03 Threat Detection
Welcome to:
Module 03 — Threat Detection
In the previous module, you learned how enterprise SOC teams collect and monitor security telemetry from:
Identity
Endpoints
Networks
Cloud
Applications
Email
SaaSNow you will learn how to turn that telemetry into:
DetectionsA detection is not simply:
A SIEM RuleA strong detection connects:
Threat Behavior ↓Relevant Telemetry ↓Detection Logic ↓Alert ↓InvestigationThe goal of this module is to help you understand not only:
How to Writea Detectionbut:
Why the DetectionShould Exist
What ThreatIt Addresses
Which EvidenceIt Requires
How to Validate It
How to Improve ItModule Objectives
Section titled “Module Objectives”By the end of this module, you will understand how to:
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explain the purpose of threat detection.
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distinguish prevention from detection.
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understand detection engineering fundamentals.
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identify detection use cases.
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connect attacker behavior to telemetry.
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distinguish IOCs from behavioral indicators.
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understand signature-based detection.
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understand behavior-based detection.
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understand threshold-based detection.
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understand correlation-based detection.
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understand anomaly detection.
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understand sequence-based detection.
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understand identity detections.
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understand endpoint detections.
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understand network detections.
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understand cloud detections.
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understand email detections.
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map detections to MITRE ATT&CK.
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build detection coverage matrices.
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understand detection logic.
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understand detection fields and conditions.
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understand rule thresholds and time windows.
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understand alert severity and confidence.
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understand false positives.
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understand false negatives.
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understand benign true positives.
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tune detection rules.
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validate detections.
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test detections safely.
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identify telemetry dependencies.
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identify detection gaps.
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measure detection quality.
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document detection use cases professionally.
1 — What Is Threat Detection?
Section titled “1 — What Is Threat Detection?”Threat detection is the process of identifying activity that may indicate:
Attack
Compromise
Abuse
Policy Violation
Suspicious BehaviorThreat detection attempts to answer:
Is SomethingPotentially MaliciousHappening?2 — Prevention vs Detection
Section titled “2 — Prevention vs Detection”Prevention tries to stop an attack.
Examples:
MFA
Firewall
Application Control
Least PrivilegeDetection tries to identify:
SuspiciousorMalicious ActivityExamples:
Impossible Travel
Credential Dumping
Suspicious PowerShell
Malicious Domain AccessThe relationship is:
PreventWhere Possible
DetectWhat PreventionMay Miss3 — Detection Is a Defensive Hypothesis
Section titled “3 — Detection Is a Defensive Hypothesis”A detection can be viewed as:
If ThisBehavior Occurs
It May IndicateThis ThreatExample:
IF
A User Has20 Failed Logins
FOLLOWED BY
A Successful Login
WITHIN
5 Minutes
THEN
InvestigatePotential Credential Attack4 — Detection Does Not Equal Incident
Section titled “4 — Detection Does Not Equal Incident”Remember:
Detection Match ↓Alertbut:
Alert ≠Confirmed AttackThe alert still requires investigation.
5 — Detection Use Case
Section titled “5 — Detection Use Case”A detection should begin with a:
Use CaseA good detection use case explains:
What ThreatAre We Tryingto Detect?Example:
Detect PotentialPrivileged AccountCompromise6 — Detection Use Case Structure
Section titled “6 — Detection Use Case Structure”A professional use case may contain:
Use Case ID
Threat Scenario
MITRE ATT&CK
Required Telemetry
Detection Logic
Severity
Confidence
Investigation Steps
Known False Positives
Validation Method7 — Start With Threat Behavior
Section titled “7 — Start With Threat Behavior”Do not begin with:
Which LogsDo We Have?Begin with:
What ThreatDo We Needto Detect?Then identify:
What WouldThat ThreatLook Like?Then:
Which TelemetryWould Show It?8 — Detection Development Workflow
Section titled “8 — Detection Development Workflow”Use:
Threat Scenario ↓Attacker Behavior ↓Required Telemetry ↓Observable Events ↓Detection Logic ↓Alert ↓Validation ↓Tuning9 — Detection Scenario Example
Section titled “9 — Detection Scenario Example”Threat:
CredentialCompromiseBehavior:
RepeatedAuthentication Failure ↓Successful Login ↓Privilege ChangeTelemetry:
Identity Logs
MFA Logs
Privilege EventsDetection:
Failures+Success+Privilege Change10 — Indicators of Compromise
Section titled “10 — Indicators of Compromise”IOCs may include:
IP Address
Domain
Hash
URL
File Name
Registry ValueExample:
Known MaliciousSHA-256 Hash11 — IOC-Based Detection
Section titled “11 — IOC-Based Detection”Conceptually:
IF
File Hash=Known Malicious Hash
THEN
Generate AlertAdvantages:
Simple
Precise
FastLimitations:
Easy forAttackers to Change12 — IOC Freshness
Section titled “12 — IOC Freshness”Indicators may become obsolete.
Example:
Attacker UsesIP A Today
IP B TomorrowTherefore:
Old IOC ≠Current Threat13 — Behavior-Based Detection
Section titled “13 — Behavior-Based Detection”Behavior detections identify:
What theAttacker Is Doinginstead of only:
Which ArtifactThey UseExample:
Office Application ↓PowerShell ↓Network Download14 — Why Behavior Detection Is Powerful
Section titled “14 — Why Behavior Detection Is Powerful”Attackers can change:
Hash
IP
Domain
File Namebut may still need to:
Execute
Persist
Escalate
Dump Credentials
Move Laterally
ExfiltrateBehavior-based detection focuses on those actions.
15 — Signature-Based Detection
Section titled “15 — Signature-Based Detection”Signature detection matches known patterns.
Examples:
Malware Signature
Exploit Pattern
Known Network SequenceBest for:
KnownThreat Patterns16 — Threshold Detection
Section titled “16 — Threshold Detection”Threshold detections identify:
Unusual VolumeExample:
More Than25 Failed Logins
Within5 Minutes17 — Threshold Design
Section titled “17 — Threshold Design”A threshold should consider:
Normal Behavior
User Type
Asset Type
Environment
Business ProcessA threshold that works for:
Employee Accountmay not work for:
Service Account18 — Correlation Detection
Section titled “18 — Correlation Detection”Correlation combines multiple events.
Example:
Failed Login +Successful Login +New MFA Methodwithin a defined period.
19 — Sequence Detection
Section titled “19 — Sequence Detection”Sequence detection evaluates:
Orderof activity.
Example:
Phishing Email ↓Suspicious Login ↓Mailbox Rule CreationOrder adds context.
20 — Anomaly Detection
Section titled “20 — Anomaly Detection”Anomaly detection identifies behavior that differs from a baseline.
Examples:
New Country
New Device
Rare Process
Unusual Data Volume
Unexpected Login Time21 — Anomaly Limitation
Section titled “21 — Anomaly Limitation”Remember:
Anomalous ≠MaliciousA user may legitimately:
Travel
Change Device
Work Late
Transfer Large Files22 — Risk-Based Detection
Section titled “22 — Risk-Based Detection”Risk-based detection combines multiple low-confidence signals.
Example:
New Country ↓+20 Risk
MFA Denials ↓+30 Risk
New Admin Role ↓+50 RiskTotal:
100may trigger a higher-priority alert.
23 — Detection Confidence
Section titled “23 — Detection Confidence”A detection may have:
Low
Medium
Highconfidence.
Example:
Known malware hash:
High ConfidenceRare process execution:
Lower Confidencedepending on context.
24 — Severity vs Confidence
Section titled “24 — Severity vs Confidence”These are different.
Severity asks:
How BadCould This Be?Confidence asks:
How StronglyDoes the EvidenceSuggest the Threat?Example:
Potential DomainAdmin Compromisemay be:
Severity:Critical
Confidence:Medium25 — Identity Detection
Section titled “25 — Identity Detection”Identity detections may monitor:
Failed Logins
Successful Logins
MFA
Role Changes
New Accounts
Password Resets
Session Activity26 — Password Spray Detection
Section titled “26 — Password Spray Detection”Password spray typically involves:
One or FewPasswords
Against
Many AccountsPossible logic:
Same Source IP
Many Users
Authentication Failures
Short Time Window27 — Brute Force Detection
Section titled “27 — Brute Force Detection”Brute force may involve:
Many Password Attempts
Against
One AccountPossible logic:
Same User
Multiple Failures
Short Time Window28 — Credential Stuffing
Section titled “28 — Credential Stuffing”Credential stuffing uses:
PreviouslyStolen Credentialsagainst multiple services or users.
Detection may require:
Authentication Pattern
IP Reputation
Device Context
Failure / Success Pattern29 — Impossible Travel Detection
Section titled “29 — Impossible Travel Detection”Conceptually:
User LoginCountry A
10 Minutes Later
User LoginCountry BPotential alert:
Impossible TravelBut check:
VPN
Proxy
Mobile Network
GeoIP Error30 — MFA Fatigue Detection
Section titled “30 — MFA Fatigue Detection”Potential pattern:
MFA Denied
MFA Denied
MFA Denied
MFA Approvedwithin a short period.
Questions:
Was UserExpecting Login?
Which Device?
Which Source IP?
What HappenedAfter Approval?31 — New Administrator Detection
Section titled “31 — New Administrator Detection”A high-value detection:
UserAdded toPrivileged GroupInvestigate:
Who Made Change?
Was It Approved?
Which User?
Which System?
What Happened Next?32 — Dormant Account Login
Section titled “32 — Dormant Account Login”Potential detection:
AccountNot Usedfor 90 Days
↓
Successful LoginThis may indicate:
Account Abuse
Return from Leave
Service ChangeContext required.
33 — Endpoint Detection
Section titled “33 — Endpoint Detection”Endpoint detections analyze:
Processes
Command Lines
Files
Registry
Services
Network Connections
User Behavior34 — Suspicious PowerShell
Section titled “34 — Suspicious PowerShell”PowerShell itself is legitimate.
Detection should focus on behavior such as:
Encoded Command
Download Cradle
Hidden Execution
Unusual Parent Process
Credential Access35 — Parent-Child Detection
Section titled “35 — Parent-Child Detection”Example:
winword.exe ↓powershell.exemay be suspicious.
Another:
excel.exe ↓cmd.exemay also deserve investigation.
36 — Rare Process Detection
Section titled “36 — Rare Process Detection”A process may be suspicious because:
It RarelyRunsin the environment.
But rare does not automatically mean malicious.
37 — Credential Dumping Detection
Section titled “37 — Credential Dumping Detection”Potential signals:
LSASS Access
Credential Tool Execution
Suspicious Memory Access
Known Dumping CommandsThis is usually high-value activity.
38 — Persistence Detection
Section titled “38 — Persistence Detection”Monitor:
Scheduled Tasks
Services
Startup Locations
Registry Run Keys
New Accounts
Cloud Persistence39 — Scheduled Task Detection
Section titled “39 — Scheduled Task Detection”Potential logic:
New Scheduled Task
Created byUnusual User
RunningSuspicious Command40 — Service Creation Detection
Section titled “40 — Service Creation Detection”Attackers may create services for:
Persistence
Execution
Lateral MovementMonitor:
New Service
Binary Path
Creator
Target System41 — File Detection
Section titled “41 — File Detection”Signals include:
ExecutableWritten toTemporary Directory
Script Createdin Startup Folder
Known Malicious Hash42 — Network Detection
Section titled “42 — Network Detection”Network detections may analyze:
IP
Domain
Port
Protocol
Bytes
Session Duration
Connection Frequency43 — Command and Control Detection
Section titled “43 — Command and Control Detection”Potential C2 indicators:
Periodic Beaconing
Rare Domain
Known Malicious IP
Long-Lived Connection
Unusual Protocol44 — Beaconing
Section titled “44 — Beaconing”Beaconing may appear as:
Endpoint ↓Same Destination ↓Regular IntervalExample:
Every 60 SecondsThis pattern can be suspicious.
45 — DNS Detection
Section titled “45 — DNS Detection”Potential detections:
Known Malicious Domain
Newly Registered Domain
High-Entropy Subdomain
Large DNS Volume
DNS Tunneling Pattern46 — DNS Tunneling
Section titled “46 — DNS Tunneling”Potential indicators:
Long DNS Queries
High Query Volume
Encoded-Looking Subdomains
Unusual Record Types47 — Data Exfiltration Detection
Section titled “47 — Data Exfiltration Detection”Potential signals:
Large Outbound Transfer
Rare Destination
Unusual Time
Sensitive System
New External Service48 — Firewall Detection
Section titled “48 — Firewall Detection”Examples:
Repeated Blocked Connections
Unexpected Inbound Access
Connection to Known C2
High-Risk Port Exposure49 — Cloud Detection
Section titled “49 — Cloud Detection”Cloud detections may monitor:
IAM
API Calls
Storage
Network
Compute
Security Services50 — Cloud Credential Misuse
Section titled “50 — Cloud Credential Misuse”Possible indicators:
API Callsfrom New Country
Unusual User Agent
New Access Key
Privilege Escalation
Multiple Services Accessed51 — Cloud Logging Disabled
Section titled “51 — Cloud Logging Disabled”High-value detection:
Audit LoggingDisabledThis may indicate:
Defense Evasion
Administrative Change
TroubleshootingInvestigation required.
52 — Public Storage Detection
Section titled “52 — Public Storage Detection”Example:
Storage ResourceChanged ↓Public Access EnabledInvestigate:
Who Changed It?
Was It Approved?
What Data?
Was It Accessed?
How Long?53 — Cloud Privilege Escalation
Section titled “53 — Cloud Privilege Escalation”Potential events:
Admin Role Assigned
Policy Modified
Access Key Created
Permission Boundary Changed54 — New Cloud User Detection
Section titled “54 — New Cloud User Detection”Monitor:
New IAM User
New Service Principal
New Access Key
New Roleespecially in:
Production55 — Security Tool Disablement
Section titled “55 — Security Tool Disablement”Detect:
EDR Disabled
Logging Disabled
Security Agent Stopped
Cloud Security Service DisabledThese may indicate:
Defense Evasion56 — Email Detection
Section titled “56 — Email Detection”Email detections may analyze:
Sender
Headers
URLs
Attachments
Authentication
Delivery
Mailbox Actions57 — Phishing Detection
Section titled “57 — Phishing Detection”Potential indicators:
Spoofed Domain
Suspicious URL
Malicious Attachment
Failed DMARC
Lookalike Domain58 — Business Email Compromise
Section titled “58 — Business Email Compromise”Possible signals:
Suspicious Login
New Inbox Rule
External Forwarding
Unusual Payment Request
Mailbox Search59 — Mailbox Rule Detection
Section titled “59 — Mailbox Rule Detection”Attackers may create rules to:
Hide Messages
Forward Messages
Delete AlertsDetect:
New Rule
Rule Modification
External Forwarding60 — Application Detection
Section titled “60 — Application Detection”Application detections may monitor:
Admin Actions
Authentication
Bulk Export
Privilege Changes
API Calls
Sensitive Transactions61 — Bulk Data Export
Section titled “61 — Bulk Data Export”Potential logic:
User Downloads100,000 Records
When NormalDaily ActivityIs 500This may require context.
62 — Web Attack Detection
Section titled “62 — Web Attack Detection”Potential patterns:
SQL Injection
Path Traversal
Command Injection
Web Shell
Repeated Exploit Attempts63 — Web Attack Correlation
Section titled “63 — Web Attack Correlation”A single:
HTTP 404is normal.
Thousands of unusual requests across:
Many Pathsmay indicate scanning.
64 — MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
Section titled “64 — MITRE ATT&CK Mapping”Each detection should map to relevant ATT&CK techniques where appropriate.
Example:
Detection:Suspicious PowerShell
ATT&CK:Execution ↓Command andScripting Interpreter65 — Why ATT&CK Mapping Helps
Section titled “65 — Why ATT&CK Mapping Helps”ATT&CK mapping supports:
Coverage Analysis
Threat Modeling
Purple Team Testing
Detection Prioritization
Reporting66 — ATT&CK Mapping Limitation
Section titled “66 — ATT&CK Mapping Limitation”Do not map every detection to:
10 Techniquesjust because words seem similar.
Map:
Actual Behaviorthe DetectionCan Observe67 — Detection Coverage Matrix
Section titled “67 — Detection Coverage Matrix”Create:
| ATT&CK Technique | Telemetry | Detection | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Credential Dumping | Endpoint | LSASS access | Covered |
| PowerShell | Endpoint | Suspicious PowerShell | Covered |
| Account Discovery | Endpoint | None | Gap |
| Cloud Account Creation | Cloud | New IAM user | Covered |
68 — Coverage Does Not Equal Effectiveness
Section titled “68 — Coverage Does Not Equal Effectiveness”A detection may exist.
But:
Rule Exists ≠Rule WorksYou need:
Validation69 — Detection Logic
Section titled “69 — Detection Logic”A detection usually contains:
Fields
Conditions
Threshold
Time Window
Exclusions
Severity70 — Detection Fields
Section titled “70 — Detection Fields”Example authentication fields:
User
Source IP
Destination
Result
Country
Device
MFA Status
Timestamp71 — Detection Condition
Section titled “71 — Detection Condition”Example:
result = failureis one condition.
A more useful detection may combine:
result = failure
AND
account_type = privileged72 — Time Window
Section titled “72 — Time Window”Many detections need:
Time ContextExample:
15 FailuresWithin5 MinutesTime windows dramatically affect rule behavior.
73 — Grouping
Section titled “73 — Grouping”A detection may group events by:
User
Source IP
Host
Device
DestinationExample:
Count FailuresBy Userversus:
Count FailuresBy Source IPdetects different attack patterns.
74 — Exclusions
Section titled “74 — Exclusions”Some activity may be expected.
Example:
Known VulnerabilityScannermight generate large connection volumes.
You may exclude it.
But exclusions must be:
Documented
Specific
Reviewed75 — Dangerous Exclusions
Section titled “75 — Dangerous Exclusions”Avoid:
Exclude AllAdministrator ActivityThis could hide real attacks.
76 — Detection Tuning
Section titled “76 — Detection Tuning”Tuning aims to improve:
SignaltoNoisePossible tuning:
Threshold Change
Scope Change
Known-Benign Exclusion
Asset Context
Identity Context
Sequence Logic
Risk Weighting77 — False Positive
Section titled “77 — False Positive”A false positive occurs when:
DetectionAlertsIncorrectlyExample:
Legitimate backup activity triggers an exfiltration rule.
78 — Benign True Positive
Section titled “78 — Benign True Positive”The detection accurately identifies suspicious behavior.
But the behavior is:
AuthorizedExample:
Red team credential dump during approved testing.
79 — False Negative
Section titled “79 — False Negative”A false negative occurs when:
Malicious ActivityOccurs
but
No DetectionAlertsThese are especially important because:
You MayNever KnowThey Happened80 — Detection Blind Spot
Section titled “80 — Detection Blind Spot”A false negative may occur because:
Telemetry Missing
Rule Missing
Rule Incorrect
Threshold Too High
Exclusion Too Broad
Attack Technique Different81 — Detection Validation
Section titled “81 — Detection Validation”Every important detection should be tested.
Validation asks:
Does theRequired BehaviorGenerate Telemetry?
Does theDetection Match?
Does theAlert ContainUseful Context?82 — End-to-End Detection Test
Section titled “82 — End-to-End Detection Test”Simulate Behavior ↓Generate Telemetry ↓Collect Telemetry ↓Parse Event ↓Detection Executes ↓Alert Generated ↓SOC Receives Alert83 — Detection Testing Safety
Section titled “83 — Detection Testing Safety”Testing should occur in:
Authorized
Controlled
Approvedenvironments.
Do not simulate potentially disruptive activity against unauthorized systems.
84 — Positive Test
Section titled “84 — Positive Test”A positive test checks:
Does Malicious-LikeBehavior Triggerthe Detection?85 — Negative Test
Section titled “85 — Negative Test”A negative test checks:
Does NormalBehavior AvoidUnnecessary Alerting?Both matter.
86 — Detection Test Case
Section titled “86 — Detection Test Case”Create:
Test Case
Expected Telemetry
Expected Detection
Expected Alert
Observed Result
Pass / Fail87 — Detection Test Failure
Section titled “87 — Detection Test Failure”If simulation produces logs but no alert:
Telemetry Exists ↓Detection FailedInvestigate:
Parsing
Query Logic
Threshold
Time Window
Rule Status88 — Telemetry Failure
Section titled “88 — Telemetry Failure”If simulation occurs but required telemetry does not exist:
Detection CannotWork ReliablyThe problem is:
Telemetry Coveragenot only rule logic.
89 — Detection Documentation
Section titled “89 — Detection Documentation”Create:
Detection_Use_Case.mdwith:
Use Case ID
Detection Name
Threat Scenario
MITRE ATT&CK
Telemetry
Logic
Severity
Confidence
Investigation Steps
False Positives
Validation Method
Owner
Status90 — Detection Ownership
Section titled “90 — Detection Ownership”Every detection should have:
Owner
Reviewer
Review DateOtherwise detections may become outdated.
91 — Detection Lifecycle
Section titled “91 — Detection Lifecycle”Threat Need ↓Design ↓Build ↓Test ↓Deploy ↓Monitor ↓Tune ↓Review ↓Retire92 — Detection Versioning
Section titled “92 — Detection Versioning”Track:
Rule Version
Logic Change
Reason
Date
Reviewerespecially when tuning changes detection behavior.
93 — Detection Change Risk
Section titled “93 — Detection Change Risk”Changing:
Threshold10 ↓100may reduce alerts.
But it may also:
CreateFalse Negatives94 — Detection Quality
Section titled “94 — Detection Quality”A good detection should be:
Relevant
Reliable
Actionable
Explainable
Testable
Maintainable95 — Actionable Alerts
Section titled “95 — Actionable Alerts”An alert should provide enough information for the analyst to begin.
Useful fields may include:
User
Host
IP
Timestamp
Process
Detection Reason
Severity
Related Events96 — Weak Alert
Section titled “96 — Weak Alert”Avoid alerts that only say:
Suspicious ActivityDetectedwithout context.
97 — Detection Precision
Section titled “97 — Detection Precision”Precision asks:
Of the AlertsGenerated
How ManyAre Useful?98 — Detection Recall
Section titled “98 — Detection Recall”Conceptually, recall asks:
Of the ThreatActivity That Occurred
How MuchDid We Detect?High precision with very low recall may still miss important threats.
99 — Detection Engineering Trade-Off
Section titled “99 — Detection Engineering Trade-Off”Too sensitive:
Many Alerts
Many False PositivesToo strict:
Few Alerts
Potential False NegativesThe goal is balance.
100 — Detection Priority
Section titled “100 — Detection Priority”Prioritize detections based on:
Threat Likelihood
Business Impact
Asset Criticality
Attack Stage
Existing Coverage
Incident History101 — High-Value Detection Areas
Section titled “101 — High-Value Detection Areas”Examples:
Privileged Access
Identity
Credential Theft
Persistence
Lateral Movement
Cloud IAM
Security Control Disablement
Data Exfiltration102 — Detection Debt
Section titled “102 — Detection Debt”Detection programs can accumulate:
Old Rules
Broken Rules
Duplicate Rules
High-Noise Rules
Unused RulesThis creates:
Detection Debt103 — Rule Review
Section titled “103 — Rule Review”Periodically review:
Alert Volume
True Positives
False Positives
Rule Usage
Last Triggered
Telemetry Dependency
ATT&CK Mapping104 — Detection Retirement
Section titled “104 — Detection Retirement”Retire rules when:
Technology Removed
Threat No Longer Relevant
Rule Replaced
Data Source Removedbut preserve history where required.
105 — Detection Gap
Section titled “105 — Detection Gap”A detection gap exists when:
Threat Behavior ↓Telemetry Exists ↓No Detection106 — Telemetry Gap
Section titled “106 — Telemetry Gap”A telemetry gap exists when:
Threat Behavior ↓Required EventNot Available107 — Visibility Gap
Section titled “107 — Visibility Gap”A broader visibility gap may involve:
Asset Not Monitored
Platform Not Integrated
Logs Missing
Retention Insufficient108 — Prioritize Detection Gaps
Section titled “108 — Prioritize Detection Gaps”Not every ATT&CK technique needs equal priority.
Use:
Threat Relevance
Environment
Assets
Business Risk
Attack History109 — Threat-Informed Detection
Section titled “109 — Threat-Informed Detection”Threat-informed defense asks:
Which ThreatsActually Matterto Our Organization?Then focuses detection coverage accordingly.
110 — Threat Intelligence and Detection
Section titled “110 — Threat Intelligence and Detection”Threat intelligence may help identify:
Campaign
Malware
Infrastructure
Techniques
TargetsYou can translate this into:
Detection Requirements111 — Detection From Threat Intelligence
Section titled “111 — Detection From Threat Intelligence”Example:
Threat report says attackers:
Use PowerShell
Create Scheduled Tasks
Access LSASSDetection team can review coverage for:
PowerShell
Scheduled Tasks
Credential Dumping112 — Detection From Incidents
Section titled “112 — Detection From Incidents”Incidents are valuable detection sources.
After an incident ask:
What Didthe Attacker Do?
Which TelemetryCaptured It?
Which AlertsTriggered?
What DidWe Miss?113 — Incident-to-Detection Loop
Section titled “113 — Incident-to-Detection Loop”Incident ↓Attack Timeline ↓Detection Gaps ↓New Rules ↓Validation ↓Improved Coverage114 — Threat Hunting and Detection
Section titled “114 — Threat Hunting and Detection”Threat hunts may uncover:
UndetectedBehaviorThat hunt can become:
New Detection115 — Purple Team and Detection
Section titled “115 — Purple Team and Detection”Purple team exercises answer:
Can OurDefenses DetectThis Technique?Workflow:
Simulate Technique ↓Observe Telemetry ↓Check Detection ↓Investigate Alert ↓Improve Rule116 — Detection Engineering Mindset
Section titled “116 — Detection Engineering Mindset”Do not ask only:
Can I Writea Query?Ask:
What ThreatDoes This Detect?
Which TelemetryDoes It Depend On?
What Willthe Analyst See?
How WillWe Validate It?
How Couldan Attacker Avoid It?Practical Exercise 1 — Detection Use Case
Section titled “Practical Exercise 1 — Detection Use Case”Create:
DET-001Privileged AccountCompromiseDocument:
Threat Scenario
Telemetry
Detection Logic
ATT&CK Mapping
Severity
False Positives
Investigation StepsPractical Exercise 2 — Password Spray
Section titled “Practical Exercise 2 — Password Spray”Design a detection using:
Source IP
Multiple Accounts
Failed Logins
Time WindowExplain why grouping only by:
Usermay fail to detect password spraying.
Practical Exercise 3 — MFA Fatigue
Section titled “Practical Exercise 3 — MFA Fatigue”Create logic for:
Multiple MFA Denials ↓Successful MFAwithin a defined window.
Document possible benign scenarios.
Practical Exercise 4 — Suspicious PowerShell
Section titled “Practical Exercise 4 — Suspicious PowerShell”Create a behavior detection considering:
Parent Process
Command Line
Encoded Command
Network Activity
UserDo not classify all PowerShell as malicious.
Practical Exercise 5 — Cloud Logging Disabled
Section titled “Practical Exercise 5 — Cloud Logging Disabled”Create a detection for:
Cloud AuditLogging DisabledDocument:
Telemetry
Severity
Investigation Questions
Potential Benign CausePractical Exercise 6 — Data Exfiltration
Section titled “Practical Exercise 6 — Data Exfiltration”Design a candidate detection using:
User
Asset
Data Volume
Destination
Time
BaselinePractical Exercise 7 — MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
Section titled “Practical Exercise 7 — MITRE ATT&CK Coverage”Create a matrix for:
10 ATT&CK Techniquesincluding:
Telemetry
Detection
Validation Status
GapPractical Exercise 8 — False Positive Analysis
Section titled “Practical Exercise 8 — False Positive Analysis”Take this detection:
OfficeSpawnsPowerShellIdentify:
5 PotentialBenign Causesand determine what context could reduce false positives.
Practical Exercise 9 — Detection Test Plan
Section titled “Practical Exercise 9 — Detection Test Plan”Create a test plan containing:
Detection
Test Behavior
Expected Telemetry
Expected Alert
Negative Test
Observed ResultPractical Exercise 10 — Detection Gap Assessment
Section titled “Practical Exercise 10 — Detection Gap Assessment”For a fictional environment, analyze:
Credential Dumping
Persistence
Lateral Movement
Cloud Privilege Escalation
Data Exfiltrationand classify each as:
Covered
Partial
Gap
UnknownKnowledge Check
Section titled “Knowledge Check”-
What is threat detection?
-
How is detection different from prevention?
-
Why should detection begin with a threat use case?
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What is a detection use case?
-
What is an IOC?
-
What are the limitations of IOC-only detection?
-
What is behavior-based detection?
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Why can behavior detection remain useful when attacker infrastructure changes?
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What is signature-based detection?
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What is threshold detection?
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What is correlation detection?
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What is sequence detection?
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What is anomaly detection?
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Why does anomalous not mean malicious?
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What is risk-based detection?
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What is detection confidence?
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How is severity different from confidence?
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How might password spraying differ from brute force?
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What telemetry is useful for MFA-fatigue detection?
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Why is a new administrator event important?
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Why should PowerShell detections consider behavior?
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What is parent-child process analysis?
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What signals may indicate credential dumping?
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What are common persistence signals?
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What is beaconing?
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What signals may indicate DNS tunneling?
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What signals may indicate data exfiltration?
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What cloud activities should have high-value detections?
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Why is disabling logging suspicious?
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What email events can indicate business email compromise?
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Why should detections map to MITRE ATT&CK?
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What is a detection coverage matrix?
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Why does detection coverage not prove detection effectiveness?
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What fields typically make up detection logic?
-
Why are time windows important?
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What is event grouping?
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Why must exclusions be carefully controlled?
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What is a false positive?
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What is a benign true positive?
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What is a false negative?
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What can cause a false negative?
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What is detection validation?
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What is a positive detection test?
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What is a negative detection test?
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Why should detections be tested end to end?
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What is detection debt?
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What is a detection gap?
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What is a telemetry gap?
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What is threat-informed detection?
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How can incidents improve detection engineering?
Key Takeaways
Section titled “Key Takeaways”Threat detection follows:
Threat ↓Behavior ↓Telemetry ↓Detection Logic ↓Alert ↓InvestigationDetection engineering follows:
Use Case ↓Design ↓Build ↓Test ↓Deploy ↓Monitor ↓TuneRemember:
IOC Match ≠Confirmed AttackAnomaly ≠Malicious ActivityRule Exists ≠Rule WorksDetection Coverage ≠Detection EffectivenessAlert ≠IncidentA strong detection program connects:
Threat Intelligence
Attack Behavior
Telemetry
Detection Logic
SOC Investigation
Incident LessonsCareer Connection
Section titled “Career Connection”Threat detection knowledge is essential for:
SOC Analysts
Blue Team Analysts
Detection Engineers
Threat Hunters
Incident Responders
SIEM Engineers
Security AnalystsDuring interviews, you should be able to explain:
How You Designa Detection
What TelemetryYou Need
How You ReduceFalse Positives
How You IdentifyFalse Negatives
How You Mapto MITRE ATT&CK
How You Validatea DetectionThe professional skill is not simply:
Writing QueriesIt is being able to connect:
Threat ↓Behavior ↓Telemetry ↓Detection ↓InvestigationWhat’s Next?
Section titled “What’s Next?”➡️ Next: 04 — Threat Hunting
You now understand how Blue Teams create detections for known or anticipated attacker behaviors.
But detections can miss activity.
The next question is:
What Ifthe AttackerIs Already Inside
and
No AlertHas Triggered?In the next module, you will move from:
Alert-DrivenInvestigationto:
ProactiveThreat HuntingYou will learn:
Threat Hunting Fundamentals
Hunt Hypotheses
Threat-Informed Hunting
MITRE ATT&CK-Based Hunting
Baseline Analysis
Anomaly Hunting
Identity Hunting
Endpoint Hunting
Network Hunting
Cloud Hunting
IOC and Behavioral Hunting
Hunt Queries
Evidence Collection
Hunt Documentation
Hunt-to-Detection ConversionYou will move from:
What AlertsDo We Have?to:
What ThreatMight Be PresentThat Our AlertsDid Not Detect?➡️ Next: 04 — Threat Hunting