Lab 01 Build Your SOC Analyst Lab
Mission Overview
Section titled “Mission Overview”Welcome to Lab 01 — Build Your SOC Analyst Lab.
This is the foundation lab for the entire SOC track.
Before investigating suspicious authentication, phishing, malware, endpoint alerts, DNS activity, or SIEM events, you need a controlled environment where logs can be collected, reviewed, correlated, preserved, and documented consistently.
A professional SOC investigation does not begin with:
“Open the SIEM and start clicking.”
It begins with:
Environment → Data Sources → Time → Evidence → Case Structure → Investigation Readiness
Your objective in this lab is to build a reusable SOC analyst workspace that supports every investigation in Labs 02–15.
Mission Goal: Build an organized SOC investigation environment, establish the core log sources, create a consistent case-management and evidence structure, validate timestamps and telemetry, and prepare a repeatable workflow for future security investigations.
Mission Information
Section titled “Mission Information”| Item | Details |
|---|---|
| Difficulty | Beginner |
| Estimated Time | 90–120 minutes |
| Primary Skill | SOC Environment Setup |
| Secondary Skill | Evidence & Log Organization |
| Environment | GoHackersCloud SOC Analyst Lab |
| Primary Outcome | Reusable SOC Investigation Workspace |
| Safety Level | Authorized Training Environment Only |
Learning Objectives
Section titled “Learning Objectives”By completing this lab, you will be able to:
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understand the basic SOC analyst environment
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identify common security log sources
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distinguish endpoint, network, identity, and application telemetry
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create a repeatable investigation folder structure
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create case IDs
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create an investigation journal
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normalize timestamps
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understand UTC and local time
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build an evidence register
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preserve original evidence
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distinguish raw evidence from analyst notes
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create an asset register
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create an identity register
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validate Windows and Linux log availability
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organize DNS, firewall, proxy, email, and endpoint telemetry
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understand SIEM data-source concepts
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build a SOC readiness checklist
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prepare the environment for alert triage
SOC Investigation Methodology
Section titled “SOC Investigation Methodology”Throughout this track, use:
Alert → Validate → Investigate → Correlate → Scope → Contain → Escalate → Report
This lab prepares the environment required to execute that methodology.
Conceptually:
Security Data Sources │ ├── Identity ├── Endpoint ├── Windows ├── Linux ├── DNS ├── Network ├── Email └── Application │ ▼ SIEM │ ▼ Alert │ ▼ SOC Investigation │ ▼ Evidence + Timeline │ ▼ Case ReportThe core principle is:
Good investigations depend on good data, good timestamps, and good evidence discipline.
Part 1 — Understand the SOC Analyst Workspace
Section titled “Part 1 — Understand the SOC Analyst Workspace”A SOC analyst normally works with several components:
SOC Workstation │ ├── SIEM ├── Endpoint Telemetry ├── Identity Logs ├── Network Logs ├── Email Evidence ├── Threat Intelligence ├── Investigation Notes └── Case ManagementYour lab does not need every enterprise product.
The goal is to reproduce the investigation workflow, not the vendor stack.
Part 2 — Recommended Lab Architecture
Section titled “Part 2 — Recommended Lab Architecture”A basic training environment may look like:
SOC Analyst Workstation │ ▼ SIEM / Logs / | \ / | \ ▼ ▼ ▼ Windows Linux Network Endpoint Server Evidence │ │ └───┬────┘ ▼ Simulated EventsA more complete environment:
SOC Analyst │ ▼ SIEM ┌─────────────┼─────────────┐ │ │ │ ▼ ▼ ▼ Windows Logs Linux Logs Network Logs │ │ │ ├─────────────┼─────────────┤ │ │ │ ▼ ▼ ▼ Endpoint DNS Email Telemetry Proxy EvidencePart 3 — Define the Lab Scope
Section titled “Part 3 — Define the Lab Scope”Document your lab environment.
Example:
SOC LAB SCOPE
Environment:GoHackersCloud SOC Analyst Training Lab
SOC Workstation:SOC01
Windows Endpoint:WIN01
Linux Server:LINUX01
Infrastructure:DNS01
Log Platform:Training SIEM / Log Repository
Assessment Type:Security Monitoring and Investigation
Authorized Data:Training-generated logs only
Production Data:Not AuthorizedPart 4 — Create Your SOC Workspace
Section titled “Part 4 — Create Your SOC Workspace”Create:
SOC-Labs/└── Lab-01/ ├── 01-Scope/ ├── 02-Assets/ ├── 03-Identities/ ├── 04-Log-Sources/ │ ├── Windows/ │ ├── Linux/ │ ├── Identity/ │ ├── Endpoint/ │ ├── DNS/ │ ├── Firewall/ │ ├── Proxy/ │ ├── Email/ │ └── Application/ ├── 05-Evidence/ │ ├── Original/ │ ├── Working/ │ └── Redacted/ ├── 06-Timelines/ ├── 07-Queries/ ├── 08-Screenshots/ ├── 09-Case-Notes/ ├── 10-Findings/ └── 11-Reports/The same structure can be reused for future SOC cases.
Part 5 — Create a Case Numbering Standard
Section titled “Part 5 — Create a Case Numbering Standard”A SOC case needs a unique identifier.
Example:
GHC-SOC-2026-001Structure:
GHCSOC2026001Meaning:
OrganizationTeamYearSequential Case NumberFor this lab:
CASE ID:GHC-SOC-LAB01-001Part 6 — Create the Case Header
Section titled “Part 6 — Create the Case Header”Create:
09-Case-Notes/GHC-SOC-LAB01-001.mdUse:
# SOC Investigation Case
## Case Information
Case ID:GHC-SOC-LAB01-001
Case Title:SOC Environment Validation
Analyst:
Date Opened:
Status:Open
Priority:Training
Source:GoHackersCloud SOC Lab
## Scope
## Assets
## Identities
## Data Sources
## Investigation Journal
## Evidence Register
## Timeline
## Findings
## ConclusionsPart 7 — Create the Asset Register
Section titled “Part 7 — Create the Asset Register”SOC investigation depends heavily on asset context.
Create:
| Asset ID | Hostname | IP | OS | Role | Criticality |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A-001 | SOC01 | Linux/Windows | Analyst Workstation | Medium | |
| A-002 | WIN01 | Windows | User Endpoint | Medium | |
| A-003 | LINUX01 | Linux | Server | High | |
| A-004 | DNS01 | Linux/Appliance | DNS | High |
Add:
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owner
-
department
-
environment
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location
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business function
where provided.
Part 8 — Why Asset Context Matters
Section titled “Part 8 — Why Asset Context Matters”An alert involving:
DEV-LAPTOP-15may have very different significance from:
PAYROLL-DB-01Even if the same alert fires.
SOC prioritization often depends on:
Alert Severity + Asset Criticality + User Context + Evidence Confidence
Part 9 — Create the Identity Register
Section titled “Part 9 — Create the Identity Register”Create:
| Identity | Type | Role | Privileged | Department |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| lab-user | User | Standard User | No | Training |
| lab-admin | User | Administrator | Yes | IT |
| svc-web | Service | Web Service | Limited | IT |
Document identities only from the training environment.
Part 10 — Understand Identity Types
Section titled “Part 10 — Understand Identity Types”Common types include:
Human User
Section titled “Human User”Example:
jsmithPrivileged User
Section titled “Privileged User”Example:
admin-jsmithService Account
Section titled “Service Account”Example:
svc-backupMachine Identity
Section titled “Machine Identity”Example:
WIN01$Application Identity
Section titled “Application Identity”Example:
app-serviceIdentity context becomes critical in Lab 03.
Part 11 — Create the Log Source Inventory
Section titled “Part 11 — Create the Log Source Inventory”Build:
| Log Source | System | Available | Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|
| Windows Security | WIN01 | Authentication | |
| Windows System | WIN01 | OS events | |
| Linux Auth | LINUX01 | Authentication | |
| DNS | DNS01 | Name resolution | |
| Firewall | Gateway | Network flows | |
| Endpoint | WIN01 | Process/security | |
| Mail Lab | Phishing | ||
| Proxy/Web | Proxy | Web traffic |
Part 12 — Understand the Major SOC Data Categories
Section titled “Part 12 — Understand the Major SOC Data Categories”Think of SOC telemetry in these groups:
IdentityEndpointHostNetworkInfrastructureApplicationEmailCloudFor this track, the main emphasis will be:
IdentityWindowsLinuxEndpointDNSNetworkEmailSIEMPart 13 — Windows Security Logs
Section titled “Part 13 — Windows Security Logs”Windows Security logs may contain evidence relating to:
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successful authentication
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failed authentication
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account changes
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group changes
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privilege activity
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process activity where auditing is configured
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system access
You do not need to memorize every Event ID in this lab.
The important question is:
Can you locate the event, understand its source, and place it in context?
Part 14 — Locate Windows Logs
Section titled “Part 14 — Locate Windows Logs”On an authorized Windows training system, use:
Event ViewerTypical location:
Windows Logs ├── Application ├── Security ├── Setup └── SystemRecord:
Host:
Security Log Available:Yes / No
System Log Available:Yes / No
Application Log Available:Yes / NoPart 15 — Validate Windows Security Telemetry
Section titled “Part 15 — Validate Windows Security Telemetry”Generate only benign lab activity such as:
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normal test login
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normal logout
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approved application start
Then verify that the expected event appears.
The goal is not to create malicious events.
It is to prove:
Activity ↓Telemetry ↓Analyst VisibilityPart 16 — Linux Log Sources
Section titled “Part 16 — Linux Log Sources”Common locations may include:
/var/log/auth.logor:
/var/log/secureDepending on distribution.
Systemd-based systems may use:
journalctlPart 17 — Validate Linux Logs
Section titled “Part 17 — Validate Linux Logs”On the authorized Linux training system:
journalctl --since "10 minutes ago"Where applicable:
sudo tail /var/log/auth.logor:
sudo tail /var/log/secureUse only read-only investigation commands.
Part 18 — Build the Linux Log Profile
Section titled “Part 18 — Build the Linux Log Profile”LINUX LOG PROFILE
Host:
Distribution:
Authentication Log:
System Journal:
SSH Events Available:Yes / No
Sudo Events Available:Yes / No / Not Tested
Service Events Available:Yes / No
Timestamp Format:
Timezone:Part 19 — DNS Logs
Section titled “Part 19 — DNS Logs”DNS telemetry can reveal:
Client ↓Query ↓Domain ↓ResponsePotential investigation value:
-
suspicious domains
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repeated queries
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newly observed domains
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command-and-control indicators
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phishing infrastructure
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internal hostname activity
For this lab, identify whether DNS data is available.
Do not begin threat hunting yet.
Part 20 — Firewall Logs
Section titled “Part 20 — Firewall Logs”Firewall or network-security logs may include:
TimestampSource IPDestination IPSource PortDestination PortProtocolActionCommon actions:
ALLOWDENYDROPRESETBuild:
| Field | Available |
|---|---|
| Timestamp | |
| Source | |
| Destination | |
| Port | |
| Protocol | |
| Action |
Part 21 — Proxy/Web Logs
Section titled “Part 21 — Proxy/Web Logs”Web or proxy telemetry may provide:
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source user
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source IP
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destination domain
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URL
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method
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status code
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user agent
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bytes transferred
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category
These become important in phishing and web-traffic investigations.
Part 22 — Email Evidence
Section titled “Part 22 — Email Evidence”Email investigations may require:
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sender
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recipient
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subject
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date
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message ID
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received headers
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reply-to
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SPF results
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DKIM results
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DMARC results
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attachments
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URLs
For this lab, simply confirm that a training email sample or evidence source exists.
Part 23 — Endpoint Telemetry
Section titled “Part 23 — Endpoint Telemetry”Endpoint detection tools may provide:
Process NameParent ProcessCommand LineFile HashUserHostNetwork ConnectionAlertYour SOC lab may use:
-
exported JSON
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CSV
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sample EDR alerts
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SIEM events
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generated training telemetry
The exact platform is less important than understanding the evidence.
Part 24 — Create the Endpoint Data Profile
Section titled “Part 24 — Create the Endpoint Data Profile”ENDPOINT DATA PROFILE
Host:
User:
Process Information Available:Yes / No
Parent Process:Yes / No
Command Line:Yes / No
File Hash:Yes / No
Network Connections:Yes / No
Detection Alerts:Yes / NoPart 25 — Understand SIEM Purpose
Section titled “Part 25 — Understand SIEM Purpose”A SIEM helps centralize and correlate events.
Conceptually:
Windows ─┐Linux ───┤DNS ─────┤Firewall ├────► SIEMEndpoint ┤ │Email ───┤ ▼Proxy ───┘ AlertsA SIEM usually supports:
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search
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filtering
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correlation
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dashboards
-
alerts
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event enrichment
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case investigation
Part 26 — Do Not Become Tool-Dependent
Section titled “Part 26 — Do Not Become Tool-Dependent”The analyst workflow should work whether the environment uses:
Platform APlatform BPlatform CThe transferable skill is:
Understand the data and ask the right investigative question.
Part 27 — Validate SIEM Data Sources
Section titled “Part 27 — Validate SIEM Data Sources”Create:
| Source | Events Visible | Latest Timestamp | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Windows | |||
| Linux | |||
| DNS | |||
| Firewall | |||
| Endpoint |
Classify:
HealthyDelayedMissingUnknownPart 28 — Understand Log Ingestion Delay
Section titled “Part 28 — Understand Log Ingestion Delay”An event may occur at:
10:00:00but appear in the SIEM at:
10:00:35Therefore distinguish:
Event Time
Section titled “Event Time”When activity occurred.
Ingestion Time
Section titled “Ingestion Time”When the SIEM received it.
This becomes very important during timeline reconstruction.
Part 29 — Create a Time Standard
Section titled “Part 29 — Create a Time Standard”Choose one investigation standard.
Recommended:
UTC for master incident timelines
You may also preserve local time.
Example:
Event Time:2026-08-28 14:15:30 UTC
Local Time:2026-08-28 19:45:30 ISTPart 30 — Why Timestamp Normalization Matters
Section titled “Part 30 — Why Timestamp Normalization Matters”Imagine:
Windows:14:05 UTC
Firewall:19:35 IST
Email:14:04 UTC
Endpoint:19:36 ISTWithout normalization, correlation becomes confusing.
Always record timezone.
Part 31 — Create the Time Normalization Register
Section titled “Part 31 — Create the Time Normalization Register”| Source | Original Timezone | Master Timezone | Offset |
|---|---|---|---|
| Windows | UTC | UTC | 0 |
| Linux | UTC | UTC | 0 |
| Endpoint | Local | UTC | |
| Firewall | Local | UTC |
Part 32 — Validate System Clock Consistency
Section titled “Part 32 — Validate System Clock Consistency”Record:
SOC Workstation Time:
Windows Time:
Linux Time:
SIEM Time:
Difference:
Acceptable:Yes / NoYou are checking visibility and consistency, not changing production clocks.
Part 33 — Create the Investigation Journal
Section titled “Part 33 — Create the Investigation Journal”Use:
TIME:
CASE ID:
ANALYST:
ACTION:
DATA SOURCE:
QUERY / METHOD:
RESULT:
INTERPRETATION:
EVIDENCE ID:
NEXT STEP:Example:
TIME:14:20 UTC
CASE:GHC-SOC-LAB01-001
ACTION:Validated Windows Security log availability.
RESULT:Authentication events are visible.
INTERPRETATION:Windows authentication telemetry is available for futureinvestigations.
EVIDENCE:EV-004
NEXT STEP:Validate Linux authentication logs.Part 34 — Separate Evidence from Notes
Section titled “Part 34 — Separate Evidence from Notes”Maintain:
Raw Evidenceseparately from:
Analyst NotesFor example:
05-Evidence/Original/windows-security.evtxversus:
09-Case-Notes/windows-analysis.mdNever overwrite your original evidence with analyst edits.
Part 35 — Build the Evidence Register
Section titled “Part 35 — Build the Evidence Register”Use:
| Evidence ID | Source | Description | Original | Working Copy |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV-001 | Windows | Security log | Yes | Yes |
| EV-002 | Linux | Auth log | Yes | Yes |
| EV-003 | DNS | Query sample | Yes | Yes |
Part 36 — Evidence Identification Standard
Section titled “Part 36 — Evidence Identification Standard”Use:
EV-001EV-002EV-003Then reference these IDs in:
-
journal
-
timeline
-
findings
-
case report
Part 37 — Preserve Original Evidence
Section titled “Part 37 — Preserve Original Evidence”Recommended model:
Original Evidence │ │ Copy ▼Working Evidence │ ▼Analysis │ ▼Redacted Evidence │ ▼ReportDo not edit the original where avoidable.
Part 38 — Understand Chain of Custody
Section titled “Part 38 — Understand Chain of Custody”For SOC investigations, record:
What evidence was collected?
Who collected it?
When?
From where?
How was it stored?
Was it modified?For this training lab, use a simple chain-of-custody register.
Part 39 — Create the Chain-of-Custody Register
Section titled “Part 39 — Create the Chain-of-Custody Register”| Evidence | Collected By | Date/Time | Source | Action |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV-001 | Analyst | WIN01 | Exported | |
| EV-002 | Analyst | LINUX01 | Copied |
Part 40 — Understand Evidence Hashing
Section titled “Part 40 — Understand Evidence Hashing”Where required, hashes can help verify evidence integrity.
Conceptually:
Evidence File ↓Hash ↓Known ValueIf the file later changes, the hash may change.
This lab does not require forensic-level evidence handling for every file, but students should understand the concept.
Part 41 — Create the Investigation Timeline Template
Section titled “Part 41 — Create the Investigation Timeline Template”Use:
| Time UTC | Source | Host/User | Event | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
You will use this heavily in Lab 12.
Part 42 — Create an Alert Register
Section titled “Part 42 — Create an Alert Register”Even though triage begins in Lab 02, prepare the structure now.
| Alert ID | Time | Source | Asset | Severity | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ALT-001 | New |
Suggested statuses:
NewInvestigatingPendingEscalatedClosedPart 43 — Create a Case Disposition Register
Section titled “Part 43 — Create a Case Disposition Register”Use consistent classifications:
Benign
Expected Activity
False Positive
Suspicious
Potential Incident
Confirmed Security Incident
Inconclusive
EscalatedDo not create a different vocabulary for every lab.
Part 44 — Separate Severity and Confidence
Section titled “Part 44 — Separate Severity and Confidence”Example:
Severity:High
Confidence:Lowis possible.
Severity means:
How serious would this be?
Confidence means:
How certain are we about the interpretation?
Part 45 — Create the Severity Model
Section titled “Part 45 — Create the Severity Model”For training, use:
CriticalHighMediumLowInformationalConsider:
-
affected asset
-
account privilege
-
number of affected systems
-
business criticality
-
evidence of execution
-
data impact
-
persistence
-
network scope
Part 46 — Create the Confidence Model
Section titled “Part 46 — Create the Confidence Model”Use:
Multiple correlated evidence sources support the conclusion.
Medium
Section titled “Medium”Evidence strongly suggests the conclusion but important context is missing.
Evidence is incomplete or largely circumstantial.
Part 47 — Create the Investigation Hypothesis Template
Section titled “Part 47 — Create the Investigation Hypothesis Template”During investigations, use:
HYPOTHESIS:
Evidence Supporting:
Evidence Contradicting:
Evidence Missing:
Current Confidence:
Next Validation Step:This prevents analysts from locking onto the first explanation.
Part 48 — Understand Confirmation Bias
Section titled “Part 48 — Understand Confirmation Bias”Suppose an alert says:
Malware DetectedA weak analyst thinks:
Host CompromisedA stronger analyst asks:
What exactly was detected?
Did it execute?
What process launched it?
What user was involved?
Did it make network connections?
Was it blocked?
Are other hosts affected?The data determines the conclusion.
Part 49 — Build the Analyst Question Framework
Section titled “Part 49 — Build the Analyst Question Framework”For any future alert, ask:
WHO?
WHAT?
WHEN?
WHERE?
HOW?
WHAT ELSE?
SO WHAT?Meaning:
User/account.
Activity or event.
Timestamp and sequence.
Where?
Section titled “Where?”Host, network, application.
Process, protocol, authentication method.
What Else?
Section titled “What Else?”Related events.
So What?
Section titled “So What?”Security impact.
Part 50 — Validate Search Capability
Section titled “Part 50 — Validate Search Capability”In your chosen SIEM/log platform, confirm you can search by:
-
host
-
user
-
IP address
-
event type
-
time range
Record:
| Search | Works |
|---|---|
| Host | |
| User | |
| IP | |
| Time | |
| Event Type |
Do not worry about advanced correlation yet.
Part 51 — Create the Saved Query Register
Section titled “Part 51 — Create the Saved Query Register”Use:
| Query ID | Purpose | Data Source |
|---|---|---|
| Q-001 | Events by host | All |
| Q-002 | Events by user | Identity |
| Q-003 | Events by source IP | Network |
| Q-004 | Events by time range | All |
Exact syntax will depend on your lab SIEM.
Part 52 — Validate Pivoting
Section titled “Part 52 — Validate Pivoting”A SOC investigation often looks like:
Alert ↓User ↓Host ↓IP ↓DNS ↓EndpointVerify that your environment allows you to move between at least two data sources.
For example:
Authentication Event ↓Same Host ↓Endpoint EventsPart 53 — Build the Pivot Register
Section titled “Part 53 — Build the Pivot Register”| Starting Evidence | Pivot | Result |
|---|---|---|
| User | Host | |
| Host | IP | |
| IP | DNS | |
| Host | Endpoint |
Part 54 — Create the IOC Register Template
Section titled “Part 54 — Create the IOC Register Template”Future investigations may contain:
-
IP
-
domain
-
URL
-
hash
-
email address
Create:
| IOC ID | Type | Value | Source | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| IOC-001 | Domain |
Do not populate it with real unrelated indicators.
Part 55 — Create the Investigation Findings Template
Section titled “Part 55 — Create the Investigation Findings Template”Use:
## Finding ID
### Observation
### Evidence
### Analysis
### Severity
### Confidence
### Scope
### Recommended Action
### Escalation Required
### Remaining QuestionsSOC findings are not always vulnerabilities.
They may represent:
-
suspicious behavior
-
incident evidence
-
policy violations
-
confirmed malicious activity
-
telemetry gaps
Part 56 — Document Telemetry Gaps
Section titled “Part 56 — Document Telemetry Gaps”Missing visibility is itself important.
Example:
TELEMETRY GAP:Endpoint process telemetry unavailable for LINUX01.
Impact:Process-level investigation may be limited.
Recommendation:Review endpoint monitoring coverage.Do not imply malicious activity simply because logs are missing.
Part 57 — Build the Telemetry Coverage Matrix
Section titled “Part 57 — Build the Telemetry Coverage Matrix”| Asset | Auth | Endpoint | DNS | Network | Application |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WIN01 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | N/A |
| LINUX01 | Yes | Partial | Yes | Yes | Yes |
This becomes extremely useful during investigations.
Part 58 — Identify Critical Logging Gaps
Section titled “Part 58 — Identify Critical Logging Gaps”Examples:
No authentication logs from critical server
No endpoint telemetry on privileged workstation
No DNS logs
Firewall events missing source IP
SIEM ingestion delayed significantlyClassify:
Operational Observationunless the lab specifically asks for a security finding.
Part 59 — Create the SOC Data Health Register
Section titled “Part 59 — Create the SOC Data Health Register”| Source | Status | Delay | Completeness | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Windows | Healthy | Low | Good | |
| Linux | Healthy | Low | Good | |
| DNS | Partial |
Part 60 — Prepare a Sample Case Workflow
Section titled “Part 60 — Prepare a Sample Case Workflow”Your future cases should follow:
CASE OPENED ↓Alert Recorded ↓Scope Confirmed ↓Initial Evidence Preserved ↓Triage ↓Investigation ↓Correlation ↓Timeline ↓Scope Determination ↓Disposition ↓Escalation / Closure ↓ReportPart 61 — Build the Case Status Model
Section titled “Part 61 — Build the Case Status Model”Use:
NEW ↓TRIAGE ↓INVESTIGATING ↓PENDING / ESCALATED ↓CONTAINED ↓CLOSEDNot every case needs every status.
Part 62 — Define Escalation Criteria
Section titled “Part 62 — Define Escalation Criteria”Prepare for later labs.
Potential escalation triggers:
-
privileged account involved
-
critical asset involved
-
malware execution confirmed
-
lateral activity suspected
-
multiple systems affected
-
sensitive data exposure
-
persistent malicious activity
-
containment required
Create:
| Condition | Escalate |
|---|---|
| Critical asset affected | Yes |
| Privileged identity affected | Review |
| Single false positive | No |
Part 63 — Define Containment Decision Fields
Section titled “Part 63 — Define Containment Decision Fields”Do not perform containment in this setup lab.
Create:
Containment Required:Yes / No / Unknown
Recommended Action:
Business Impact:
Evidence Preservation Required:
Approval Required:
Escalation Owner:Part 64 — Create the SOC Analyst Dashboard
Section titled “Part 64 — Create the SOC Analyst Dashboard”Maintain a simple case dashboard:
SOC LAB DASHBOARD
Open Cases:
New Alerts:
Cases Investigating:
Cases Escalated:
Cases Closed:
Log Sources Healthy:
Log Sources Missing:
Current Lab:
Current Case:Part 65 — Perform a Readiness Validation
Section titled “Part 65 — Perform a Readiness Validation”Your environment should answer:
Can I locate Windows authentication logs?
Can I locate Linux authentication logs?
Can I identify a DNS event?
Can I identify a network event?
Can I find endpoint telemetry?
Can I search by hostname?
Can I search by user?
Can I search by IP?
Can I search by time?
Can I preserve evidence?
Can I create an investigation timeline?
Can I document a case?Part 66 — Build the SOC Readiness Matrix
Section titled “Part 66 — Build the SOC Readiness Matrix”| Capability | Ready | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Windows logs | ||
| Linux logs | ||
| Identity context | ||
| DNS evidence | ||
| Network evidence | ||
| Endpoint evidence | ||
| SIEM search | ||
| Timeline | ||
| Evidence register | ||
| Case notes |
Part 67 — Mission Challenge
Section titled “Part 67 — Mission Challenge”Complete:
LAB INFORMATION
Lab:Build Your SOC Analyst Lab
Case ID:
Analyst:
Date:
SOC ENVIRONMENT
SOC Workstation:
SIEM / Log Platform:
Windows Host:
Linux Host:
DNS Source:
Network Source:
Endpoint Source:
Email Source:
ASSETS
Asset 01:
Role:
Criticality:
Asset 02:
Role:
Criticality:
IDENTITIES
Standard User:
Privileged User:
Service Account:
LOG SOURCES
Windows Security:Available / Missing
Linux Authentication:Available / Missing
DNS:Available / Missing
Firewall:Available / Missing
Proxy:Available / Missing
Endpoint:Available / Missing
Email:Available / Missing
TIME
SOC Timezone:
Windows Timezone:
Linux Timezone:
SIEM Timezone:
Master Investigation Timezone:
Clock Differences:
EVIDENCE
Original Evidence Folder:
Working Evidence Folder:
Redacted Evidence Folder:
Evidence Naming Standard:
Chain of Custody Created:Yes / No
SIEM
Search by Host:Yes / No
Search by User:Yes / No
Search by IP:Yes / No
Search by Time:Yes / No
Pivot Between Sources:Yes / No
TELEMETRY HEALTH
Healthy Sources:
Delayed Sources:
Missing Sources:
Critical Visibility Gaps:
CASE MANAGEMENT
Case Template Created:Yes / No
Alert Register Created:Yes / No
IOC Register Created:Yes / No
Timeline Created:Yes / No
Journal Created:Yes / No
FINAL READINESS
Asset Context Ready:Yes / No
Identity Context Ready:Yes / No
Log Sources Ready:Yes / No
Time Normalization Ready:Yes / No
Evidence Handling Ready:Yes / No
SIEM Search Ready:Yes / No
Case Management Ready:Yes / No
Ready for Alert Triage:Yes / NoPart 68 — What Not to Do
Section titled “Part 68 — What Not to Do”Do not:
Import unrelated production logs
Collect real employee credentials
Capture personal data unnecessarily
Modify original evidence without retaining a copy
Delete inconvenient evidence
Change timestamps to make events align
Mix local time and UTC without labeling
Store passwords in analyst notes
Share raw security evidence publicly
Create malicious events unnecessarily
Generate malware simply to produce telemetry
Perform password attacks
Disable logging
Modify security controls
Hide telemetry gaps
Assume missing logs mean nothing happened
Treat every alert as an incidentThe professional rule is:
Build visibility without creating unnecessary security risk.
Troubleshooting
Section titled “Troubleshooting”Windows Events Are Missing
Section titled “Windows Events Are Missing”Check:
-
correct event channel
-
correct time range
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auditing configuration
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log ingestion
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SIEM delay
Do not immediately conclude the activity did not occur.
Linux Authentication Log Does Not Exist
Section titled “Linux Authentication Log Does Not Exist”The distribution may use:
/var/log/secureor:
journalctlIdentify the correct source.
SIEM Has No Recent Events
Section titled “SIEM Has No Recent Events”Check:
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ingestion status
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data-source status
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event delay
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timestamp/timezone
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filters
Event Times Do Not Match
Section titled “Event Times Do Not Match”Check:
UTC vs local timebefore assuming separate events.
Endpoint Data Is Missing
Section titled “Endpoint Data Is Missing”Record the visibility limitation.
Do not invent process details.
DNS Events Are Missing
Section titled “DNS Events Are Missing”Determine whether:
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DNS logging is disabled
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clients use another resolver
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source is not ingested
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the selected time range is incorrect
Evidence Requirements
Section titled “Evidence Requirements”Capture at minimum:
Evidence 01
Section titled “Evidence 01”SOC lab scope.
Evidence 02
Section titled “Evidence 02”Lab architecture.
Evidence 03
Section titled “Evidence 03”Case ID and case template.
Evidence 04
Section titled “Evidence 04”Asset Register.
Evidence 05
Section titled “Evidence 05”Identity Register.
Evidence 06
Section titled “Evidence 06”Log Source Inventory.
Evidence 07
Section titled “Evidence 07”Windows log availability.
Evidence 08
Section titled “Evidence 08”Linux log availability.
Evidence 09
Section titled “Evidence 09”DNS data availability.
Evidence 10
Section titled “Evidence 10”Network data availability.
Evidence 11
Section titled “Evidence 11”Endpoint data availability.
Evidence 12
Section titled “Evidence 12”SIEM data-source status.
Evidence 13
Section titled “Evidence 13”Time Normalization Register.
Evidence 14
Section titled “Evidence 14”Clock consistency validation.
Evidence 15
Section titled “Evidence 15”Investigation Journal.
Evidence 16
Section titled “Evidence 16”Evidence Register.
Evidence 17
Section titled “Evidence 17”Chain-of-Custody Register.
Evidence 18
Section titled “Evidence 18”Timeline template.
Evidence 19
Section titled “Evidence 19”Alert Register.
Evidence 20
Section titled “Evidence 20”IOC Register.
Evidence 21
Section titled “Evidence 21”Saved Query Register.
Evidence 22
Section titled “Evidence 22”Pivot Register.
Evidence 23
Section titled “Evidence 23”Telemetry Coverage Matrix.
Evidence 24
Section titled “Evidence 24”SOC Data Health Register.
Evidence 25
Section titled “Evidence 25”SOC Readiness Matrix.
Evidence 26
Section titled “Evidence 26”Mission Challenge worksheet.
Mission Deliverables
Section titled “Mission Deliverables”Complete:
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SOC lab scope documented
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SOC architecture documented
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case-numbering standard defined
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first training case created
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Asset Register completed
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Identity Register completed
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Log Source Inventory completed
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Windows telemetry validated
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Linux telemetry validated
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DNS telemetry identified
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network telemetry identified
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endpoint telemetry identified
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email evidence source identified
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SIEM data sources reviewed
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ingestion delay understood
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master timezone selected
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timestamp normalization documented
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evidence folder structure created
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Evidence Register completed
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chain-of-custody template created
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investigation journal created
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timeline template created
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Alert Register created
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IOC Register created
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severity model defined
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confidence model defined
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telemetry gaps documented
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search capability validated
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pivot capability validated
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escalation criteria prepared
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SOC Readiness Matrix completed
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environment declared ready for investigation
Lab Report Template
Section titled “Lab Report Template”# Lab 01 — Build Your SOC Analyst Lab
## Executive Summary
## Mission Objective
## Lab Scope
## SOC Architecture
## Case Management Standard
## Asset Register
## Identity Register
## Log Source Inventory
## Windows Telemetry
## Linux Telemetry
## DNS Telemetry
## Network Telemetry
## Endpoint Telemetry
## Email Evidence
## SIEM Data Sources
## Timestamp Normalization
## Evidence Handling
## Chain of Custody
## Investigation Journal
## Alert Register
## IOC Register
## Timeline Framework
## Telemetry Coverage
## Data Health
## Investigation Search Capability
## Escalation Criteria
## SOC Readiness Assessment
## Limitations
## ConclusionKnowledge Check
Section titled “Knowledge Check”Question 1 — Why is asset context important during alert triage?
Section titled “Question 1 — Why is asset context important during alert triage?”Because the same security event can have very different risk depending on the system’s role and criticality.
Question 2 — What is the difference between event time and ingestion time?
Section titled “Question 2 — What is the difference between event time and ingestion time?”Event time represents when the activity occurred. Ingestion time represents when the log platform received the event.
Question 3 — Why normalize timestamps?
Section titled “Question 3 — Why normalize timestamps?”To accurately correlate events coming from systems using different timezones and logging formats.
Question 4 — Why preserve original evidence?
Section titled “Question 4 — Why preserve original evidence?”So the analyst can demonstrate what was originally collected and avoid confusing analyst modifications with source evidence.
Question 5 — Is missing telemetry proof that no activity occurred?
Section titled “Question 5 — Is missing telemetry proof that no activity occurred?”No.
It may indicate a visibility gap.
Question 6 — What is the purpose of an investigation journal?
Section titled “Question 6 — What is the purpose of an investigation journal?”To preserve a chronological record of analyst actions, searches, observations, evidence, and decisions.
Question 7 — What is the difference between severity and confidence?
Section titled “Question 7 — What is the difference between severity and confidence?”Severity represents potential or confirmed impact. Confidence represents how certain the analyst is about the conclusion.
Question 8 — Why create an identity register?
Section titled “Question 8 — Why create an identity register?”Because user privilege, account type, department, and expected behavior are essential context during identity investigations.
Question 9 — What is a SIEM’s primary role in the SOC workflow?
Section titled “Question 9 — What is a SIEM’s primary role in the SOC workflow?”To centralize, search, correlate, enrich, and alert on security telemetry from multiple sources.
Question 10 — What is the central question of this lab?
Section titled “Question 10 — What is the central question of this lab?”“Do I have the data, timestamps, context, evidence process, and investigation workspace required to analyze a security alert professionally?”
Skills Achieved
Section titled “Skills Achieved”After completing this lab, you should understand:
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SOC lab architecture
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case management fundamentals
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asset context
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identity context
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security log sources
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Windows logging basics
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Linux logging basics
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DNS telemetry
-
network telemetry
-
endpoint telemetry
-
email evidence
-
SIEM concepts
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event vs ingestion time
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timestamp normalization
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evidence preservation
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chain-of-custody fundamentals
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investigation journaling
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timeline preparation
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severity vs confidence
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telemetry-gap identification
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investigation readiness
Professional Takeaway
Section titled “Professional Takeaway”A weak SOC setup looks like:
Alert Appears ↓Search Randomly ↓Take Screenshot ↓Make ConclusionA professional SOC setup looks like:
Know the Environment ↓Know the Assets ↓Know the Identities ↓Know the Log Sources ↓Normalize Time ↓Preserve Evidence ↓Record Analyst Actions ↓Correlate Data ↓Reach Defensible ConclusionsAlways distinguish:
Alert ≠IncidentLog Missing ≠Activity Did Not OccurEvent Time ≠Ingestion TimeHigh Severity ≠High ConfidenceRaw Evidence ≠Analyst InterpretationIOC Match ≠Confirmed CompromiseOne Event ≠Complete Incident StoryBy the end of this lab, you should be able to answer:
“Is my SOC environment organized well enough that another analyst could reproduce my investigation, locate my evidence, understand my timestamps, and continue the case without starting over?”
What’s Next?
Section titled “What’s Next?”➡️ Lab 02 — Security Alert Triage & Prioritization
In the next lab, students will receive a realistic alert queue and decide which alerts should be:
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closed as expected activity
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classified as false positives
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investigated further
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prioritized
-
escalated
They will work with:
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alert severity
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confidence
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asset criticality
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identity context
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duplicate alerts
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supporting telemetry
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triage notes
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disposition
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escalation criteria
The methodology becomes:
Alert → Context → Validate → Prioritize → Investigate / Close / Escalate
The central question will be:
“Does this alert represent meaningful security risk, and what should the SOC do with it next?”