables
Section titled “Discovery Deliverables”- AWS account inventory
- Cluster inventory
- Namespace inventory
- Workload inventory
- Identity inventory
- Network inventory
- Security-tool inventory
- Data-flow inventory
Architecture Deliverables
Section titled “Architecture Deliverables”- High-level architecture
- AWS account architecture
- Cluster architecture
- Network architecture
- Identity architecture
- Workload identity flow
- Software supply-chain architecture
- Secrets architecture
- Logging architecture
- Runtime architecture
- Incident-response architecture
- Backup and recovery architecture
- Trust-boundary diagram
- Data-flow diagram
Technical Deliverables
Section titled “Technical Deliverables”- Terraform configuration
- RBAC manifests
- Service Account manifests
- Pod Security labels
- ResourceQuotas
- LimitRanges
- Network Policies
- Admission policies
- Secure workload manifests
- Runtime rules
- Monitoring configuration
- Backup configuration
- Safe incident-simulation manifests
Security Deliverables
Section titled “Security Deliverables”- Threat model
- Security requirements
- Security assessment
- Findings register
- Risk register
- Exception register
- Detection catalogue
- Control-validation matrix
- Compliance mapping
- Root Cause Analysis
- Remediation roadmap
Operational Deliverables
Section titled “Operational Deliverables”- Access-review procedure
- Secure namespace onboarding
- Vulnerability-management process
- Runtime alert runbook
- Compromised Pod runbook
- Credential-compromise runbook
- Container-escape runbook
- Backup and restore runbook
- Production-readiness checklist
- Escalation matrix
- RACI matrix
Management Deliverables
Section titled “Management Deliverables”- Executive summary
- Current-state risk overview
- Target-state security architecture
- Security scorecard
- Incident summary
- Business-impact assessment
- Remediation roadmap
- Residual-risk statement
- Final production recommendation
- Final presentation
Recommended Project Folder Structure
Section titled “Recommended Project Folder Structure”10-end-to-end-kubernetes-security-capstone/
├── README.md│├── 01-project-management/│ ├── project-charter.md│ ├── scope.md│ ├── rules-of-engagement.md│ ├── stakeholders.md│ ├── assumptions.md│ └── project-plan.md│├── 02-discovery/│ ├── aws-inventory.md│ ├── cluster-inventory.md│ ├── namespace-inventory.md│ ├── workload-inventory.md│ ├── identity-inventory.md│ ├── network-inventory.md│ └── security-tool-inventory.md│├── 03-assessment/│ ├── account-security.md│ ├── eks-security.md│ ├── identity-rbac.md│ ├── node-security.md│ ├── workload-security.md│ ├── network-security.md│ ├── image-security.md│ ├── secrets-security.md│ ├── logging-runtime.md│ └── backup-recovery.md│├── 04-threat-model/│ ├── assets.md│ ├── threat-actors.md│ ├── trust-boundaries.md│ ├── attack-paths.md│ └── control-mapping.md│├── 05-architecture/│ ├── high-level-architecture.md│ ├── account-architecture.md│ ├── cluster-architecture.md│ ├── network-architecture.md│ ├── identity-architecture.md│ ├── workload-identity.md│ ├── supply-chain-architecture.md│ ├── secrets-architecture.md│ ├── logging-architecture.md│ ├── runtime-architecture.md│ ├── incident-response-architecture.md│ └── backup-dr-architecture.md│├── 06-implementation/│ ├── terraform/│ ├── namespaces/│ ├── rbac/│ ├── service-accounts/│ ├── workloads/│ ├── network-policies/│ ├── admission-policies/│ ├── secrets/│ ├── logging/│ ├── runtime/│ └── backup/│├── 07-validation/│ ├── validation-plan.md│ ├── identity-tests.md│ ├── workload-tests.md│ ├── network-tests.md│ ├── image-tests.md│ ├── runtime-tests.md│ ├── monitoring-tests.md│ └── recovery-tests.md│├── 08-incident-simulation/│ ├── scenario.md│ ├── test-manifests/│ ├── detection-evidence/│ ├── investigation-notes/│ ├── containment-actions/│ ├── recovery-evidence/│ └── root-cause-analysis.md│├── 09-compliance/│ ├── cis-mapping.md│ ├── nist-mapping.md│ ├── policy-reports/│ ├── compliance-scorecard.md│ └── exception-register.md│├── 10-evidence/│ ├── commands/│ ├── manifests/│ ├── logs/│ ├── alerts/│ ├── screenshots/│ ├── scans/│ ├── dashboards/│ └── restore-tests/│├── 11-findings/│ ├── findings-register.md│ ├── risk-register.md│ ├── remediation-roadmap.md│ └── residual-risk.md│├── 12-runbooks/│ ├── access-review.md│ ├── compromised-pod.md│ ├── credential-compromise.md│ ├── runtime-alert.md│ ├── container-escape.md│ ├── malicious-image.md│ ├── backup-restore.md│ └── cluster-recovery.md│└── 13-report/ ├── executive-summary.md ├── technical-report.md ├── security-scorecard.md ├── production-readiness.md ├── final-recommendation.md └── final-presentation.mdProject Phases
Section titled “Project Phases”The project contains 18 phases.
Phase 1 — Project Initiation
↓
Phase 2 — Scope and Rules of Engagement
↓
Phase 3 — Environment Discovery
↓
Phase 4 — Current-State Security Assessment
↓
Phase 5 — Threat Modelling
↓
Phase 6 — Target Security Architecture
↓
Phase 7 — Identity and Access Implementation
↓
Phase 8 — Workload and Node Security
↓
Phase 9 — Network Security
↓
Phase 10 — Software Supply-Chain Security
↓
Phase 11 — Secrets and Data Protection
↓
Phase 12 — Logging and Runtime Detection
↓
Phase 13 — Security Validation
↓
Phase 14 — Incident Simulation
↓
Phase 15 — Investigation and Containment
↓
Phase 16 — Recovery and Root Cause Analysis
↓
Phase 17 — Compliance and Production Readiness
↓
Phase 18 — Final Reporting and PresentationPhase 1 — Project Initiation
Section titled “Phase 1 — Project Initiation”Task 1.1 — Create the Project Charter
Section titled “Task 1.1 — Create the Project Charter”Document:
Organisation:
CloudNova Technologies
Project:
End-to-End Kubernetes Security Capstone
Platform:
Amazon EKS
Environment:
Production and approved test environment
Project Sponsor:
Chief Information Security Officer
Project Owner:
Cloud Security
Platform Owner:
Platform Engineering
Application Owner:
Digital Services
Monitoring Owner:
Security Operations Centre
Recovery Owner:
Site Reliability EngineeringTask 1.2 — Define the Project Goals
Section titled “Task 1.2 — Define the Project Goals”Goals include:
- Assess current Kubernetes risks.
- Build the secure target state.
- Implement priority controls.
- Validate security controls.
- Test monitoring and response.
- Demonstrate secure recovery.
- Produce audit evidence.
- Support production approval.
Task 1.3 — Define Success Criteria
Section titled “Task 1.3 — Define Success Criteria”The project succeeds when:
- All critical assets are inventoried.
- Critical risks are identified.
- Target architecture is approved.
- Priority controls are implemented.
- Security tests pass.
- Runtime detections operate.
- Incident-response workflow is tested.
- Recovery is validated.
- Compliance evidence is complete.
- Final production recommendation is issued.
Phase 2 — Scope and Rules of Engagement
Section titled “Phase 2 — Scope and Rules of Engagement”Task 2.1 — Define Scope
Section titled “Task 2.1 — Define Scope”Include:
- AWS accounts
- Regions
- EKS clusters
- Namespaces
- Workloads
- IAM roles
- Service Accounts
- VPC
- ECR repositories
- Security services
- Logging systems
- Backup systems
- CI/CD pipeline
Task 2.2 — Define Out-of-Scope Activities
Section titled “Task 2.2 — Define Out-of-Scope Activities”Examples:
- Real production exploitation
- Real malware
- Destructive node testing
- Denial-of-Service
- Credential cracking
- Social engineering
- Unapproved data extraction
- Uncontrolled container escape testing
Task 2.3 — Define Stop Conditions
Section titled “Task 2.3 — Define Stop Conditions”Stop and escalate if:
- Active compromise is discovered
- Production availability is affected
- Sensitive credentials are exposed
- Unknown malware is identified
- Node compromise is suspected
- Security tests cause instability
- Production data becomes accessible unexpectedly
Phase 3 — Environment Discovery
Section titled “Phase 3 — Environment Discovery”Task 3.1 — Confirm the Kubernetes Context
Section titled “Task 3.1 — Confirm the Kubernetes Context”kubectl config current-contextkubectl cluster-infoTask 3.2 — Inventory the Cluster
Section titled “Task 3.2 — Inventory the Cluster”kubectl versionkubectl get nodes -o widekubectl get namespaces --show-labelskubectl get deployments,statefulsets,daemonsets,jobs,cronjobs -ATask 3.3 — Inventory Services and Exposure
Section titled “Task 3.3 — Inventory Services and Exposure”kubectl get services -Akubectl get ingress -ARecord:
- LoadBalancer Services
- NodePort Services
- External IPs
- Public hostnames
- Administrative endpoints
- TLS status
Task 3.4 — Inventory Identity
Section titled “Task 3.4 — Inventory Identity”kubectl get serviceaccounts -Akubectl get rolebindings -Akubectl get clusterrolebindingsReview:
- EKS access entries
- Cluster administrators
- Namespace users
- Service Accounts
- Pod Identity associations
- IRSA roles
- Node roles
- CI/CD identities
Task 3.5 — Inventory Images
Section titled “Task 3.5 — Inventory Images”kubectl get pods -A -o json \ | jq -r ' .items[] | .metadata.namespace as $ns | .metadata.name as $pod | .spec.containers[] | [$ns, $pod, .name, .image] | @tsv 'Identify:
- Public registries
- Mutable tags
latest- Unknown repositories
- Missing digests
Phase 4 — Current-State Security Assessment
Section titled “Phase 4 — Current-State Security Assessment”Assess the following domains.
AWS Account and Governance
Section titled “AWS Account and Governance”- Account separation
- Organisational guardrails
- CloudTrail
- GuardDuty
- Security Hub
- Inspector
- AWS Config
- Central logging
Amazon EKS
Section titled “Amazon EKS”- Version
- API endpoint
- Logging
- Encryption
- Access mode
- Add-ons
- Tags
- Infrastructure as Code
Identity
Section titled “Identity”- Federation
- MFA
- Temporary access
- Cluster-admin
- RBAC
- Service Accounts
- Workload IAM
- Break-glass access
Worker Nodes
Section titled “Worker Nodes”- Private subnets
- Public IPs
- AMI
- Patch level
- IMDSv2
- IAM role
- Runtime agents
- Administration
- Encryption
Workloads
Section titled “Workloads”- Non-root
- Privileged mode
- Privilege escalation
- Capabilities
- Seccomp
- Host namespaces
- HostPath
- Runtime sockets
- Resource controls
- Health probes
Networking
Section titled “Networking”- Default-deny policies
- Ingress exposure
- Egress controls
- DNS
- Security Groups
- Flow Logs
- WAF
- Database isolation
Images
Section titled “Images”- Registry
- Scanning
- Signing
- SBOM
- Provenance
- Digest pinning
- Admission validation
Secrets
Section titled “Secrets”- Git exposure
- Image exposure
- Kubernetes Secrets
- Secrets Manager
- IAM access
- KMS
- Rotation
- Logging
Logging and Runtime
Section titled “Logging and Runtime”- Audit Logs
- Application logs
- Falco
- GuardDuty Runtime
- SIEM
- Monitoring health
- Detection rules
Backup and Recovery
Section titled “Backup and Recovery”- RPO
- RTO
- Backup coverage
- Encryption
- Cross-account copies
- Restore testing
- Recovery runbooks
Phase 5 — Threat Modelling
Section titled “Phase 5 — Threat Modelling”Task 5.1 — Identify Assets
Section titled “Task 5.1 — Identify Assets”Include:
- Kubernetes API
- Administrator identities
- Application Pods
- Worker nodes
- Container images
- Service Account tokens
- Workload IAM roles
- Node IAM role
- Secrets
- Databases
- Logs
- Backups
- CI/CD credentials
Task 5.2 — Identify Threat Actors
Section titled “Task 5.2 — Identify Threat Actors”- External attacker
- Malicious insider
- Compromised developer
- Compromised application
- Supply-chain attacker
- Cloud credential thief
- Ransomware operator
- Third-party compromise
Task 5.3 — Define Attack Paths
Section titled “Task 5.3 — Define Attack Paths”Application Exploitation
Section titled “Application Exploitation”Internet
↓
Vulnerable Application
↓
Pod Shell
↓
Service Account Token Access
↓
Secret Enumeration
↓
Internal Service Access
↓
Data ExfiltrationAdministrator Compromise
Section titled “Administrator Compromise”Stolen Identity
↓
Privileged AWS Role
↓
EKS Access Entry
↓
cluster-admin
↓
Malicious WorkloadSupply-Chain Compromise
Section titled “Supply-Chain Compromise”Compromised Pipeline
↓
Malicious Image
↓
Trusted Registry
↓
Production Deployment
↓
Runtime CompromiseContainer Escape
Section titled “Container Escape”Privileged Pod
↓
Runtime Socket
↓
Worker Node
↓
Node IAM Credentials
↓
AWS ServicesPhase 6 — Target Security Architecture
Section titled “Phase 6 — Target Security Architecture”Design the target state using:
- Separate production AWS account
- Restricted EKS API endpoint
- Private worker nodes
- Federated access
- EKS access entries
- Namespace-scoped RBAC
- Dedicated Service Accounts
- Pod Identity or IRSA
- Pod Security Admission
- Admission policies
- Default-deny networking
- Approved image registries
- Image scanning and signing
- External secrets management
- Central logging
- Runtime monitoring
- Tested recovery
Phase 7 — Identity and Access Implementation
Section titled “Phase 7 — Identity and Access Implementation”Task 7.1 — Define Human Access
Section titled “Task 7.1 — Define Human Access”Enterprise Identity Provider
↓
IAM Identity Center
↓
MFA
↓
Temporary Role
↓
EKS Access Entry
↓
Kubernetes RBACTask 7.2 — Remove Excessive Access
Section titled “Task 7.2 — Remove Excessive Access”Review:
kubectl get clusterrolebindingsRemove:
- Unknown administrators
- Unused groups
- Shared identities
- Unnecessary wildcard roles
Task 7.3 — Implement Namespace RBAC
Section titled “Task 7.3 — Implement Namespace RBAC”Create:
- Namespace administrator Role
- Developer Role
- Read-only Role
- Auditor Role
Validate:
kubectl auth can-i list pods \ -n payments \ --as=<developer-identity>kubectl auth can-i get secrets \ -n payments \ --as=<developer-identity>Expected:
Pod access allowed.
Secret access denied.Task 7.4 — Implement Workload Identity
Section titled “Task 7.4 — Implement Workload Identity”Pod
↓
Dedicated Service Account
↓
EKS Pod Identity or IRSA
↓
Dedicated IAM Role
↓
Approved AWS ResourcePhase 8 — Workload and Node Security
Section titled “Phase 8 — Workload and Node Security”Task 8.1 — Apply Pod Security Admission
Section titled “Task 8.1 — Apply Pod Security Admission”Example:
apiVersion: v1kind: Namespacemetadata: name: payments
labels: pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: restricted pod-security.kubernetes.io/audit: restricted pod-security.kubernetes.io/warn: restrictedTask 8.2 — Deploy Secure Workloads
Section titled “Task 8.2 — Deploy Secure Workloads”Requirements:
- Non-root
- No privilege escalation
- Drop capabilities
RuntimeDefaultseccomp- Read-only root filesystem
- Dedicated Service Account
- Resource limits
- Health probes
- Approved image digest
Task 8.3 — Harden Nodes
Section titled “Task 8.3 — Harden Nodes”Validate:
- Private subnets
- Approved AMI
- Encrypted volumes
- IMDSv2
- Restricted node IAM
- No unnecessary SSH
- Runtime monitoring
- Immutable replacement
Phase 9 — Network Security
Section titled “Phase 9 — Network Security”Task 9.1 — Apply Default-Deny
Section titled “Task 9.1 — Apply Default-Deny”apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1kind: NetworkPolicymetadata: name: default-deny-all namespace: payments
spec: podSelector: {}
policyTypes: - Ingress - EgressTask 9.2 — Allow Required DNS
Section titled “Task 9.2 — Allow Required DNS”Create explicit DNS egress.
Task 9.3 — Allow Approved Application Flows
Section titled “Task 9.3 — Allow Approved Application Flows”Example:
Customer Portal
↓
Payment API
AllowedCustomer Portal
↓
Payment Database
DeniedTask 9.4 — Validate Public Exposure
Section titled “Task 9.4 — Validate Public Exposure”Review:
kubectl get services -Akubectl get ingress -ARemove or restrict unapproved public endpoints.
Phase 10 — Software Supply-Chain Security
Section titled “Phase 10 — Software Supply-Chain Security”Task 10.1 — Secure the Source Repository
Section titled “Task 10.1 — Secure the Source Repository”Require:
- MFA
- Protected branches
- Pull-request approval
- CODEOWNERS
- Secret scanning
- Audit logging
Task 10.2 — Secure the Pipeline
Section titled “Task 10.2 — Secure the Pipeline”Implement:
Source Review
↓
Secret Scan
↓
Dependency Scan
↓
Infrastructure Scan
↓
Container Build
↓
Image Scan
↓
SBOM
↓
Image Signing
↓
Amazon ECR
↓
Admission VerificationTask 10.3 — Enforce Approved Images
Section titled “Task 10.3 — Enforce Approved Images”Require:
- Approved registry
- Immutable digest
- Passed vulnerability gate
- Signature
- Provenance
- SBOM
Task 10.4 — Block Unsafe Images
Section titled “Task 10.4 — Block Unsafe Images”Test:
- Unsigned image
- Public registry image
- Mutable tag
- Critical-vulnerability image
Expected:
Admission denied.Phase 11 — Secrets and Data Protection
Section titled “Phase 11 — Secrets and Data Protection”Task 11.1 — Store Secrets Externally
Section titled “Task 11.1 — Store Secrets Externally”Use:
- AWS Secrets Manager
- AWS KMS
- Workload IAM
- Secrets Store CSI Driver or approved retrieval method
Task 11.2 — Restrict Secret Access
Section titled “Task 11.2 — Restrict Secret Access”Grant each workload access only to required resources.
Task 11.3 — Validate Rotation
Section titled “Task 11.3 — Validate Rotation”Confirm:
- Rotation completes
- Application reloads safely
- Previous credential is revoked
- CloudTrail records access
Task 11.4 — Protect Data
Section titled “Task 11.4 — Protect Data”Encrypt:
- EBS
- EFS
- Databases
- Logs
- Backups
- Registry
- Evidence
Phase 12 — Logging and Runtime Detection
Section titled “Phase 12 — Logging and Runtime Detection”Task 12.1 — Enable EKS Logs
Section titled “Task 12.1 — Enable EKS Logs”Enable:
- API Server
- Audit
- Authenticator
- Controller Manager
- Scheduler
Task 12.2 — Centralise Telemetry
Section titled “Task 12.2 — Centralise Telemetry”EKS and AWS Sources
↓
CloudWatch and Security Services
↓
Central Log Archive
↓
SIEM
↓
SOCTask 12.3 — Deploy Runtime Security
Section titled “Task 12.3 — Deploy Runtime Security”Use:
- Falco
- GuardDuty Runtime Monitoring
- Equivalent approved tooling
Detect:
- Unexpected shell
- Reverse shell
- Package-manager execution
- File execution from
/tmp - Credential access
- Runtime socket access
- Privilege escalation
- Cryptomining
- Agent tampering
Task 12.4 — Validate SIEM Delivery
Section titled “Task 12.4 — Validate SIEM Delivery”Confirm:
- Alert generated
- Parsed correctly
- Enriched
- Routed to SOC
- Runbook attached
- Delivery time measured
Phase 13 — Security Validation
Section titled “Phase 13 — Security Validation”Create a validation matrix.
| Domain | Positive Test | Negative Test | Expected Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| RBAC | Developer lists Pods | Developer reads Secrets | Secret access denied |
| Pod security | Secure Pod deploys | Privileged Pod deploys | Privileged Pod denied |
| Network | Portal reaches API | Portal reaches database | Database access denied |
| Image security | Signed image deploys | Unsigned image deploys | Unsigned image denied |
| Secrets | App reads required secret | App reads unrelated secret | Access denied |
| Runtime | Normal process runs | Unexpected shell starts | Alert generated |
| Logging | Event generated | Pipeline interrupted | Health alert generated |
| Backup | Restore valid backup | Restore invalid backup | Invalid restore rejected |
Phase 14 — Incident Simulation
Section titled “Phase 14 — Incident Simulation”Simulation Scenario
Section titled “Simulation Scenario”A vulnerable test application is simulated as compromised.
The scenario includes:
Authorised Test Request
↓
Shell Started in Test Pod
↓
Harmless File Created in /tmp
↓
Non-Sensitive Test Token Path Accessed
↓
Approved External Test Destination Contacted
↓
Runtime Alert GeneratedDo not use:
- Real malware
- Real stolen credentials
- Real exfiltration
- Real reverse shell infrastructure
- Production data
Expected Detections
Section titled “Expected Detections”- Shell execution
- File activity
- Sensitive-path access
- Network connection
- Kubernetes Audit Log event
- SIEM incident creation
Phase 15 — Investigation and Containment
Section titled “Phase 15 — Investigation and Containment”Task 15.1 — Triage the Alert
Section titled “Task 15.1 — Triage the Alert”Identify:
- Cluster
- Namespace
- Pod
- Container
- Image
- Process
- Parent process
- Service Account
- Node
- Source and destination
- Detection rule
Task 15.2 — Collect Evidence
Section titled “Task 15.2 — Collect Evidence”Preserve:
kubectl get pod <pod-name> \ -n <namespace> \ -o yaml \ > pod.yamlkubectl logs <pod-name> \ -n <namespace> \ --timestamps \ > container.logCollect:
- Pod YAML
- Pod JSON
- Current logs
- Previous logs
- Process tree
- Network connections
- Audit events
- Runtime alert
- CloudTrail
- VPC Flow Logs
Task 15.3 — Determine Scope
Section titled “Task 15.3 — Determine Scope”Assess:
Container
↓
Pod
↓
Namespace
↓
Node
↓
Cluster
↓
AWS AccountTask 15.4 — Contain the Test Workload
Section titled “Task 15.4 — Contain the Test Workload”Approved actions may include:
- Apply quarantine Network Policy
- Remove Pod from Service traffic
- Scale workload to zero
- Revoke workload IAM association
- Block test destination
- Preserve evidence
Phase 16 — Recovery and Root Cause Analysis
Section titled “Phase 16 — Recovery and Root Cause Analysis”Task 16.1 — Rebuild the Workload
Section titled “Task 16.1 — Rebuild the Workload”Use:
- Trusted source
- Patched dependency
- Clean pipeline
- Scanned image
- Signed image
- Immutable digest
- Secure manifest
Task 16.2 — Rotate Test Credentials
Section titled “Task 16.2 — Rotate Test Credentials”Rotate all credentials accessible to the simulated workload.
Task 16.3 — Validate Recovery
Section titled “Task 16.3 — Validate Recovery”Confirm:
- Correct image digest
- No suspicious process
- No unexpected network connection
- Runtime monitoring active
- Logs active
- Business function healthy
- Security policies enforced
Task 16.4 — Perform Root Cause Analysis
Section titled “Task 16.4 — Perform Root Cause Analysis”Document:
- Initial access
- Attack path
- Control failures
- Root causes
- Contributing factors
- Blast radius
- Corrective actions
- Preventive actions
Example Root Cause
Section titled “Example Root Cause”The test application permitted command execution because a vulnerable dependency was not blocked by the CI/CD vulnerability gate.
The impact increased because the workload had unnecessary token access and unrestricted egress.Phase 17 — Compliance and Production Readiness
Section titled “Phase 17 — Compliance and Production Readiness”Task 17.1 — Perform CIS Review
Section titled “Task 17.1 — Perform CIS Review”Assess applicable controls from:
- CIS Kubernetes Benchmark
- CIS Amazon EKS Benchmark
- CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark
Task 17.2 — Map to NIST
Section titled “Task 17.2 — Map to NIST”Map controls to applicable:
- NIST Cybersecurity Framework
- NIST SP 800-53
Task 17.3 — Review Exceptions
Section titled “Task 17.3 — Review Exceptions”Every exception must include:
- Control
- Justification
- Risk
- Compensating controls
- Owner
- Approver
- Expiry
- Remediation plan
Task 17.4 — Complete Production Checklist
Section titled “Task 17.4 — Complete Production Checklist”Validate:
- Identity
- Nodes
- Workloads
- Network
- Images
- Secrets
- Logging
- Runtime
- Backup
- Incident response
- Compliance
- Governance
Production Security Scorecard
Section titled “Production Security Scorecard”| Domain | Weight | Status | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| AWS governance | Critical | Pass/Fail | Account assessment |
| EKS architecture | Critical | Pass/Fail | Cluster configuration |
| Identity and RBAC | Critical | Pass/Fail | Access review |
| Worker nodes | Critical | Pass/Fail | Node validation |
| Workload security | Critical | Pass/Fail | Policy report |
| Network security | Critical | Pass/Fail | Connectivity tests |
| Supply chain | High | Pass/Fail | Image evidence |
| Secrets | Critical | Pass/Fail | Secret-access test |
| Logging | Critical | Pass/Fail | Log evidence |
| Runtime | High | Pass/Fail | Runtime alert |
| Incident response | High | Pass/Fail | Exercise evidence |
| Recovery | High | Pass/Fail | Restore test |
| Compliance | Medium | Pass/Fail | Compliance report |
Critical Go-Live Blockers
Section titled “Critical Go-Live Blockers”Production approval should be blocked when:
- Unknown cluster-admin access exists
- EKS API exposure is unrestricted
- Static credentials remain in workloads
- Worker-node IAM permissions are excessive
- Privileged production workloads are unresolved
- Pod Security is not enforced
- Network isolation is absent
- Unapproved images can deploy
- Secrets are stored in Git
- Audit logging is missing
- Runtime coverage is incomplete
- Critical alerts do not reach the SIEM
- Backup restoration fails
- Critical vulnerabilities remain unresolved
- Security exceptions are unapproved or expired
- Incident-response procedures are unavailable
Phase 18 — Final Reporting and Presentation
Section titled “Phase 18 — Final Reporting and Presentation”Executive Report Structure
Section titled “Executive Report Structure”1. Executive Summary
2. Business Context
3. Project Scope
4. Current Security Posture
5. Critical Risks
6. Target Security Architecture
7. Implemented Controls
8. Validation Results
9. Incident Simulation Summary
10. Business Impact
11. Compliance Status
12. Remediation Roadmap
13. Residual Risk
14. Production RecommendationTechnical Report Structure
Section titled “Technical Report Structure”1. Introduction
2. Scope and Rules of Engagement
3. Environment Discovery
4. Current-State Assessment
5. Threat Model
6. Target Architecture
7. Identity and Access
8. Node and Workload Security
9. Network Security
10. Software Supply Chain
11. Secrets and Data Protection
12. Logging and Runtime Security
13. Security Validation
14. Incident Simulation
15. Investigation and Containment
16. Recovery and Root Cause Analysis
17. Compliance Mapping
18. Findings and Risk Register
19. Evidence Index
20. Production Readiness
21. Final RecommendationExecutive Summary Template
Section titled “Executive Summary Template”CloudNova Technologies commissioned an end-to-end Kubernetes security engagement for its production Amazon EKS platform.
The engagement included environment discovery, security assessment, threat modelling, architecture design, security implementation, control validation, incident simulation, investigation, recovery and compliance review.
The target architecture uses restricted cluster access, private worker nodes, federated identities, least-privilege RBAC, pod-level AWS identities, secure workload standards, default-deny Network Policies, signed container images, external secrets management, centralised audit logging, runtime threat detection and tested recovery procedures.
The project identified critical and high-risk findings that require remediation before full production approval. The final recommendation is based on verified controls, successful security testing, residual risk and business readiness.Findings Template
Section titled “Findings Template”Finding ID:
Title:
Severity:
Security Domain:
Affected Resource:
Description:
Evidence:
Technical Impact:
Business Impact:
Likelihood:
Recommendation:
Owner:
Target Date:
Status:Example Finding
Section titled “Example Finding”Finding ID:
CAP-SEC-001
Title:
Production Workload Uses Broad Node IAM Permissions
Severity:
Critical
Affected Resource:
payments/payment-api
Description:
The payment-api workload does not use a dedicated Pod Identity or IRSA role and can access permissions assigned to the worker-node IAM role.
Evidence:
CAP-IAM-04-node-role-review.json
Technical Impact:
A compromised Pod may obtain AWS permissions intended for node operations and access unrelated AWS resources.
Business Impact:
An attacker may access sensitive services, credentials or data beyond the application’s approved scope.
Recommendation:
Implement a dedicated workload IAM role, restrict the node IAM role and monitor CloudTrail for unexpected node-role activity.
Owner:
Platform Engineering
Status:
OpenRemediation Roadmap
Section titled “Remediation Roadmap”Immediate — 0 to 30 Days
Section titled “Immediate — 0 to 30 Days”- Restrict cluster endpoint exposure.
- Remove unknown administrators.
- Revoke excessive credentials.
- Enable audit logging.
- Remediate privileged workloads.
- Apply emergency network restrictions.
- Close runtime-monitoring gaps.
- Validate backups.
Short Term — 31 to 90 Days
Section titled “Short Term — 31 to 90 Days”- Implement namespace-scoped RBAC.
- Deploy workload identities.
- Enforce Pod Security Admission.
- Implement default-deny Network Policies.
- Deploy admission policies.
- Implement external secrets.
- Integrate alerts with the SIEM.
- Test incident runbooks.
Medium Term — 91 to 180 Days
Section titled “Medium Term — 91 to 180 Days”- Implement image signing and verification.
- Standardise secure EKS Terraform modules.
- Automate compliance evidence.
- Implement just-in-time administration.
- Centralise egress inspection.
- Mature threat hunting.
- Conduct quarterly recovery tests.
Long Term — 6 to 12 Months
Section titled “Long Term — 6 to 12 Months”- Build an enterprise EKS landing zone.
- Implement multi-cluster security governance.
- Automate drift remediation.
- Mature Zero Trust enforcement.
- Implement cross-Region recovery for critical services.
- Establish continuous control validation.
- Build executive risk analytics.
Final Production Recommendation Options
Section titled “Final Production Recommendation Options”Approved
Section titled “Approved”All critical controls pass.
Approved with Conditions
Section titled “Approved with Conditions”Minor non-critical issues remain with owners and deadlines.
Deferred
Section titled “Deferred”Production approval is paused pending remediation.
Rejected
Section titled “Rejected”Critical risk remains unresolved.
Project Success Criteria
Section titled “Project Success Criteria”The capstone is complete when:
- Project charter is approved
- Scope and Rules of Engagement are complete
- Environment inventory is complete
- Current-state assessment is complete
- Threat model is complete
- Target architecture is approved
- Identity controls are implemented
- Workload controls are implemented
- Network controls are implemented
- Supply-chain controls are implemented
- Secrets controls are implemented
- Logging and runtime monitoring are operational
- Security validations pass
- Incident simulation is completed
- Investigation evidence is collected
- Containment workflow is tested
- Recovery is validated
- Root Cause Analysis is completed
- Compliance mapping is completed
- Findings and risks are documented
- Remediation roadmap is approved
- Production-readiness scorecard is complete
- Executive and technical reports are complete
- Final recommendation is issued
- Final presentation is delivered
Portfolio Presentation
Section titled “Portfolio Presentation”When presenting this capstone, explain:
Business Problem
Section titled “Business Problem”CloudNova Technologies needed a complete security validation before launching a critical enterprise Kubernetes platform.
Your Role
Section titled “Your Role”You acted as the lead Kubernetes Security Engineer and Cloud Security Architect.
What You Assessed
Section titled “What You Assessed”- AWS account governance
- Amazon EKS
- IAM and RBAC
- Worker nodes
- Workloads
- Networking
- Images
- Secrets
- Logging
- Runtime monitoring
- Recovery
What You Designed
Section titled “What You Designed”- Target security architecture
- Identity model
- Network segmentation
- Secure workload baseline
- Software supply-chain controls
- Runtime monitoring
- Incident-response workflows
- Backup and recovery
What You Implemented
Section titled “What You Implemented”Show selected examples of:
- Terraform
- RBAC
- Service Accounts
- Network Policies
- Admission policies
- Secure workload manifests
- Runtime rules
- Monitoring configuration
- Backup configuration
What You Validated
Section titled “What You Validated”Demonstrate:
- Approved access succeeds.
- Unapproved access fails.
- Privileged Pods are denied.
- Cross-namespace traffic is blocked.
- Unsigned images are denied.
- Secret access follows least privilege.
- Runtime alerts reach the SIEM.
- Incident runbooks operate.
- Backups restore successfully.
Business Outcome
Section titled “Business Outcome”Explain how the project:
- Reduced attack surface
- Limited identity blast radius
- Prevented insecure workloads
- Restricted lateral movement
- Improved software trust
- Increased threat visibility
- Improved incident response
- Strengthened compliance
- Increased recovery confidence
- Supported production approval
Real-World Project Scenario
Section titled “Real-World Project Scenario”CloudNova Technologies completes the final pre-production security exercise.
A controlled test application simulates suspicious activity.
The Security Operations platform detects:
- Unexpected shell execution
- File creation under
/tmp - Access to a protected test path
- Outbound network communication
- Kubernetes API activity
The response team:
- Validates the alert.
- Identifies the affected Pod and owner.
- Collects Pod metadata and logs.
- Correlates the event with Kubernetes Audit Logs.
- Reviews the workload IAM role.
- Reviews VPC Flow Logs.
- Applies a quarantine Network Policy.
- Removes the workload from Service traffic.
- Rotates test credentials.
- Rebuilds the application.
- Scans and signs the new image.
- Redeploys using an immutable digest.
- Validates runtime monitoring.
- Performs Root Cause Analysis.
- Updates the CI/CD vulnerability gate.
- Updates the runtime detection rule.
- Documents the result in the production-readiness report.
The final review confirms that:
- Preventive controls reduced the attack path.
- Detective controls generated useful alerts.
- Response procedures worked.
- Recovery used trusted artefacts.
- Evidence supported audit and management review.
Key Takeaways
Section titled “Key Takeaways”- Enterprise Kubernetes security requires end-to-end integration.
- Discovery and inventory are required before security decisions.
- Identity and access determine the possible blast radius.
- Workload, node and network controls must work together.
- Software supply-chain security protects the deployment path.
- Secrets should be externalised and access controlled.
- Runtime monitoring detects attacks after deployment.
- Incident response must be tested before production.
- Recovery must use trusted images, credentials and configuration.
- Root Cause Analysis converts incidents into lasting improvements.
- Compliance evidence should be generated by design.
- Production approval should be based on validated controls.
- Technical findings must be translated into business risk.
- A mature security programme continuously reassesses and improves controls.
Knowledge Check
Section titled “Knowledge Check”1. Why is this project considered end to end?
Section titled “1. Why is this project considered end to end?”Answer: It covers the complete Kubernetes security lifecycle, including discovery, assessment, architecture, implementation, validation, detection, incident response, recovery, compliance and executive reporting.
2. Why should the project include both positive and negative security tests?
Section titled “2. Why should the project include both positive and negative security tests?”Answer: Positive tests confirm that approved activity still works, while negative tests confirm that prohibited activity is blocked or detected.
3. Why is a controlled incident simulation important?
Section titled “3. Why is a controlled incident simulation important?”Answer: It validates monitoring, investigation, containment and recovery procedures without introducing real malicious risk.
4. Why should Root Cause Analysis follow the incident simulation?
Section titled “4. Why should Root Cause Analysis follow the incident simulation?”Answer: Root Cause Analysis identifies the underlying technical and process weaknesses that allowed the simulated attack path and defines corrective and preventive actions.
5. What determines the final production recommendation?
Section titled “5. What determines the final production recommendation?”Answer: The recommendation is based on control effectiveness, unresolved findings, residual risk, recovery readiness, compliance status and business acceptance.
Final Capstone Completion
Section titled “Final Capstone Completion”You have completed Project 10 — End-to-End Kubernetes Security Capstone when the complete project evidence demonstrates that you can:
Assess
↓
Design
↓
Implement
↓
Validate
↓
Detect
↓
Investigate
↓
Contain
↓
Recover
↓
Report
↓
ImproveCongratulations
Section titled “Congratulations”You have completed the Enterprise Kubernetes Security Projects module.
You now have a complete portfolio of enterprise Kubernetes security projects covering:
- Secure Amazon EKS architecture
- Kubernetes security assessment
- CIS Kubernetes auditing
- Multi-tenant security
- Production security architecture
- Runtime threat detection
- Kubernetes SOC integration
- Zero Trust
- Security Operations
- End-to-end security delivery
You are now prepared to apply these skills in roles such as:
- Kubernetes Security Engineer
- Amazon EKS Security Engineer
- Cloud Security Engineer
- Platform Security Engineer
- DevSecOps Engineer
- Container Security Engineer
- Cloud Security Architect
- Kubernetes Security Consultant
- Cloud SOC Engineer
- Incident Response Engineer
➡️ Learning Path Complete — Kubernetes Security Engineer