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Network Threat Investigation Lab

Network threat investigation is about turning traffic, logs, and context into a defensible explanation of what happened, what was affected, and what should happen next.

Welcome to the Network Threat Investigation Lab.

You have already completed the preventive-control sequence:

  • Network Security Fundamentals
  • ACL Security
  • Firewall Security
  • VPN Security

Now you will shift from:

How do we control traffic?

to:

How do we investigate traffic that looks wrong?

This lab is especially relevant for:

  • SOC Analysts
  • Network Security Analysts
  • Network Security Engineers
  • Incident Responders
  • Threat Hunters
  • Firewall Engineers
  • Security Consultants
Item Details
Lab Network Threat Investigation
Difficulty Intermediate
Estimated Time 2–4 Hours
Primary Focus Network Detection, Investigation & Incident Analysis
Target Roles SOC Analyst, Network Security Analyst, Incident Responder
Certification Alignment CCST Cybersecurity, CCNA, CCNP Security
Career Skill Network Threat Analysis & Incident Investigation
Environment Approved lab, firewall logs, VPN logs, DNS logs, packet/log datasets
Output Investigation Timeline, Evidence Matrix, Scope Assessment, Findings & Recommendations

You are working in a Security Operations Center.

During normal monitoring, the SOC identifies several suspicious events:

  • one workstation repeatedly connects to an unfamiliar external IP
  • multiple failed VPN logins occur from the same source
  • an internal host scans several systems
  • a server begins communicating with systems it normally does not access
  • a privileged account authenticates shortly before unusual firewall activity

Security leadership asks:

Is this normal activity, misconfiguration, or an active security incident?

Your mission is to:

  1. validate the events
  2. build context
  3. correlate evidence
  4. determine scope
  5. identify possible attack paths
  6. recommend containment
  7. document the investigation professionally

By the end of this lab, you should be able to:

  • analyze source and destination traffic
  • interpret firewall logs
  • review VPN authentication activity
  • analyze DNS evidence
  • recognize repeated connection patterns
  • identify port scanning behavior
  • investigate brute-force and password-spray activity
  • recognize possible beaconing
  • investigate lateral movement
  • correlate network and authentication evidence
  • build an incident timeline
  • determine affected systems
  • assess severity
  • recommend containment
  • create professional findings
  • answer network-security interview scenarios

You should understand:

  • IPv4 addressing
  • TCP/UDP
  • common ports
  • routing
  • ACLs
  • firewalls
  • VPNs
  • DNS
  • basic security monitoring
  • incident-response fundamentals

Recommended previous labs:

  • Firewall Security Lab
  • VPN Security Lab

For every suspicious event, ask:

Who / What?
↓
Source
↓
Destination
↓
Protocol / Port
↓
Security Control
↓
Allowed / Denied
↓
Time Pattern
↓
Context
↓
Scope
↓
Decision

For every network event, answer:

Which host, user, or device generated the activity?

Which source and destination are involved?

Which protocol or service?

Is this isolated or repeated?

Is there a legitimate business explanation?

What happened before and after the event?

πŸ§ͺ Task 1 β€” Build an Investigation Worksheet

Section titled β€œπŸ§ͺ Task 1 β€” Build an Investigation Worksheet”

Create:

Field Details
Case ID
Alert Source
First Seen
Last Seen
Source IP
Destination IP
Protocol
Port
User
Host
Initial Severity
Analyst

Use a sample firewall event such as:

2026-08-24 10:14:21
SRC=10.10.10.25
DST=198.51.100.25
PROTO=TCP
DPT=443
ACTION=ALLOW

Identify:

  • timestamp

  • source

  • destination

  • protocol

  • destination port

  • firewall decision

An allowed connection may be:

  • normal

  • unwanted

  • suspicious

  • malicious

The firewall tells you what happened to the traffic.

It does not automatically tell you why.

For:

10.10.10.25

identify:

  • device name

  • owner

  • department

  • network segment

  • asset criticality

Create:

IP Hostname Owner Zone Criticality

An IP address alone is not enough.

Always connect:

IP
↓
Device
↓
User / Service
↓
Business Context

πŸ§ͺ Task 4 β€” Investigate Destination Context

Section titled β€œπŸ§ͺ Task 4 β€” Investigate Destination Context”

For the external destination ask:

  • domain or hostname?

  • known business service?

  • approved vendor?

  • cloud provider?

  • known suspicious infrastructure?

  • first time observed?

Do not label an IP malicious simply because you do not recognize it.

Scenario:

10.10.10.25
↓
198.51.100.25:443
↓
Every 60 Seconds

Regular periodic communication may indicate:

  • legitimate application polling

  • monitoring

  • software update checks

  • malware beaconing

The pattern alone does not prove compromise.

Create:

Time Source Destination Port
10:00 10.10.10.25 198.51.100.25 443
10:01 10.10.10.25 198.51.100.25 443
10:02 10.10.10.25 198.51.100.25 443
10:03 10.10.10.25 198.51.100.25 443

Ask:

Is the timing unusually regular?

Then ask:

Does the endpoint have a legitimate process that explains it?

πŸ§ͺ Task 6 β€” Identify Other Hosts Using the Destination

Section titled β€œπŸ§ͺ Task 6 β€” Identify Other Hosts Using the Destination”

Check whether:

198.51.100.25

is contacted by:

  • one system

  • many systems

  • one department

  • the entire organization

May indicate a legitimate common service.

May deserve deeper investigation.

Context changes the risk.

Review whether the source resolved a domain shortly before connection.

Example:

10:13:55
10.10.10.25
DNS QUERY:
update-service.example

Then:

10:14:01
10.10.10.25
β†’ 198.51.100.25:443

What name did the host think it was connecting to?

DNS logs can be valuable during investigations.

Look for:

  • unusual domains

  • high query volume

  • random-looking names

  • newly observed domains

  • repeated failed lookups

Time Host Domain Result Notes

A suspicious domain is stronger evidence when combined with:

  • suspicious process

  • unusual destination

  • related alert

  • abnormal timing

Do not rely on domain appearance alone.

Suppose a host generates:

a12x-test.example
b94p-test.example
z77k-test.example

repeatedly with failed responses.

Possible explanations may include:

  • misconfigured application

  • malware

  • algorithmically generated domains

Investigate rather than immediately classify.

Scenario:

One internal host connects to:

10.10.20.10:22
10.10.20.10:23
10.10.20.10:80
10.10.20.10:443
10.10.20.10:445
10.10.20.10:3389

within a short period.

This may indicate:

  • vulnerability scanner

  • administrator testing

  • asset-discovery tool

  • attacker reconnaissance

Time Source Destination Port

Is the source an approved scanner?

Is scanning expected during this window?

Does the user who owns the host normally perform this activity?

πŸ§ͺ Task 10 β€” Compare Vertical vs Horizontal Scan Concepts

Section titled β€œπŸ§ͺ Task 10 β€” Compare Vertical vs Horizontal Scan Concepts”

One source probes many ports on one host.

Source
↓
Host A : 22
Host A : 80
Host A : 443
Host A : 3389

One source probes the same port across many hosts.

Source
↓
Host A : 445
Host B : 445
Host C : 445
Host D : 445

The pattern helps you understand the likely objective.

Scenario:

Firewall/VPN logs show:

User: alice
User: bob
User: carol
User: david
Source:
203.0.113.50
Result:
FAILED

A small number of password attempts across many accounts may indicate:

password spraying.

Time Source IP Username Result

πŸ§ͺ Task 12 β€” Look for Successful Authentication

Section titled β€œπŸ§ͺ Task 12 β€” Look for Successful Authentication”

This is critical.

Suppose:

50 Failed Logins
↓
1 Successful Login

The successful event may require immediate investigation.

Ask:

Did any account eventually authenticate successfully?

πŸ§ͺ Task 13 β€” Investigate the Successful User

Section titled β€œπŸ§ͺ Task 13 β€” Investigate the Successful User”

Review:

  • source IP

  • time

  • MFA

  • VPN assignment

  • resources accessed

  • session duration

Password Spray
↓
Successful VPN Login
↓
Internal Reconnaissance
↓
Sensitive Server Access

For suspicious VPN access collect:

Username
Source IP
Authentication Result
MFA Result
Assigned VPN IP
User Group
Connected Time
Disconnected Time
Field Value
User
Source IP
VPN Address
Authentication
MFA
Group
Session Start
Session End

Ask:

What did the user do after connecting?

Authentication is only the beginning of the investigation.

πŸ§ͺ Task 15 β€” Review Internal Traffic After VPN Login

Section titled β€œπŸ§ͺ Task 15 β€” Review Internal Traffic After VPN Login”

Search for traffic from the assigned VPN address.

Example:

VPN User
10.50.50.25
↓
10.10.20.10:443
↓
10.10.30.10:445
↓
10.10.40.10:22

A normal employee VPN user accessing:

  • database systems

  • SMB

  • management SSH

may require explanation.

Lateral movement means an attacker moves from one compromised system to another.

Example:

Compromised User PC
↓
Application Server
↓
Database Server
↓
Management System
  • SMB

  • RDP

  • SSH

  • remote administration

  • unusual authentication

  • new inter-segment traffic

Create:

HOST-A
↓
HOST-B
↓
HOST-C

For every hop document:

Source Destination Service Expected?

Ask:

Does the compromised source normally communicate with this destination?

πŸ§ͺ Task 17 β€” Compare Against the Traffic Matrix

Section titled β€œπŸ§ͺ Task 17 β€” Compare Against the Traffic Matrix”

Use the traffic matrices created in previous labs.

Expected:

Users β†’ Application

Not expected:

Users β†’ Database Admin Service

This is why network documentation helps investigations.

Scenario:

At 11:25 an administrator modifies the firewall.

At 11:27 suspicious traffic begins.

Time Event
11:25 Firewall rule modified
11:27 New traffic path observed
11:30 External connection established

Was this an approved change?

Who made it?

Did the rule create the attack path?

New Rule:
ANY
↓
Internal Server
↓
RDP
↓
ALLOW

followed by external connections.

Denied traffic is useful, but not every deny is important.

An internet-facing firewall may constantly log scans.

Thousands of random internet IPs scanning common ports.

Potentially routine background noise.

One external IP repeatedly targets a VPN portal, then successfully authenticates.

Higher investigation value.

Prioritize:

behavior + context + impact.

Not raw alert count alone.

A baseline helps identify unusual behavior.

Examples:

  • normal destinations

  • normal ports

  • normal login times

  • normal traffic volume

For one endpoint document:

Category Normal
DNS Internal resolver
Web Common approved sites
Internal Access Business application
Admin Ports None
VPN Not applicable

You need to know:

what normal looks like

before confidently identifying:

abnormal.

Correlate:

  • firewall

  • VPN

  • DNS

  • authentication

  • host information

Example:

09:04
Failed VPN Attempts
09:12
Successful VPN Login
09:15
Internal Port Scan
09:20
SMB Connection to Server
09:24
Repeated External Beacon
09:30
SOC Alert

πŸ§ͺ Task 21 β€” Create the Investigation Timeline

Section titled β€œπŸ§ͺ Task 21 β€” Create the Investigation Timeline”
Time Source Event Evidence Significance

Your timeline should tell a story.

Do not investigate only the original alert.

Ask:

Which users are affected?

Which systems are involved?

Which internal/external addresses?

Which zones were crossed?

How long has the activity existed?

πŸ§ͺ Task 22 β€” Build an Affected Asset Matrix

Section titled β€œπŸ§ͺ Task 22 β€” Build an Affected Asset Matrix”
Asset Role Evidence Affected?
USER-PC01 User Endpoint
APP-SRV01 Application
DB-SRV01 Database
VPN User Identity

Use:

Compromised Identity
+
Network Access
+
Permitted Services
+
Trust Relationships
=
Potential Blast Radius

Classify:

False Positive
Benign Positive
Suspicious
Confirmed Malicious

Detection logic incorrectly flagged legitimate behavior.

The event occurred as detected, but it was approved and legitimate.

Example:

An authorized vulnerability scanner triggered a port-scan detection.

Evidence indicates unusual behavior, but malicious intent is not yet confirmed.

Evidence demonstrates unauthorized or malicious activity.

Use:

Assessment:
Evidence Supporting Assessment:
Evidence Against Malicious Interpretation:
Confidence:
Next Action:

Use:

Threat Confidence
+
Privilege
+
Network Reachability
+
Asset Criticality
+
Business Impact
=
Severity

Examples:

  • confirmed privileged remote compromise

  • active lateral movement into critical systems

Examples:

  • successful unauthorized VPN access

  • compromised production server

  • suspicious lateral movement

Examples:

  • reconnaissance with limited impact

  • suspicious beaconing not yet confirmed

Examples:

  • benign scan requiring documentation

  • low-impact anomaly

Containment should be proportionate and authorized.

Possible actions include:

  • disable compromised VPN account

  • block malicious IP

  • isolate endpoint

  • restrict firewall traffic

  • revoke temporary access

  • quarantine network segment

Do not automatically block an IP without understanding:

  • whether it belongs to a legitimate provider

  • whether business services depend on it

  • whether blocking only the IP actually addresses the threat

Document:

Action Reason Impact Approval

Contain:

enough to stop further harm

while preserving:

evidence and business continuity where possible.

Preserve relevant:

  • firewall logs

  • VPN logs

  • DNS logs

  • authentication logs

  • timeline evidence

  • network captures where authorized

Evidence ID Source Time Description
EV-001 Firewall
EV-002 VPN
EV-003 DNS

Evidence should be:

  • timestamped

  • attributable

  • preserved

  • clearly documented

Do not confuse:

detection source

with:

root cause.

Firewall alert
Compromised VPN credentials were successfully used from an external source, and the account had excessive internal network access.

Use:

Initial Access:
Root Cause:
Contributing Factors:
Detection Source:
Security Control Failure:
Finding ID:
NTI-001
Title:
Remote VPN User Had Excessive Internal Network Reachability
Severity:
High
Observation:
A remote-access user could connect directly to sensitive server and management networks.
Risk:
Compromise of the VPN account could provide broad lateral movement opportunities.
Recommendation:
Implement role-based VPN authorization and restrict remote users to required applications and networks.

🚨 Finding 2 β€” Missing Detection for Internal Scan

Section titled β€œπŸš¨ Finding 2 β€” Missing Detection for Internal Scan”
Finding ID:
NTI-002
Title:
Internal Port Scanning Was Not Detected Promptly
Severity:
Medium / High
Observation:
An internal host probed multiple systems and services without generating a timely SOC alert.
Risk:
Reconnaissance preceding lateral movement may remain unnoticed.
Recommendation:
Develop and tune detection for suspicious internal scanning while excluding approved security scanners.

🚨 Finding 3 β€” Insufficient Firewall Logging

Section titled β€œπŸš¨ Finding 3 β€” Insufficient Firewall Logging”
Finding ID:
NTI-003
Title:
Firewall Logging Was Insufficient for Complete Investigation
Severity:
Medium
Observation:
Relevant firewall events did not contain sufficient detail or were not retained long enough for analysis.
Risk:
Security teams may be unable to reconstruct attacker activity accurately.
Recommendation:
Review logging requirements, retention, and centralized monitoring for high-value traffic.
Finding ID:
NTI-004
Title:
User Network Could Access Sensitive Administrative Services
Severity:
High
Observation:
Standard user endpoints could directly communicate with privileged management services.
Risk:
A compromised workstation could be used to attempt lateral movement toward network or server administration.
Recommendation:
Restrict administrative services to approved management networks.
Finding ID:
NTI-005
Title:
VPN Authentication Relied on Password-Only Access
Severity:
High
Risk:
Credential theft or password spraying could result in unauthorized remote access.
Recommendation:
Implement stronger authentication controls such as MFA where appropriate.

Recommended structure:

1. Incident Summary
2. Detection Source
3. Initial Severity
4. Affected Identity
5. Affected Hosts
6. Network Evidence
7. DNS Evidence
8. VPN Evidence
9. Investigation Timeline
10. Scope
11. Analyst Assessment
12. Containment
13. Root Cause
14. Findings
15. Remediation
16. Lessons Learned
Incident ID:
NTI-2026-001
Severity:
High
Summary:
Security monitoring identified repeated failed VPN authentication attempts from an external source followed by a successful login.
Post-authentication network activity included internal scanning and unexpected access attempts toward sensitive systems.
The affected VPN account had broader internal reachability than required.
Immediate containment focused on restricting the account and validating potentially affected systems.
Longer-term remediation should strengthen VPN authentication, reduce remote-access scope, improve internal segmentation, and expand detection for suspicious network reconnaissance.

Start with a hypothesis:

A compromised system may be making periodic outbound connections to an unusual external destination.

Search for:

  • repeated external destinations

  • similar timing intervals

  • one-to-many connections

  • unusual ports

Hypothesis
↓
Network Data
↓
Identify Pattern
↓
Find Hosts
↓
Validate
↓
Expand Scope

Search for:

  • RDP

  • SMB

  • SSH

  • administrative services

originating from endpoints that do not normally use them.

πŸ§ͺ Task 29 β€” Hunt for Suspicious VPN Activity

Section titled β€œπŸ§ͺ Task 29 β€” Hunt for Suspicious VPN Activity”

Look for:

  • unusual source countries/locations

  • repeated failures

  • first-time source IPs

  • privileged VPN users

  • long sessions

  • activity outside expected hours

Use rarity as:

a reason to investigate

not:

proof.

πŸ” Part 20 β€” Detection Engineering Connection

Section titled β€œπŸ” Part 20 β€” Detection Engineering Connection”

If your investigation identifies a reliable pattern, document a detection concept.

Example:

Threat:
Password Spray Against VPN
Telemetry:
VPN Authentication Logs
Logic:
Multiple usernames
+
Same external source
+
Repeated failures
+
Short time window
Priority:
High if followed by successful login
Threat Investigation
↓
Repeatable Pattern
↓
Detection Logic
↓
Continuous Monitoring

🎀 Network Threat Investigation Interview Questions

Section titled β€œπŸŽ€ Network Threat Investigation Interview Questions”

Practise without notes.

18. How would you investigate a successful VPN login after repeated failures?

Section titled β€œ18. How would you investigate a successful VPN login after repeated failures?”

20. How do network segmentation controls help incident response?

Section titled β€œ20. How do network segmentation controls help incident response?”

One workstation connects to the same external IP every 60 seconds.

A strong response should include:

Identify Host
↓
Destination Context
↓
Timing Pattern
↓
DNS
↓
Host/Application Context
↓
Other Hosts
↓
Decision

Do not immediately declare malware.

One IP attempts 100 usernames on the VPN and eventually succeeds with one.

Investigate:

  • source IP

  • successful identity

  • MFA

  • VPN session

  • assigned network access

  • post-login activity

  • other attempted accounts

An internal workstation scans hundreds of ports across production servers.

Ask:

  • approved scanner?

  • user/device owner?

  • maintenance window?

  • subsequent access?

  • other unusual behavior?

A server begins using SMB to connect to systems it has never contacted before.

Investigate:

  • source identity

  • destinations

  • authentication

  • timing

  • expected business function

  • other lateral movement

Firewall logs show a suspicious IP was blocked. Is the incident complete?

No.

Ask:

  • was traffic previously allowed?

  • are other destinations involved?

  • did the source use other IPs/domains?

  • was an internal host already compromised?

A VPN user accesses the database and network-device management interfaces.

Discuss:

  • user role

  • authorization

  • business requirement

  • potential compromise

  • excessive VPN scope

  • segmentation

Use:

Alert
↓
Validate
↓
Source
↓
Destination
↓
Identity
↓
Traffic Pattern
↓
Timeline
↓
Scope
↓
Contain
↓
Remediate

Avoid:

β€œI would block the IP.”

A stronger answer is:

β€œI would first identify the source system and user, review the destination and traffic pattern, correlate firewall, VPN, DNS, and authentication evidence, determine whether the activity is expected, identify any related systems or successful access, establish the scope, and then recommend containment based on the evidence.”

That sounds like a Network Security Analyst.

After completing this lab, create a sanitized investigation package.

Include:

Document:

  • alert

  • source

  • destination

  • severity

Include:

  • firewall records

  • VPN activity

  • DNS events

Show the full chronology.

Example:

External Source
↓
VPN Account
↓
Internal Scan
↓
Application Server
↓
Sensitive Network

Document affected:

  • users

  • endpoints

  • servers

  • network segments

Create at least 3–5 findings.

Separate:

Immediate
Short Term
Strategic

Instead of:

Network threat investigation experience.

Use:

Investigated simulated network-security incidents by correlating firewall, VPN, DNS, authentication, and traffic evidence to identify suspicious external connections, scanning, and lateral movement.

Or:

Built incident timelines and scope assessments for simulated VPN credential compromise and internal reconnaissance scenarios, with documented containment and remediation recommendations.

Or:

Performed threat-hunting exercises across network telemetry to identify repeated outbound beaconing patterns, unusual administrative traffic, and suspicious authentication behavior.

After this lab, you should be able to:

  • interpret firewall events

  • review VPN authentication

  • analyze DNS evidence

  • identify repeated traffic patterns

  • recognize scanning behavior

  • recognize password-spray patterns

  • investigate successful login after failures

  • analyze lateral movement

  • correlate multiple telemetry sources

  • build incident timelines

  • determine incident scope

  • distinguish benign from suspicious activity

  • recommend containment

  • document findings professionally

If your investigation still means:

suspicious IP β†’ block it β†’ close ticket

repeat the correlation and scope sections.

The goal is:

Understand what happened before, during, and after the network event, determine whether the activity is malicious, identify the full scope, and apply containment based on evidence rather than assumptions.

You have now completed the Cisco/network-security lab sequence:

Network Security Fundamentals
↓
ACL Security
↓
Firewall Security
↓
VPN Security
↓
Network Threat Investigation

You have progressed through:

Understand Traffic
↓
Control Traffic
↓
Secure Trust Boundaries
↓
Secure Remote Connectivity
↓
Investigate Suspicious Traffic

You now have the practical skills required to move into structured professional review methodology.

➑️ Next: Network Security Assessment Runbook

In the next runbook, you will systematically assess:

  • network architecture

  • asset and subnet inventory

  • trust boundaries

  • network segmentation

  • ACLs

  • firewall placement

  • public exposure

  • management access

  • VPN architecture

  • remote-access security

  • routing

  • NAT

  • DNS and network services

  • security monitoring

  • logging

  • findings

  • risk rating

  • remediation

  • executive reporting