Network Threat Investigation Lab
Network threat investigation is about turning traffic, logs, and context into a defensible explanation of what happened, what was affected, and what should happen next.
Welcome to the Network Threat Investigation Lab.
You have already completed the preventive-control sequence:
- Network Security Fundamentals
- ACL Security
- Firewall Security
- VPN Security
Now you will shift from:
How do we control traffic?
to:
How do we investigate traffic that looks wrong?
This lab is especially relevant for:
- SOC Analysts
- Network Security Analysts
- Network Security Engineers
- Incident Responders
- Threat Hunters
- Firewall Engineers
- Security Consultants
π― Mission Information
Section titled βπ― Mission Informationβ| Item | Details |
|---|---|
| Lab | Network Threat Investigation |
| Difficulty | Intermediate |
| Estimated Time | 2β4 Hours |
| Primary Focus | Network Detection, Investigation & Incident Analysis |
| Target Roles | SOC Analyst, Network Security Analyst, Incident Responder |
| Certification Alignment | CCST Cybersecurity, CCNA, CCNP Security |
| Career Skill | Network Threat Analysis & Incident Investigation |
| Environment | Approved lab, firewall logs, VPN logs, DNS logs, packet/log datasets |
| Output | Investigation Timeline, Evidence Matrix, Scope Assessment, Findings & Recommendations |
π’ Mission Scenario
Section titled βπ’ Mission ScenarioβYou are working in a Security Operations Center.
During normal monitoring, the SOC identifies several suspicious events:
- one workstation repeatedly connects to an unfamiliar external IP
- multiple failed VPN logins occur from the same source
- an internal host scans several systems
- a server begins communicating with systems it normally does not access
- a privileged account authenticates shortly before unusual firewall activity
Security leadership asks:
Is this normal activity, misconfiguration, or an active security incident?
Your mission is to:
- validate the events
- build context
- correlate evidence
- determine scope
- identify possible attack paths
- recommend containment
- document the investigation professionally
π― Mission Objectives
Section titled βπ― Mission ObjectivesβBy the end of this lab, you should be able to:
- analyze source and destination traffic
- interpret firewall logs
- review VPN authentication activity
- analyze DNS evidence
- recognize repeated connection patterns
- identify port scanning behavior
- investigate brute-force and password-spray activity
- recognize possible beaconing
- investigate lateral movement
- correlate network and authentication evidence
- build an incident timeline
- determine affected systems
- assess severity
- recommend containment
- create professional findings
- answer network-security interview scenarios
π Prerequisites
Section titled βπ PrerequisitesβYou should understand:
- IPv4 addressing
- TCP/UDP
- common ports
- routing
- ACLs
- firewalls
- VPNs
- DNS
- basic security monitoring
- incident-response fundamentals
Recommended previous labs:
- Firewall Security Lab
- VPN Security Lab
π§ Network Investigation Mental Model
Section titled βπ§ Network Investigation Mental ModelβFor every suspicious event, ask:
Who / What? βSource βDestination βProtocol / Port βSecurity Control βAllowed / Denied βTime Pattern βContext βScope βDecisionπ§ The Six Questions
Section titled βπ§ The Six QuestionsβFor every network event, answer:
1. Who?
Section titled β1. Who?βWhich host, user, or device generated the activity?
2. Where?
Section titled β2. Where?βWhich source and destination are involved?
3. What?
Section titled β3. What?βWhich protocol or service?
4. When?
Section titled β4. When?βIs this isolated or repeated?
5. Why?
Section titled β5. Why?βIs there a legitimate business explanation?
6. What Next?
Section titled β6. What Next?βWhat happened before and after the event?
π§ͺ Task 1 β Build an Investigation Worksheet
Section titled βπ§ͺ Task 1 β Build an Investigation WorksheetβCreate:
| Field | Details |
|---|---|
| Case ID | |
| Alert Source | |
| First Seen | |
| Last Seen | |
| Source IP | |
| Destination IP | |
| Protocol | |
| Port | |
| User | |
| Host | |
| Initial Severity | |
| Analyst |
π§ͺ Task 2 β Review Basic Firewall Logs
Section titled βπ§ͺ Task 2 β Review Basic Firewall LogsβUse a sample firewall event such as:
2026-08-24 10:14:21SRC=10.10.10.25DST=198.51.100.25PROTO=TCPDPT=443ACTION=ALLOWIdentify:
-
timestamp
-
source
-
destination
-
protocol
-
destination port
-
firewall decision
π§ Do Not Stop at βAllowedβ
Section titled βπ§ Do Not Stop at βAllowedββAn allowed connection may be:
-
normal
-
unwanted
-
suspicious
-
malicious
The firewall tells you what happened to the traffic.
It does not automatically tell you why.
π§ͺ Task 3 β Determine Asset Ownership
Section titled βπ§ͺ Task 3 β Determine Asset OwnershipβFor:
10.10.10.25identify:
-
device name
-
owner
-
department
-
network segment
-
asset criticality
Create:
| IP | Hostname | Owner | Zone | Criticality |
|---|---|---|---|---|
π§ Investigation Principle
Section titled βπ§ Investigation PrincipleβAn IP address alone is not enough.
Always connect:
IP βDevice βUser / Service βBusiness Contextπ§ͺ Task 4 β Investigate Destination Context
Section titled βπ§ͺ Task 4 β Investigate Destination ContextβFor the external destination ask:
-
domain or hostname?
-
known business service?
-
approved vendor?
-
cloud provider?
-
known suspicious infrastructure?
-
first time observed?
Do not label an IP malicious simply because you do not recognize it.
π Part 1 β Repeated Outbound Connections
Section titled βπ Part 1 β Repeated Outbound ConnectionsβScenario:
10.10.10.25 β198.51.100.25:443 βEvery 60 Secondsπ§ Why This Is Interesting
Section titled βπ§ Why This Is InterestingβRegular periodic communication may indicate:
-
legitimate application polling
-
monitoring
-
software update checks
-
malware beaconing
The pattern alone does not prove compromise.
π§ͺ Task 5 β Build a Frequency Table
Section titled βπ§ͺ Task 5 β Build a Frequency TableβCreate:
| Time | Source | Destination | Port |
|---|---|---|---|
| 10:00 | 10.10.10.25 | 198.51.100.25 | 443 |
| 10:01 | 10.10.10.25 | 198.51.100.25 | 443 |
| 10:02 | 10.10.10.25 | 198.51.100.25 | 443 |
| 10:03 | 10.10.10.25 | 198.51.100.25 | 443 |
π§ Beaconing Question
Section titled βπ§ Beaconing QuestionβAsk:
Is the timing unusually regular?
Then ask:
Does the endpoint have a legitimate process that explains it?
π§ͺ Task 6 β Identify Other Hosts Using the Destination
Section titled βπ§ͺ Task 6 β Identify Other Hosts Using the DestinationβCheck whether:
198.51.100.25is contacted by:
-
one system
-
many systems
-
one department
-
the entire organization
π§ Interpretation
Section titled βπ§ InterpretationβMany corporate systems
Section titled βMany corporate systemsβMay indicate a legitimate common service.
One unusual workstation
Section titled βOne unusual workstationβMay deserve deeper investigation.
Context changes the risk.
π§ͺ Task 7 β Correlate With DNS
Section titled βπ§ͺ Task 7 β Correlate With DNSβReview whether the source resolved a domain shortly before connection.
Example:
10:13:5510.10.10.25DNS QUERY:update-service.exampleThen:
10:14:0110.10.10.25β 198.51.100.25:443π§ DNS Helps Answer
Section titled βπ§ DNS Helps AnswerβWhat name did the host think it was connecting to?
π Part 2 β DNS Investigation
Section titled βπ Part 2 β DNS InvestigationβDNS logs can be valuable during investigations.
Look for:
-
unusual domains
-
high query volume
-
random-looking names
-
newly observed domains
-
repeated failed lookups
π§ͺ Task 8 β Build a DNS Evidence Table
Section titled βπ§ͺ Task 8 β Build a DNS Evidence Tableβ| Time | Host | Domain | Result | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
π§ DNS Security Principle
Section titled βπ§ DNS Security PrincipleβA suspicious domain is stronger evidence when combined with:
-
suspicious process
-
unusual destination
-
related alert
-
abnormal timing
Do not rely on domain appearance alone.
π¨ Scenario β High DNS Failure Volume
Section titled βπ¨ Scenario β High DNS Failure VolumeβSuppose a host generates:
a12x-test.exampleb94p-test.examplez77k-test.examplerepeatedly with failed responses.
Possible explanations may include:
-
misconfigured application
-
malware
-
algorithmically generated domains
Investigate rather than immediately classify.
π Part 3 β Port Scanning
Section titled βπ Part 3 β Port ScanningβScenario:
One internal host connects to:
10.10.20.10:2210.10.20.10:2310.10.20.10:8010.10.20.10:44310.10.20.10:44510.10.20.10:3389within a short period.
π§ Possible Interpretation
Section titled βπ§ Possible InterpretationβThis may indicate:
-
vulnerability scanner
-
administrator testing
-
asset-discovery tool
-
attacker reconnaissance
π§ͺ Task 9 β Create a Scan Timeline
Section titled βπ§ͺ Task 9 β Create a Scan Timelineβ| Time | Source | Destination | Port |
|---|---|---|---|
π§ Ask
Section titled βπ§ AskβIs the source an approved scanner?
Is scanning expected during this window?
Does the user who owns the host normally perform this activity?
π§ͺ Task 10 β Compare Vertical vs Horizontal Scan Concepts
Section titled βπ§ͺ Task 10 β Compare Vertical vs Horizontal Scan ConceptsβVertical Scan
Section titled βVertical ScanβOne source probes many ports on one host.
Source βHost A : 22Host A : 80Host A : 443Host A : 3389Horizontal Scan
Section titled βHorizontal ScanβOne source probes the same port across many hosts.
Source βHost A : 445Host B : 445Host C : 445Host D : 445π§ Why This Matters
Section titled βπ§ Why This MattersβThe pattern helps you understand the likely objective.
π Part 4 β Brute Force and Password Spray
Section titled βπ Part 4 β Brute Force and Password SprayβScenario:
Firewall/VPN logs show:
User: aliceUser: bobUser: carolUser: david
Source:203.0.113.50
Result:FAILEDπ§ Password Spray Pattern
Section titled βπ§ Password Spray PatternβA small number of password attempts across many accounts may indicate:
password spraying.
π§ͺ Task 11 β Build an Authentication Table
Section titled βπ§ͺ Task 11 β Build an Authentication Tableβ| Time | Source IP | Username | Result |
|---|---|---|---|
π§ͺ Task 12 β Look for Successful Authentication
Section titled βπ§ͺ Task 12 β Look for Successful AuthenticationβThis is critical.
Suppose:
50 Failed Logins β1 Successful LoginThe successful event may require immediate investigation.
π§ Do Not Focus Only on Failures
Section titled βπ§ Do Not Focus Only on FailuresβAsk:
Did any account eventually authenticate successfully?
π§ͺ Task 13 β Investigate the Successful User
Section titled βπ§ͺ Task 13 β Investigate the Successful UserβReview:
-
source IP
-
time
-
MFA
-
VPN assignment
-
resources accessed
-
session duration
π¨ Possible Sequence
Section titled βπ¨ Possible SequenceβPassword Spray βSuccessful VPN Login βInternal Reconnaissance βSensitive Server Accessπ Part 5 β VPN Investigation
Section titled βπ Part 5 β VPN InvestigationβFor suspicious VPN access collect:
UsernameSource IPAuthentication ResultMFA ResultAssigned VPN IPUser GroupConnected TimeDisconnected Timeπ§ͺ Task 14 β Build a VPN Session Record
Section titled βπ§ͺ Task 14 β Build a VPN Session Recordβ| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| User | |
| Source IP | |
| VPN Address | |
| Authentication | |
| MFA | |
| Group | |
| Session Start | |
| Session End |
π§ VPN Investigation Question
Section titled βπ§ VPN Investigation QuestionβAsk:
What did the user do after connecting?
Authentication is only the beginning of the investigation.
π§ͺ Task 15 β Review Internal Traffic After VPN Login
Section titled βπ§ͺ Task 15 β Review Internal Traffic After VPN LoginβSearch for traffic from the assigned VPN address.
Example:
VPN User10.50.50.25 β10.10.20.10:443 β10.10.30.10:445 β10.10.40.10:22π¨ Security Concern
Section titled βπ¨ Security ConcernβA normal employee VPN user accessing:
-
database systems
-
SMB
-
management SSH
may require explanation.
π Part 6 β Lateral Movement
Section titled βπ Part 6 β Lateral MovementβLateral movement means an attacker moves from one compromised system to another.
Example:
Compromised User PC βApplication Server βDatabase Server βManagement Systemπ§ Network Indicators May Include
Section titled βπ§ Network Indicators May Includeβ-
SMB
-
RDP
-
SSH
-
remote administration
-
unusual authentication
-
new inter-segment traffic
π§ͺ Task 16 β Build a Lateral Movement Map
Section titled βπ§ͺ Task 16 β Build a Lateral Movement MapβCreate:
HOST-A βHOST-B βHOST-CFor every hop document:
| Source | Destination | Service | Expected? |
|---|---|---|---|
π§ Key Question
Section titled βπ§ Key QuestionβAsk:
Does the compromised source normally communicate with this destination?
π§ͺ Task 17 β Compare Against the Traffic Matrix
Section titled βπ§ͺ Task 17 β Compare Against the Traffic MatrixβUse the traffic matrices created in previous labs.
Expected:
Users β ApplicationNot expected:
Users β Database Admin ServiceThis is why network documentation helps investigations.
π Part 7 β Firewall Rule Changes
Section titled βπ Part 7 β Firewall Rule ChangesβScenario:
At 11:25 an administrator modifies the firewall.
At 11:27 suspicious traffic begins.
π§ͺ Task 18 β Create a Change Timeline
Section titled βπ§ͺ Task 18 β Create a Change Timelineβ| Time | Event |
|---|---|
| 11:25 | Firewall rule modified |
| 11:27 | New traffic path observed |
| 11:30 | External connection established |
π§ Ask
Section titled βπ§ AskβWas this an approved change?
Who made it?
Did the rule create the attack path?
π¨ High-Risk Example
Section titled βπ¨ High-Risk ExampleβNew Rule:ANY βInternal Server βRDP βALLOWfollowed by external connections.
π Part 8 β Denied Traffic Analysis
Section titled βπ Part 8 β Denied Traffic AnalysisβDenied traffic is useful, but not every deny is important.
An internet-facing firewall may constantly log scans.
π§ͺ Task 19 β Compare Two Deny Patterns
Section titled βπ§ͺ Task 19 β Compare Two Deny PatternsβPattern A
Section titled βPattern AβThousands of random internet IPs scanning common ports.
Potentially routine background noise.
Pattern B
Section titled βPattern BβOne external IP repeatedly targets a VPN portal, then successfully authenticates.
Higher investigation value.
π§ SOC Principle
Section titled βπ§ SOC PrincipleβPrioritize:
behavior + context + impact.
Not raw alert count alone.
π Part 9 β Baseline Normal Traffic
Section titled βπ Part 9 β Baseline Normal TrafficβA baseline helps identify unusual behavior.
Examples:
-
normal destinations
-
normal ports
-
normal login times
-
normal traffic volume
π§ͺ Task 20 β Create a Simple Baseline
Section titled βπ§ͺ Task 20 β Create a Simple BaselineβFor one endpoint document:
| Category | Normal |
|---|---|
| DNS | Internal resolver |
| Web | Common approved sites |
| Internal Access | Business application |
| Admin Ports | None |
| VPN | Not applicable |
π§ Why Baselines Matter
Section titled βπ§ Why Baselines MatterβYou need to know:
what normal looks like
before confidently identifying:
abnormal.
π Part 10 β Build the Master Timeline
Section titled βπ Part 10 β Build the Master TimelineβCorrelate:
-
firewall
-
VPN
-
DNS
-
authentication
-
host information
Example:
09:04Failed VPN Attempts
09:12Successful VPN Login
09:15Internal Port Scan
09:20SMB Connection to Server
09:24Repeated External Beacon
09:30SOC Alertπ§ͺ Task 21 β Create the Investigation Timeline
Section titled βπ§ͺ Task 21 β Create the Investigation Timelineβ| Time | Source | Event | Evidence | Significance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
π§ Timeline Principle
Section titled βπ§ Timeline PrincipleβYour timeline should tell a story.
π Part 11 β Determine Scope
Section titled βπ Part 11 β Determine ScopeβDo not investigate only the original alert.
Ask:
Identities
Section titled βIdentitiesβWhich users are affected?
Endpoints
Section titled βEndpointsβWhich systems are involved?
Destinations
Section titled βDestinationsβWhich internal/external addresses?
Network Segments
Section titled βNetwork SegmentsβWhich zones were crossed?
How long has the activity existed?
π§ͺ Task 22 β Build an Affected Asset Matrix
Section titled βπ§ͺ Task 22 β Build an Affected Asset Matrixβ| Asset | Role | Evidence | Affected? |
|---|---|---|---|
| USER-PC01 | User Endpoint | ||
| APP-SRV01 | Application | ||
| DB-SRV01 | Database | ||
| VPN User | Identity |
π§ Blast Radius
Section titled βπ§ Blast RadiusβUse:
Compromised Identity +Network Access +Permitted Services +Trust Relationships =Potential Blast Radiusπ Part 12 β Incident Classification
Section titled βπ Part 12 β Incident ClassificationβClassify:
False PositiveBenign PositiveSuspiciousConfirmed Maliciousπ§ False Positive
Section titled βπ§ False PositiveβDetection logic incorrectly flagged legitimate behavior.
π§ Benign Positive
Section titled βπ§ Benign PositiveβThe event occurred as detected, but it was approved and legitimate.
Example:
An authorized vulnerability scanner triggered a port-scan detection.
π§ Suspicious
Section titled βπ§ SuspiciousβEvidence indicates unusual behavior, but malicious intent is not yet confirmed.
π§ Confirmed Malicious
Section titled βπ§ Confirmed MaliciousβEvidence demonstrates unauthorized or malicious activity.
π§ͺ Task 23 β Write an Analyst Assessment
Section titled βπ§ͺ Task 23 β Write an Analyst AssessmentβUse:
Assessment:
Evidence Supporting Assessment:
Evidence Against Malicious Interpretation:
Confidence:
Next Action:π Part 13 β Severity Assessment
Section titled βπ Part 13 β Severity AssessmentβUse:
Threat Confidence+Privilege+Network Reachability+Asset Criticality+Business Impact=Severityπ΄ Critical
Section titled βπ΄ CriticalβExamples:
-
confirmed privileged remote compromise
-
active lateral movement into critical systems
π High
Section titled βπ HighβExamples:
-
successful unauthorized VPN access
-
compromised production server
-
suspicious lateral movement
π‘ Medium
Section titled βπ‘ MediumβExamples:
-
reconnaissance with limited impact
-
suspicious beaconing not yet confirmed
π΅ Low
Section titled βπ΅ LowβExamples:
-
benign scan requiring documentation
-
low-impact anomaly
π Part 14 β Containment Decisions
Section titled βπ Part 14 β Containment DecisionsβContainment should be proportionate and authorized.
Possible actions include:
-
disable compromised VPN account
-
block malicious IP
-
isolate endpoint
-
restrict firewall traffic
-
revoke temporary access
-
quarantine network segment
β οΈ Important
Section titled ββ οΈ ImportantβDo not automatically block an IP without understanding:
-
whether it belongs to a legitimate provider
-
whether business services depend on it
-
whether blocking only the IP actually addresses the threat
π§ͺ Task 24 β Create a Containment Plan
Section titled βπ§ͺ Task 24 β Create a Containment PlanβDocument:
| Action | Reason | Impact | Approval |
|---|---|---|---|
π§ Containment Principle
Section titled βπ§ Containment PrincipleβContain:
enough to stop further harm
while preserving:
evidence and business continuity where possible.
π Part 15 β Evidence Preservation
Section titled βπ Part 15 β Evidence PreservationβPreserve relevant:
-
firewall logs
-
VPN logs
-
DNS logs
-
authentication logs
-
timeline evidence
-
network captures where authorized
π§ͺ Task 25 β Build an Evidence Register
Section titled βπ§ͺ Task 25 β Build an Evidence Registerβ| Evidence ID | Source | Time | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| EV-001 | Firewall | ||
| EV-002 | VPN | ||
| EV-003 | DNS |
π§ Evidence Quality
Section titled βπ§ Evidence QualityβEvidence should be:
-
timestamped
-
attributable
-
preserved
-
clearly documented
π Part 16 β Root Cause Analysis
Section titled βπ Part 16 β Root Cause AnalysisβDo not confuse:
detection source
with:
root cause.
π« Weak Root Cause
Section titled βπ« Weak Root CauseβFirewall alertβ Better Root Cause Example
Section titled ββ Better Root Cause ExampleβCompromised VPN credentials were successfully used from an external source, and the account had excessive internal network access.π§ͺ Task 26 β Document Root Cause
Section titled βπ§ͺ Task 26 β Document Root CauseβUse:
Initial Access:
Root Cause:
Contributing Factors:
Detection Source:
Security Control Failure:π Part 17 β Security Findings
Section titled βπ Part 17 β Security Findingsβπ¨ Finding 1 β Excessive VPN Access
Section titled βπ¨ Finding 1 β Excessive VPN AccessβFinding ID:NTI-001
Title:Remote VPN User Had Excessive Internal Network Reachability
Severity:High
Observation:A remote-access user could connect directly to sensitive server and management networks.
Risk:Compromise of the VPN account could provide broad lateral movement opportunities.
Recommendation:Implement role-based VPN authorization and restrict remote users to required applications and networks.π¨ Finding 2 β Missing Detection for Internal Scan
Section titled βπ¨ Finding 2 β Missing Detection for Internal ScanβFinding ID:NTI-002
Title:Internal Port Scanning Was Not Detected Promptly
Severity:Medium / High
Observation:An internal host probed multiple systems and services without generating a timely SOC alert.
Risk:Reconnaissance preceding lateral movement may remain unnoticed.
Recommendation:Develop and tune detection for suspicious internal scanning while excluding approved security scanners.π¨ Finding 3 β Insufficient Firewall Logging
Section titled βπ¨ Finding 3 β Insufficient Firewall LoggingβFinding ID:NTI-003
Title:Firewall Logging Was Insufficient for Complete Investigation
Severity:Medium
Observation:Relevant firewall events did not contain sufficient detail or were not retained long enough for analysis.
Risk:Security teams may be unable to reconstruct attacker activity accurately.
Recommendation:Review logging requirements, retention, and centralized monitoring for high-value traffic.π¨ Finding 4 β Unrestricted Lateral Access
Section titled βπ¨ Finding 4 β Unrestricted Lateral AccessβFinding ID:NTI-004
Title:User Network Could Access Sensitive Administrative Services
Severity:High
Observation:Standard user endpoints could directly communicate with privileged management services.
Risk:A compromised workstation could be used to attempt lateral movement toward network or server administration.
Recommendation:Restrict administrative services to approved management networks.π¨ Finding 5 β Weak VPN Authentication
Section titled βπ¨ Finding 5 β Weak VPN AuthenticationβFinding ID:NTI-005
Title:VPN Authentication Relied on Password-Only Access
Severity:High
Risk:Credential theft or password spraying could result in unauthorized remote access.
Recommendation:Implement stronger authentication controls such as MFA where appropriate.π Part 18 β Create the Incident Report
Section titled βπ Part 18 β Create the Incident ReportβRecommended structure:
1. Incident Summary2. Detection Source3. Initial Severity4. Affected Identity5. Affected Hosts6. Network Evidence7. DNS Evidence8. VPN Evidence9. Investigation Timeline10. Scope11. Analyst Assessment12. Containment13. Root Cause14. Findings15. Remediation16. Lessons Learnedπ Example Executive Summary
Section titled βπ Example Executive SummaryβIncident ID:NTI-2026-001
Severity:High
Summary:Security monitoring identified repeated failed VPN authentication attempts from an external source followed by a successful login.
Post-authentication network activity included internal scanning and unexpected access attempts toward sensitive systems.
The affected VPN account had broader internal reachability than required.
Immediate containment focused on restricting the account and validating potentially affected systems.
Longer-term remediation should strengthen VPN authentication, reduce remote-access scope, improve internal segmentation, and expand detection for suspicious network reconnaissance.π Part 19 β Threat Hunting Exercise
Section titled βπ Part 19 β Threat Hunting ExerciseβStart with a hypothesis:
A compromised system may be making periodic outbound connections to an unusual external destination.
π§ͺ Task 27 β Hunt Across Firewall Data
Section titled βπ§ͺ Task 27 β Hunt Across Firewall DataβSearch for:
-
repeated external destinations
-
similar timing intervals
-
one-to-many connections
-
unusual ports
π§ Hunting Flow
Section titled βπ§ Hunting FlowβHypothesis βNetwork Data βIdentify Pattern βFind Hosts βValidate βExpand Scopeπ§ͺ Task 28 β Hunt for Lateral Movement
Section titled βπ§ͺ Task 28 β Hunt for Lateral MovementβSearch for:
-
RDP
-
SMB
-
SSH
-
administrative services
originating from endpoints that do not normally use them.
π§ͺ Task 29 β Hunt for Suspicious VPN Activity
Section titled βπ§ͺ Task 29 β Hunt for Suspicious VPN ActivityβLook for:
-
unusual source countries/locations
-
repeated failures
-
first-time source IPs
-
privileged VPN users
-
long sessions
-
activity outside expected hours
π§ Rare Does Not Mean Malicious
Section titled βπ§ Rare Does Not Mean MaliciousβUse rarity as:
a reason to investigate
not:
proof.
π Part 20 β Detection Engineering Connection
Section titled βπ Part 20 β Detection Engineering ConnectionβIf your investigation identifies a reliable pattern, document a detection concept.
Example:
Threat:Password Spray Against VPN
Telemetry:VPN Authentication Logs
Logic:Multiple usernames+Same external source+Repeated failures+Short time window
Priority:High if followed by successful loginπ§ Hunt-to-Detection
Section titled βπ§ Hunt-to-DetectionβThreat Investigation βRepeatable Pattern βDetection Logic βContinuous Monitoringπ€ Network Threat Investigation Interview Questions
Section titled βπ€ Network Threat Investigation Interview QuestionsβPractise without notes.
1. How do you investigate suspicious network traffic?
Section titled β1. How do you investigate suspicious network traffic?β2. What information is useful in a firewall log?
Section titled β2. What information is useful in a firewall log?β3. What is beaconing?
Section titled β3. What is beaconing?β4. Does regular outbound traffic prove malware?
Section titled β4. Does regular outbound traffic prove malware?β5. What is port scanning?
Section titled β5. What is port scanning?β6. Vertical vs horizontal scanning?
Section titled β6. Vertical vs horizontal scanning?β7. What is password spraying?
Section titled β7. What is password spraying?β8. Brute force vs password spray?
Section titled β8. Brute force vs password spray?β9. What is lateral movement?
Section titled β9. What is lateral movement?β10. Why is DNS useful during investigations?
Section titled β10. Why is DNS useful during investigations?β11. Why are VPN logs important?
Section titled β11. Why are VPN logs important?β12. What is an incident timeline?
Section titled β12. What is an incident timeline?β13. How do you determine incident scope?
Section titled β13. How do you determine incident scope?β14. False positive vs benign positive?
Section titled β14. False positive vs benign positive?β15. How do you prioritize network alerts?
Section titled β15. How do you prioritize network alerts?β16. Why is network baselining useful?
Section titled β16. Why is network baselining useful?β17. What information would you preserve as evidence?
Section titled β17. What information would you preserve as evidence?β18. How would you investigate a successful VPN login after repeated failures?
Section titled β18. How would you investigate a successful VPN login after repeated failures?β19. Why is blocking an IP not always sufficient?
Section titled β19. Why is blocking an IP not always sufficient?β20. How do network segmentation controls help incident response?
Section titled β20. How do network segmentation controls help incident response?βπ¨ Scenario Interview Question 1
Section titled βπ¨ Scenario Interview Question 1βOne workstation connects to the same external IP every 60 seconds.
A strong response should include:
Identify Host βDestination Context βTiming Pattern βDNS βHost/Application Context βOther Hosts βDecisionDo not immediately declare malware.
π¨ Scenario Interview Question 2
Section titled βπ¨ Scenario Interview Question 2βOne IP attempts 100 usernames on the VPN and eventually succeeds with one.
Investigate:
-
source IP
-
successful identity
-
MFA
-
VPN session
-
assigned network access
-
post-login activity
-
other attempted accounts
π¨ Scenario Interview Question 3
Section titled βπ¨ Scenario Interview Question 3βAn internal workstation scans hundreds of ports across production servers.
Ask:
-
approved scanner?
-
user/device owner?
-
maintenance window?
-
subsequent access?
-
other unusual behavior?
π¨ Scenario Interview Question 4
Section titled βπ¨ Scenario Interview Question 4βA server begins using SMB to connect to systems it has never contacted before.
Investigate:
-
source identity
-
destinations
-
authentication
-
timing
-
expected business function
-
other lateral movement
π¨ Scenario Interview Question 5
Section titled βπ¨ Scenario Interview Question 5βFirewall logs show a suspicious IP was blocked. Is the incident complete?
No.
Ask:
-
was traffic previously allowed?
-
are other destinations involved?
-
did the source use other IPs/domains?
-
was an internal host already compromised?
π¨ Scenario Interview Question 6
Section titled βπ¨ Scenario Interview Question 6βA VPN user accesses the database and network-device management interfaces.
Discuss:
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user role
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authorization
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business requirement
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potential compromise
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excessive VPN scope
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segmentation
π§ Investigation Interview Framework
Section titled βπ§ Investigation Interview FrameworkβUse:
Alert βValidate βSource βDestination βIdentity βTraffic Pattern βTimeline βScope βContain βRemediateπ¬ Interview Tip
Section titled βπ¬ Interview TipβAvoid:
βI would block the IP.β
A stronger answer is:
βI would first identify the source system and user, review the destination and traffic pattern, correlate firewall, VPN, DNS, and authentication evidence, determine whether the activity is expected, identify any related systems or successful access, establish the scope, and then recommend containment based on the evidence.β
That sounds like a Network Security Analyst.
π Portfolio Evidence
Section titled βπ Portfolio EvidenceβAfter completing this lab, create a sanitized investigation package.
Include:
1. Incident Intake
Section titled β1. Incident IntakeβDocument:
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alert
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source
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destination
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severity
2. Network Evidence
Section titled β2. Network EvidenceβInclude:
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firewall records
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VPN activity
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DNS events
3. Incident Timeline
Section titled β3. Incident TimelineβShow the full chronology.
4. Attack Path
Section titled β4. Attack PathβExample:
External Source βVPN Account βInternal Scan βApplication Server βSensitive Network5. Scope Assessment
Section titled β5. Scope AssessmentβDocument affected:
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users
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endpoints
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servers
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network segments
6. Security Findings
Section titled β6. Security FindingsβCreate at least 3β5 findings.
7. Remediation Plan
Section titled β7. Remediation PlanβSeparate:
ImmediateShort TermStrategicπ Resume Examples
Section titled βπ Resume ExamplesβInstead of:
Network threat investigation experience.
Use:
Investigated simulated network-security incidents by correlating firewall, VPN, DNS, authentication, and traffic evidence to identify suspicious external connections, scanning, and lateral movement.
Or:
Built incident timelines and scope assessments for simulated VPN credential compromise and internal reconnaissance scenarios, with documented containment and remediation recommendations.
Or:
Performed threat-hunting exercises across network telemetry to identify repeated outbound beaconing patterns, unusual administrative traffic, and suspicious authentication behavior.
β Job-Readiness Check
Section titled ββ Job-Readiness CheckβAfter this lab, you should be able to:
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interpret firewall events
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review VPN authentication
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analyze DNS evidence
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identify repeated traffic patterns
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recognize scanning behavior
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recognize password-spray patterns
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investigate successful login after failures
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analyze lateral movement
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correlate multiple telemetry sources
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build incident timelines
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determine incident scope
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distinguish benign from suspicious activity
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recommend containment
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document findings professionally
If your investigation still means:
suspicious IP β block it β close ticket
repeat the correlation and scope sections.
The goal is:
Understand what happened before, during, and after the network event, determine whether the activity is malicious, identify the full scope, and apply containment based on evidence rather than assumptions.
π Mission Complete
Section titled βπ Mission CompleteβYou have now completed the Cisco/network-security lab sequence:
Network Security Fundamentals βACL Security βFirewall Security βVPN Security βNetwork Threat InvestigationYou have progressed through:
Understand Traffic βControl Traffic βSecure Trust Boundaries βSecure Remote Connectivity βInvestigate Suspicious Trafficπ Whatβs Next?
Section titled βπ Whatβs Next?βYou now have the practical skills required to move into structured professional review methodology.
β‘οΈ Next: Network Security Assessment Runbook
In the next runbook, you will systematically assess:
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network architecture
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asset and subnet inventory
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trust boundaries
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network segmentation
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ACLs
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firewall placement
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public exposure
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management access
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VPN architecture
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remote-access security
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routing
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NAT
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DNS and network services
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security monitoring
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logging
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findings
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risk rating
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remediation
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executive reporting