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Lab 09 DNS & Web Traffic Investigation

Welcome to Lab 09 — DNS & Web Traffic Investigation.

In Lab 08, you investigated network security alerts by analyzing source and destination systems, ports, protocols, firewall actions, IDS/IPS detections, processes, and related telemetry.

Now you will investigate two telemetry sources that frequently provide the missing context behind those alerts:

DNS and web traffic.

DNS can show which domains a system attempted to resolve.

Proxy and web telemetry can show what happened after resolution.

Endpoint telemetry can help determine which process or user initiated the activity.

When these sources are correlated, the SOC can reconstruct a sequence such as:

User / Process
DNS Query
Domain Resolution
Web Connection
URL Request
HTTP Response
Download / Redirect
Endpoint Activity

But every stage must be proven separately.

Mission Goal: Investigate simulated DNS and web activity, determine which client, user, or process generated it, reconstruct domain-to-web activity, identify suspicious patterns, correlate related endpoint and network telemetry, determine organizational scope, and produce an evidence-based SOC disposition.

Item Details
Difficulty Intermediate
Estimated Time 120–150 minutes
Primary Skill DNS & Web Traffic Investigation
Secondary Skill Proxy and Network Correlation
Environment GoHackersCloud SOC Analyst Lab
Evidence Simulated DNS + proxy/web + endpoint + SIEM logs
Primary Outcome DNS & Web Investigation Report
Safety Level Authorized Training Evidence Only

By completing this lab, you will be able to:

  • investigate suspicious DNS activity

  • identify the requesting client

  • interpret DNS queries and responses

  • correlate domains with resolved IP addresses

  • distinguish resolution from communication

  • investigate repeated DNS activity

  • analyze web/proxy logs

  • interpret URLs and HTTP methods

  • interpret HTTP response codes

  • analyze allowed and blocked web requests

  • investigate redirects

  • investigate downloads

  • correlate DNS and web activity

  • correlate activity with endpoint processes

  • associate user context where evidence exists

  • investigate multiple affected hosts

  • distinguish IOC matches from compromise

  • reconstruct DNS/web timelines

  • determine incident scope

  • document security-control outcomes

  • produce a professional SOC investigation report

Use:

Client → DNS Query → Resolution → Web Request → Response → User/Process → Correlation → Scope → Disposition

A more complete workflow is:

Alert / Indicator
Identify Client
Analyze DNS Query
Analyze DNS Response
Domain → IP
Search Web / Proxy
URL / Method / Response
Allowed / Blocked
User + Process
Endpoint / Network Correlation
Related Hosts
Timeline + Scope
Disposition

The core principle is:

DNS tells you what a system attempted to resolve. Web telemetry helps determine what happened next. Neither source should be interpreted in isolation.

Part 1 — Create the Investigation Workspace

Section titled “Part 1 — Create the Investigation Workspace”

Create:

SOC-Labs/
└── Lab-09/
├── 01-Scope/
├── 02-Alert/
├── 03-DNS/
│ ├── Queries/
│ └── Responses/
├── 04-Domains/
├── 05-Web-Traffic/
├── 06-Proxy/
├── 07-Redirects/
├── 08-Downloads/
├── 09-Endpoint/
├── 10-Network/
├── 11-IOCs/
├── 12-Correlation/
├── 13-Scope/
├── 14-Timeline/
├── 15-Evidence/
├── 16-Findings/
└── 17-Report/

Create:

Lab-09-DNS-Web-Traffic-Investigation.md

Example:

CASE ID:
GHC-SOC-2026-009
CASE TITLE:
DNS & Web Traffic Investigation
STATUS:
Investigating
INITIAL PRIORITY:
P2
ANALYST:
DATE:

Assume the SOC receives:

ALERT ID:
ALT-DNS-001
ALERT:
Suspicious Domain Query
CLIENT:
10.10.20.45
DOMAIN:
account-update.example.test
TIME:
15:21 UTC
QUERY TYPE:
A
DNS ACTION:
Allowed
INITIAL SEVERITY:
Medium

Do not conclude:

Suspicious Domain
DNS Query
Compromised Host

Instead ask:

Which system generated the query, why was the domain requested, what IP was returned, was a subsequent connection made, which user or process generated it, and what happened afterward?

Record:

DNS ALERT PROFILE
Alert ID:
Timestamp:
Client IP:
Client Host:
Domain:
Query Type:
Response:
Resolved Address:
DNS Server:
Security Action:
Rule / Detection:
Initial Severity:
Evidence Reference:

Part 5 — Establish the Investigation Window

Section titled “Part 5 — Establish the Investigation Window”

Example:

Alert Time:
15:21 UTC
Initial Window:
15:05–15:40 UTC

If earlier or later related events appear, expand the window.

Document every expansion.

Create:

CLIENT PROFILE
Client IP:
Hostname:
Operating System:
User:
Department:
Business Role:
Criticality:
Network Segment:
Endpoint Protection:
Normal Web Usage:
Expected DNS Server:

Remember:

Client IP ≠ Permanent Endpoint Identity

Correlate the address with the event timestamp.

A simplified DNS sequence is:

Client
│ Query: account-update.example.test
DNS Resolver
│ Response: 203.0.113.50
Client

This demonstrates resolution activity.

It does not prove the client subsequently communicated with the returned address.

Create:

DNS QUERY PROFILE
Time:
Client:
User:
If known
Domain:
Query Type:
Resolver:
Response Code:
Answer:
TTL:
If supplied
Security Verdict:
Action:
Process:
If available

Part 9 — Understand Common DNS Query Types

Section titled “Part 9 — Understand Common DNS Query Types”

You may encounter:

Type General Purpose
A IPv4 address
AAAA IPv6 address
CNAME Alias/canonical-name relationship
MX Mail server
TXT Text/policy information
NS Name server
PTR Reverse lookup

The record type alone does not indicate malicious behavior.

Record:

DOMAIN:
account-update.example.test
QUERY TYPE:
A
ANSWER:
203.0.113.50
RESPONSE:
Successful
TIME:
15:21 UTC

Then determine whether the returned address appears elsewhere in the investigation.

Time Client Domain Type Answer Action
15:21 10.10.20.45 account-update.example.test A 203.0.113.50 Allowed

Always distinguish:

Domain Queried
Domain Resolved
Domain Resolved
Connection Established
Connection Established
Malicious Activity
Malicious Domain Contact
Host Compromise Automatically

Part 13 — Investigate Failed DNS Queries

Section titled “Part 13 — Investigate Failed DNS Queries”

You may encounter:

NXDOMAIN

which generally indicates the requested name did not resolve.

A failed lookup may still be useful evidence.

It may reflect:

  • mistyped hostname

  • stale configuration

  • removed infrastructure

  • application behavior

  • suspicious automated activity

Do not classify from NXDOMAIN alone.

Part 14 — Build the DNS Response Register

Section titled “Part 14 — Build the DNS Response Register”
Domain Response Answer Count Assessment
account-update.example.test Success 203.0.113.50
missing.example.test NXDOMAIN None

Determine whether the client queried the domain:

Once
Repeatedly
Periodically
In bursts

Create:

Time Client Domain Response
15:21 WIN-FIN-02 account-update.example.test Success
15:26 WIN-FIN-02 account-update.example.test Success
15:31 WIN-FIN-02 account-update.example.test Success

Part 16 — Interpret Repeated Queries Carefully

Section titled “Part 16 — Interpret Repeated Queries Carefully”

Repeated DNS queries can result from:

  • normal applications

  • browsers

  • software updates

  • telemetry agents

  • cloud services

  • failed connectivity

  • short TTL values

  • automated suspicious processes

Therefore:

Repeated DNS Query ≠ Command-and-Control

Record:

DOMAIN PROFILE
Domain:
First Seen:
Last Seen:
Clients:
Resolved IPs:
Query Count:
Web Activity:
Security Verdict:
If supplied
Related Alert:
Expected Business Use:
Assessment:

Part 18 — Evaluate Domain Characteristics

Section titled “Part 18 — Evaluate Domain Characteristics”

Look for evidence such as:

  • unusual naming

  • brand imitation

  • excessive subdomains

  • unexpected business context

  • domain appearing in phishing evidence

  • threat-intelligence classification supplied by the lab

Do not visit the domain directly.

Suppose Lab 06 contained:

Phishing URL:
https://account-update.example.test/login

and Lab 09 shows:

DNS Query:
account-update.example.test

This creates useful correlation:

Phishing Email
URL
DNS Query

But it still does not prove the web page was successfully accessed.

Search supplied telemetry for:

203.0.113.50

across:

  • firewall

  • proxy

  • EDR

  • network alerts

  • SIEM

Create:

RESOLVED-IP CORRELATION
Domain:
Resolved IP:
Client:
Connection Found:
Yes / No
Protocol:
Port:
Action:
Time:
Evidence:

Part 21 — Correlate DNS to Network Connection

Section titled “Part 21 — Correlate DNS to Network Connection”

Example:

15:21:04
DNS Query
15:21:04
Response: 203.0.113.50
15:21:06
TCP connection to 203.0.113.50:443

Now the evidence supports:

DNS resolution followed by a network connection.

It still does not establish application-level activity by itself.

Part 22 — Build the DNS-to-Network Register

Section titled “Part 22 — Build the DNS-to-Network Register”
DNS Time Domain Resolved IP Connection Time Port Action

Look for activity associated with:

  • client IP

  • user

  • domain

  • URL

  • resolved IP

  • investigation time

Create:

WEB EVENT PROFILE
Time:
Client:
User:
Method:
URL:
Domain:
Destination IP:
Status:
Proxy Action:
Category:
Bytes:
User-Agent:
If supplied
Downloaded File:
If supplied

Example:

https://account-update.example.test/login?id=100
│ │ │ │
Scheme Host Path Query

Record:

Scheme:
Host:
Port:
Path:
Query:
Fragment:
If present

Do not manually browse suspicious URLs.

URL ID Time Client URL Action Assessment
URL-01

Common methods include:

GET
POST
HEAD

In SOC investigation:

  • GET may represent resource retrieval.

  • POST may represent submitted data.

But:

HTTP POST ≠ Credential Theft

Many legitimate applications use POST requests.

Context is required.

Part 27 — Build the HTTP Method Register

Section titled “Part 27 — Build the HTTP Method Register”
Time User URL Method Status Assessment
GET
POST

Part 28 — Understand HTTP Response Codes

Section titled “Part 28 — Understand HTTP Response Codes”

Useful categories include:

2xx → Successful processing
3xx → Redirection
4xx → Client-side request issue
5xx → Server-side error

A response code provides application context but is not a security verdict.

Time URL Method Status Action
GET 302
GET 200

Always distinguish:

HTTP 200
Legitimate Website

It generally indicates the web server successfully handled the request.

A malicious site can also return HTTP 200.

Example:

Initial URL
HTTP 302
Redirect Domain
HTTP 302
Final Destination

Create:

REDIRECT CHAIN
Initial URL:
Redirect 01:
Redirect 02:
Final URL:
Final Domain:
Final Status:
Security Assessment:
Step Time URL/Domain Status Destination
1 302
2 302
3 200

Do not manually follow suspicious redirects.

Part 33 — Investigate Web Filtering Outcome

Section titled “Part 33 — Investigate Web Filtering Outcome”

Possible outcomes:

Allowed
Blocked
Warned
Redirected
Quarantined
Unknown

Record:

WEB SECURITY OUTCOME
URL:
Domain:
User:
Host:
Security Category:
Proxy Action:
Browser Access:
Downloaded Content:
Assessment:

Part 34 — Distinguish Attempt from Access

Section titled “Part 34 — Distinguish Attempt from Access”

If the proxy blocked the request:

Web Request
Proxy Block

then do not report:

User successfully visited malicious website

unless other evidence supports it.

If telemetry identifies a download, record:

DOWNLOAD PROFILE
Time:
User:
Host:
URL:
Filename:
File Type:
Size:
Hash:
If supplied
Proxy Action:
Endpoint Detection:
Execution:
Yes / No / Unknown

Always separate:

URL Requested
File Downloaded
File Downloaded
File Opened
File Opened
File Executed
File Executed
Endpoint Compromised Automatically

Part 37 — Correlate Downloads with Endpoint Telemetry

Section titled “Part 37 — Correlate Downloads with Endpoint Telemetry”

Example:

15:22
Web request
15:22
File downloaded
15:23
File created on endpoint
15:24
Process execution
15:24
EDR alert

This creates a much stronger activity chain.

Part 38 — Build the Web-to-Endpoint Register

Section titled “Part 38 — Build the Web-to-Endpoint Register”
Time Web Event File Endpoint Event Evidence
Download File Created
Process Started

Part 39 — Identify the Responsible Process

Section titled “Part 39 — Identify the Responsible Process”

Where telemetry exists, determine which process initiated the web activity.

Possible examples:

chrome.exe
edge.exe
firefox.exe
powershell.exe
application.exe

Do not classify a process solely by its name.

Part 40 — Build the Process-to-Web Register

Section titled “Part 40 — Build the Process-to-Web Register”
Time Host User Process Domain URL

Part 41 — Analyze Parent Process Context

Section titled “Part 41 — Analyze Parent Process Context”

Example:

explorer.exe
chrome.exe
account-update.example.test

may represent user browsing.

Compare with:

InvoiceViewer.exe
powershell.exe
account-update.example.test

The second chain provides significantly different investigative context.

Create:

USER WEB PROFILE
User:
Host:
Authentication Status:
Browser / Process:
Normal Browsing Pattern:
Expected Domain:
Business Purpose:
Recent Phishing Case:
Recent Endpoint Alert:
Assessment:

Part 43 — Correlate Authentication Evidence

Section titled “Part 43 — Correlate Authentication Evidence”

Ask whether suspicious web activity follows:

  • new login

  • unusual login

  • privileged session

  • remote access

  • VPN activity

Do not infer causation solely from timing.

Part 44 — Build the Authentication Correlation Register

Section titled “Part 44 — Build the Authentication Correlation Register”
Time User Auth Event Web Event Relationship

Search the suspicious domain across DNS logs.

Create:

Client User Query Count Web Access Status
WIN-FIN-02 finance-user 3 Yes Investigating
WIN-HR-04 hr-user 1 Blocked Review

Part 46 — Distinguish Domain Scope from Compromise Scope

Section titled “Part 46 — Distinguish Domain Scope from Compromise Scope”

Suppose:

Domain Queried:
10 hosts
Web Connection:
4 hosts
Web Access Allowed:
2 hosts
File Download:
1 host
Execution:
0 confirmed

Then:

10 domain queries
10 compromised hosts

A case may contain:

Initial Domain
Redirect Domain
Content Domain

Search each identified indicator across authorized telemetry.

Part 48 — Build the Domain Relationship Register

Section titled “Part 48 — Build the Domain Relationship Register”
Domain Relationship Clients Web Activity
Domain-A Initial
Domain-B Redirect
Domain-C Final

Part 49 — Investigate Related IP Addresses

Section titled “Part 49 — Investigate Related IP Addresses”

One domain may resolve to multiple addresses.

Likewise, multiple domains may resolve to shared infrastructure.

Do not automatically infer common malicious ownership.

Domain IP First Seen Last Seen Clients

Search the supplied telemetry for:

Domain
URL
Resolved IP
Redirect Domain
Downloaded File Hash

Build:

IOC DNS Proxy Endpoint Network Email
Domain
URL
IP
Hash

Part 52 — Interpret IOC Matches Correctly

Section titled “Part 52 — Interpret IOC Matches Correctly”

Remember:

IOC Match ≠ Compromise

An indicator match should trigger investigation.

It should not replace investigation.

Part 53 — Investigate Security-Control Outcomes

Section titled “Part 53 — Investigate Security-Control Outcomes”

Determine whether controls:

  • detected domain

  • blocked resolution

  • blocked URL

  • prevented download

  • quarantined file

  • terminated process

Create:

Control Detection Prevention Evidence
DNS Security
Proxy
Firewall
EDR

Part 54 — Identify Positive Security Controls

Section titled “Part 54 — Identify Positive Security Controls”

Examples:

DNS security blocked the domain.
Proxy prevented web access.
Web filtering blocked the download.
EDR quarantined the downloaded file.
Firewall prevented outbound communication.
User reported the suspicious website.

Positive controls reduce actual exposure and should appear in the report.

Part 55 — Investigate Possible Credential-Phishing Activity

Section titled “Part 55 — Investigate Possible Credential-Phishing Activity”

If the web evidence relates to Lab 06, determine whether the user:

Reached phishing page
Submitted form
Generated subsequent authentication activity

But:

POST Request ≠ Credentials Submitted Automatically

You may know data was submitted without knowing its exact contents.

Part 56 — Correlate Identity Activity After Web Access

Section titled “Part 56 — Correlate Identity Activity After Web Access”

Example:

15:21
DNS query
15:21
Web request
15:22
Phishing page loaded
15:24
POST request
15:32
Unexpected authentication

This sequence deserves escalation.

But evidence must still establish what each event means.

Part 57 — Build the Identity Correlation Register

Section titled “Part 57 — Build the Identity Correlation Register”
Time User Web Activity Identity Activity Assessment

Part 58 — Investigate Possible Automated Communication

Section titled “Part 58 — Investigate Possible Automated Communication”

If no interactive browser activity exists, ask whether traffic was generated by:

  • application

  • service

  • endpoint agent

  • suspicious process

  • scheduled activity

Create:

AUTOMATION PROFILE
Host:
Process:
Parent Process:
User Context:
Domain:
Frequency:
Interactive User:
Yes / No / Unknown
Expected Application:
Yes / No / Unknown
Assessment:

Example:

15:00
Query
15:05
Query
15:10
Query
15:15
Query

This is periodic.

But:

Periodicity ≠ Malicious Beaconing Automatically

Compare with process and application context.

Part 60 — Build the Periodicity Register

Section titled “Part 60 — Build the Periodicity Register”
Event Interval Count Process Expected
DNS Query 5 min 12
Web Request 5 min 12

Part 61 — Investigate Unusual Query Volume

Section titled “Part 61 — Investigate Unusual Query Volume”

High DNS volume can have many explanations.

Examples:

  • application behavior

  • browser activity

  • endpoint security software

  • configuration problem

  • service discovery

  • suspicious automated behavior

Do not label unusual volume as tunneling without supporting evidence.

Examples:

No endpoint process mapping
Proxy bypass possible
DNS logs missing for part of window
Encrypted HTTPS content
No user attribution
NAT obscures client identity
No file hash available
No identity telemetry

Create:

Gap Investigation Impact Confidence Effect
No process telemetry Cannot identify requesting process Medium

Part 63 — Build the Master DNS/Web Timeline

Section titled “Part 63 — Build the Master DNS/Web Timeline”

Example:

15:18
Phishing email delivered
15:20
User opened email
15:21:02
DNS query for account-update.example.test
15:21:03
DNS response returned 203.0.113.50
15:21:05
Proxy observed HTTPS request
15:21:05
Request allowed
15:21:06
HTTP redirect observed
15:21:07
Final web resource requested
15:22
File downloaded
15:23
File created on endpoint
15:24
Endpoint alert generated
15:32
Unexpected authentication observed
15:40
SOC investigation started

This timeline connects multiple SOC domains.

Example:

Phishing Email
User Click
DNS Query
Domain Resolution
Web Request
Redirect
Download
Endpoint Event
Identity Activity

Only include stages supported by evidence.

Create:

DNS SCOPE
Primary Domain:
Related Domains:
Resolved IPs:
Clients:
Users:
Query Count:
First Seen:
Last Seen:
Blocked Queries:
Successful Responses:

Create:

WEB SCOPE
Domains Accessed:
URLs:
Users:
Hosts:
Allowed Requests:
Blocked Requests:
Redirects:
Downloads:
Files:
First Seen:
Last Seen:

Create:

ENDPOINT SCOPE
Hosts with DNS Query:
Hosts with Web Request:
Hosts with Download:
Hosts with Execution:
Hosts with Endpoint Alert:
Hosts Requiring Investigation:

Create:

USER SCOPE
Users Receiving Related Email:
Users Querying Domain:
Users Accessing URL:
Users Downloading Content:
Users with Identity Anomalies:
Privileged Users:
Unknown User Attribution:

A useful model is:

Level 1
Domain Query
Level 2
Domain Resolved
Level 3
Web Connection
Level 4
Web Resource Accessed
Level 5
Content Downloaded
Level 6
Content Executed
Level 7
Security Impact Observed

This prevents overstatement.

Host DNS Web Download Execution Impact
WIN-FIN-02 Yes Yes Yes Unknown Review
WIN-HR-04 Yes Blocked No No None observed

Part 71 — Build Investigation Hypotheses

Section titled “Part 71 — Build Investigation Hypotheses”
Expected user
+
approved domain
+
browser process
+
normal activity

Hypothesis 2 — False Positive / Benign Domain

Section titled “Hypothesis 2 — False Positive / Benign Domain”
Security alert
+
legitimate business service
+
no suspicious correlation
Phishing email
+
matching URL
+
DNS query
+
web request

Hypothesis 4 — Suspicious Automated Communication

Section titled “Hypothesis 4 — Suspicious Automated Communication”
Non-browser process
+
unexpected domain
+
repeated communication

Hypothesis 5 — Potential Security Incident

Section titled “Hypothesis 5 — Potential Security Incident”
Suspicious domain
+
web access
+
download or suspicious process
+
endpoint/identity correlation
Hypothesis Supporting Evidence Contradicting Evidence Confidence
Expected browsing
Benign/false positive
Phishing interaction
Automated communication
Security incident

Use consistent classifications.

DNS/web activity matches approved business use.

Activity is harmless.

Detection logic triggered on legitimate behavior.

Evidence is anomalous but incomplete.

Evidence supports interaction with the phishing infrastructure.

Multiple telemetry sources support possible compromise.

Evidence establishes unauthorized malicious activity and relevant impact.

Available evidence cannot support a reliable conclusion.

Part 74 — Example — Domain Queried but Blocked

Section titled “Part 74 — Example — Domain Queried but Blocked”
DISPOSITION:
Suspicious DNS Activity — Blocked
HOST:
WIN-HR-04
DOMAIN:
account-update.example.test
EVIDENCE:
The endpoint attempted to resolve a domain associated with the
simulated phishing investigation.
DNS security blocked the request.
SUBSEQUENT WEB ACTIVITY:
Not observed.
DOWNLOAD:
Not observed.
ENDPOINT IMPACT:
Not observed.
SEVERITY:
Low
CONFIDENCE:
High
POSITIVE CONTROL:
DNS security prevented further access.

Part 75 — Example — Phishing URL Accessed

Section titled “Part 75 — Example — Phishing URL Accessed”
DISPOSITION:
Confirmed Phishing Interaction
USER:
finance-user
HOST:
WIN-FIN-02
EVIDENCE:
The phishing domain identified in the email investigation was
resolved by the recipient endpoint.
Proxy telemetry recorded a subsequent web request to the matching
URL.
The request was allowed.
DOWNLOAD:
Not observed.
CREDENTIAL SUBMISSION:
Unconfirmed.
ENDPOINT COMPROMISE:
Not established.
SEVERITY:
Medium
CONFIDENCE:
High

Part 76 — Example — Potential Security Incident

Section titled “Part 76 — Example — Potential Security Incident”
DISPOSITION:
Potential Security Incident
HOST:
WIN-FIN-02
USER:
finance-user
EVIDENCE:
The endpoint resolved and accessed a suspicious domain associated
with the phishing case.
Web telemetry recorded a file download.
Endpoint telemetry subsequently recorded execution-related
activity associated with the downloaded file.
Unexpected authentication activity was also identified during
the investigation window.
KNOWN IMPACT:
Requires additional endpoint and identity investigation.
SEVERITY:
High
CONFIDENCE:
High
ESCALATION:
Required.

Consider:

  • domain classification

  • user interaction

  • privileged user involvement

  • allowed vs blocked access

  • download

  • execution

  • endpoint activity

  • identity anomalies

  • number of hosts

  • critical asset involvement

  • control effectiveness

Example:

Phishing Interaction:
Confirmed
Confidence:
High
Credential Exposure:
Possible
Confidence:
Low
Endpoint Compromise:
Potential
Confidence:
Medium

This is more precise than one generic confidence score.

Part 79 — Determine Containment Recommendations

Section titled “Part 79 — Determine Containment Recommendations”

Depending on evidence:

  • block domain

  • block URL

  • block related IP

  • remove related phishing emails

  • quarantine downloaded file

  • isolate affected endpoint

  • protect affected account

  • revoke sessions

  • increase monitoring

  • preserve logs

Document actions rather than performing disruptive changes unless explicitly authorized.

Part 80 — Build the Containment Decision Matrix

Section titled “Part 80 — Build the Containment Decision Matrix”
Action Required Reason Impact Approval
Block domain
Block URL
Block IP
Quarantine file
Isolate endpoint
Protect account

Escalate when:

  • phishing URL was successfully accessed

  • suspicious file downloaded

  • execution suspected

  • unexpected authentication follows interaction

  • privileged user affected

  • multiple hosts contacted the indicator

  • suspicious automated communication exists

  • security controls failed to prevent activity

  • containment is required

ESCALATION SUMMARY
Case ID:
Alert:
Primary Domain:
Related Domains:
Resolved IPs:
Primary Host:
Primary User:
DNS Activity:
Web Activity:
Proxy Action:
Redirects:
Downloads:
Process:
Endpoint Correlation:
Identity Correlation:
Other Hosts:
Other Users:
Known Impact:
Unconfirmed Concerns:
Severity:
Confidence:
Containment Recommendation:
Evidence References:

Part 83 — Build the DNS/Web Evidence Register

Section titled “Part 83 — Build the DNS/Web Evidence Register”
Evidence ID Source Description
EV-WEB-01 SIEM Original alert
EV-WEB-02 DNS Query evidence
EV-WEB-03 DNS Resolution evidence
EV-WEB-04 Firewall Connection
EV-WEB-05 Proxy Web request
EV-WEB-06 Proxy Redirect
EV-WEB-07 Endpoint Process activity
EV-WEB-08 Email Related phishing URL
EV-WEB-09 Identity Related authentication

Complete:

LAB INFORMATION
Lab:
DNS & Web Traffic Investigation
Case ID:
Analyst:
Date:
INITIAL ALERT
Alert ID:
Alert:
Time:
Client:
Domain:
Query Type:
Initial Severity:
CLIENT
IP:
Hostname:
User:
Department:
Role:
Criticality:
Network Segment:
DNS ANALYSIS
Domain:
Query Type:
Resolver:
Response:
Resolved IP:
Query Count:
First Seen:
Last Seen:
DNS Security Action:
DOMAIN ANALYSIS
Expected Business Domain:
Yes / No / Unknown
Related Phishing Case:
Yes / No
Related Domains:
Related IPs:
Assessment:
NETWORK CORRELATION
Resolved IP:
Connection Observed:
Yes / No
Port:
Protocol:
Allowed / Blocked:
Connection Time:
WEB ANALYSIS
URL:
Method:
Status:
Proxy Action:
Redirect:
Final URL:
Bytes:
User-Agent:
If available
DOWNLOAD
File:
Type:
Hash:
Downloaded:
Yes / No
Endpoint Observed:
Yes / No
Execution:
Yes / No / Unknown
PROCESS CORRELATION
Process:
Parent:
User:
Host:
Expected Process:
Automated:
Yes / No / Unknown
EMAIL CORRELATION
Related Email:
Sender:
Recipient:
URL Match:
Timeline Match:
IDENTITY CORRELATION
Unexpected Authentication:
MFA Activity:
Source:
Time:
Relationship:
SCOPE
Hosts Querying Domain:
Hosts Accessing URL:
Users:
Downloads:
Executions:
Identity Anomalies:
SECURITY CONTROLS
DNS Security:
Proxy:
Firewall:
EDR:
Email Security:
TELEMETRY GAPS
Gap 01:
Impact:
Gap 02:
Impact:
FINAL ASSESSMENT
Disposition:
DNS Activity:
Expected / Suspicious / Malicious / Inconclusive
Web Interaction:
Confirmed / Not Observed / Unknown
Download:
Confirmed / Not Observed / Unknown
Execution:
Confirmed / Not Observed / Unknown
Compromise:
Confirmed / Potential / Not Established
Severity:
Confidence:
Known Impact:
Escalation:
Yes / No
Containment:
Yes / No
Remaining Questions:
Ready for SIEM Search & Correlation:
Yes / No

Do not:

Browse suspicious domains directly
Click suspicious URLs
Follow suspicious redirects manually
Download suspicious files for testing
Execute downloaded content
Submit credentials to suspicious websites
Attempt to interact with external threat infrastructure
Assume DNS query means web access
Assume successful DNS response means connection
Assume HTTP 200 means legitimate content
Assume HTTP POST means credentials were stolen
Assume redirect means malicious activity
Assume download means execution
Assume IOC match means compromise
Assume periodic DNS means command-and-control
Assume high DNS volume means DNS tunneling
Assume encrypted traffic means malicious traffic
Block production domains without approval
Delete evidence
Overstate impact

The professional rule is:

Reconstruct activity from existing telemetry instead of recreating potentially dangerous activity yourself.

DNS Query Exists but No Web Request Exists

Section titled “DNS Query Exists but No Web Request Exists”

Possible explanations include:

  • user/application did not continue

  • security control blocked activity

  • browser prefetch

  • application lookup

  • missing proxy telemetry

Document:

DNS resolution observed.
Subsequent web interaction not established.

Web Request Exists but DNS Evidence Is Missing

Section titled “Web Request Exists but DNS Evidence Is Missing”

Possible explanations:

  • cached DNS response

  • alternate resolver

  • missing logs

  • direct IP connection

Do not invent the missing query.

Document all observed addresses and correlate each with network telemetry.

Do not report successful web access unless another telemetry source demonstrates it.

It demonstrates successful request handling, not benign content.

Document the method.

Do not claim credential theft without supporting evidence.

Download Is Observed but Endpoint Execution Is Missing

Section titled “Download Is Observed but Endpoint Execution Is Missing”

Record:

Download:
Confirmed
Execution:
Not established

Determine whether the domain is:

  • common business infrastructure

  • shared cloud infrastructure

  • advertising/analytics

  • security tooling

  • part of the simulated suspicious campaign

Scope before escalating.

Capture:

Original alert.

Investigation scope.

Client Profile.

DNS Query Profile.

DNS Event Register.

DNS Response Register.

Query frequency analysis.

Domain Profile.

Resolved-IP correlation.

DNS-to-Network Register.

Web Event Profile.

URL Register.

HTTP Method Register.

Response Register.

Redirect chain.

Web Security Outcome.

Download Profile.

Web-to-Endpoint Register.

Process-to-Web Register.

User Web Profile.

Authentication correlation.

Multiple-client analysis.

Domain Relationship Register.

Domain-to-IP Matrix.

IOC Correlation Matrix.

Security Control Outcome Matrix.

Identity Correlation Register.

Automation Profile.

Periodicity Register.

Telemetry Gap Register.

Master DNS/Web Timeline.

Activity Chain.

DNS Scope.

Web Scope.

Endpoint Scope.

User Scope.

Exposure Matrix.

Hypothesis Matrix.

Containment Decision Matrix.

Escalation Package.

DNS/Web Evidence Register.

Mission Challenge worksheet.

Complete:

  • SOC case opened

  • original alert preserved

  • investigation window established

  • client identified

  • client IP mapped to correct host/time

  • DNS query analyzed

  • query type identified

  • DNS response analyzed

  • resolved addresses documented

  • failed responses reviewed

  • query frequency analyzed

  • domain profile created

  • domain compared with previous case evidence

  • resolved IP searched across telemetry

  • DNS-to-network correlation completed

  • proxy/web telemetry reviewed

  • URLs analyzed safely

  • HTTP methods reviewed

  • response codes reviewed

  • redirects reconstructed

  • web filtering outcome documented

  • downloads investigated

  • endpoint telemetry correlated

  • responsible process identified where possible

  • user context established

  • authentication activity correlated

  • related clients searched

  • related domains searched

  • related IP addresses searched

  • IOC matrix completed

  • security-control outcomes documented

  • positive controls documented

  • potential credential-phishing evidence evaluated

  • automated activity considered

  • periodicity analyzed

  • telemetry gaps documented

  • master timeline reconstructed

  • activity chain reconstructed

  • DNS scope determined

  • web scope determined

  • endpoint scope determined

  • user scope determined

  • exposure levels distinguished

  • hypotheses evaluated

  • final disposition assigned

  • severity assigned

  • confidence assigned separately

  • containment recommendations documented

  • escalation decision documented

  • final DNS & Web Investigation Report completed

# Lab 09 — DNS & Web Traffic Investigation
## Executive Summary
## Mission Objective
## Case Information
## Initial Alert
## Investigation Scope
## Client Analysis
## DNS Query Analysis
## DNS Response Analysis
## Query Frequency Analysis
## Domain Analysis
## Domain-to-IP Analysis
## Network Correlation
## Web / Proxy Analysis
## URL Analysis
## HTTP Method Analysis
## HTTP Response Analysis
## Redirect Analysis
## Download Analysis
## Process Correlation
## Endpoint Correlation
## User Context
## Email Correlation
## Identity Correlation
## IOC Correlation
## Related Host Analysis
## Security-Control Outcomes
## Positive Security Controls
## Telemetry Gaps
## Master Timeline
## Activity Chain
## DNS Scope
## Web Scope
## Endpoint Scope
## User Scope
## Exposure Assessment
## Hypothesis Analysis
## Final Disposition
## Severity
## Confidence
## Known Impact
## Containment Recommendations
## Escalation Decision
## Evidence Register
## Remaining Questions
## Limitations
## Conclusion

Question 1 — Does a DNS query prove the client visited a website?

Section titled “Question 1 — Does a DNS query prove the client visited a website?”

No.

A DNS query demonstrates name-resolution activity.

Question 2 — Does successful DNS resolution prove a connection occurred?

Section titled “Question 2 — Does successful DNS resolution prove a connection occurred?”

No.

Network telemetry is required to establish subsequent communication.

Question 3 — Does HTTP 200 mean the website is legitimate?

Section titled “Question 3 — Does HTTP 200 mean the website is legitimate?”

No.

A malicious web server can return a successful response.

Question 4 — Does HTTP POST prove credentials were stolen?

Section titled “Question 4 — Does HTTP POST prove credentials were stolen?”

No.

POST is widely used by legitimate applications. Additional evidence is required.

Question 5 — Why correlate DNS with proxy telemetry?

Section titled “Question 5 — Why correlate DNS with proxy telemetry?”

DNS identifies the requested domain, while proxy/web telemetry can help establish subsequent application-level interaction.

Question 6 — Does a file download prove execution?

Section titled “Question 6 — Does a file download prove execution?”

No.

Download and execution are separate events.

Question 7 — Why identify the responsible process?

Section titled “Question 7 — Why identify the responsible process?”

It helps distinguish interactive browsing, legitimate application activity, and potentially suspicious automated communication.

Question 8 — Does periodic DNS activity prove malware beaconing?

Section titled “Question 8 — Does periodic DNS activity prove malware beaconing?”

No.

Many legitimate applications generate periodic DNS and network traffic.

Question 9 — Why investigate the same domain across multiple hosts?

Section titled “Question 9 — Why investigate the same domain across multiple hosts?”

To determine organizational exposure and distinguish a single-host event from broader activity.

Question 10 — What is the central question?

Section titled “Question 10 — What is the central question?”

“What domain or web resource did the system attempt to reach, what happened after resolution, which user or process initiated the activity, and does the complete evidence support normal browsing, suspicious communication, or a security incident?”

After completing this lab, you should understand:

  • DNS investigation

  • DNS query interpretation

  • DNS response analysis

  • domain-to-IP correlation

  • DNS frequency analysis

  • web/proxy log analysis

  • URL analysis

  • HTTP method interpretation

  • HTTP response interpretation

  • redirect-chain analysis

  • download investigation

  • process-to-web correlation

  • user attribution

  • endpoint correlation

  • identity correlation

  • IOC correlation

  • multi-host scoping

  • DNS/web timeline reconstruction

  • exposure assessment

  • security-control validation

  • containment planning

  • SOC escalation

  • investigation reporting

A weak investigation looks like:

Suspicious Domain
DNS Query
Malware
Compromised Host

A professional investigation looks like:

Suspicious Domain
Identify Client
DNS Query
DNS Response
Resolved IP
Network Connection?
Proxy / Web Request?
Allowed / Blocked?
Redirect / Download?
User + Process
Endpoint + Identity
Other Hosts
Timeline
Scope
Evidence-Based Disposition

Always distinguish:

DNS Query
Web Access
DNS Resolution
Connection
Connection
Malicious Activity
HTTP 200
Legitimate Content
HTTP POST
Credential Theft
URL Request
File Download
File Download
Execution
IOC Match
Compromise
Periodic DNS
Command-and-Control
Many DNS Queries
DNS Tunneling

The strongest analyst does not stop at:

“This endpoint queried a suspicious domain.”

They continue until they can explain:

“Which endpoint and process generated the query, what address was returned, whether a subsequent web connection occurred, what the web server returned, whether content was downloaded or executed, what other systems were involved, and what security impact the evidence actually demonstrates.”

➡️ Lab 10 — SIEM Search, Filtering & Event Correlation

In the next lab, you will bring together the evidence sources used throughout the SOC track and investigate them from the perspective of a centralized SIEM.

You will work with:

  • time-range selection

  • event filtering

  • host searches

  • username searches

  • IP searches

  • domain searches

  • event-type searches

  • field-based filtering

  • pivots between data sources

  • related-event discovery

  • alert-to-event validation

  • authentication events

  • endpoint telemetry

  • DNS events

  • firewall events

  • proxy events

  • email events

  • timeline construction

  • saved searches

  • evidence export

  • investigation documentation

The methodology becomes:

Alert → Search → Filter → Pivot → Correlate → Timeline → Scope → Conclusion

And the central question will be:

“Can you use centralized security telemetry to move from one alert to the complete set of related events needed to explain what actually happened?”